

CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT No. 2

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD—FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR—SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets A through H.

- a. G-2, Hawaiian Department list of Intelligence Reports prepared by Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.
- b. G-2, CID memorandum, 12 September 1944, re Shinto Shrines and custodial detention of persons connected with shrines.
- c. War Department, Hq. Army Pearl Harbor Board memorandum, 7 September 1944, to C. G., POA, re Documentary Evidence.
- d. G-2, Hawaiian Department report re Japan, Foreign Relations and Domestic Conditions, 1 December 1942 (2 copies).
- e. Exhibit I—A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands Before, On, and After December 7, 1941.
- f. Exhibit II—December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands Through the Eyes of the Press.
- g. Hawaiian Department Summary of the Situation as of 7:30 a. m., 7 December 1941, dated 22 December 1941.
- h. Transcript of Trans-Pacific Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori.
- i. Radio from War Department to G-2, Hawaiian Department re Japanese negotiations, 27 November 1941.
- j. Informal report re Thailand.
- k. Army Contact Office memorandum, 1 August 1941, re Asama Maru and conditions in Japan.
- l. Radio from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 13 November 1941.
- m. Brief re Japanese magazine translation from the "Gendai", July 1941.
- n. Army Contact Office memorandum, 2 May 1941, re Comments on observations of a missionary.
- o. Memorandum for Colonel Bicknell, 1 August 1941, re Local Japanese Situation During the Period 26-31 July 1941.
- p. Copy of radio received 27 November 1941.
- q. Inter-Staff Routing Slip re Information re Japanese Situation.
- r. Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Assistant Naval Attache Shanghai.
- s. Radio re speeches made by Military Naval Officials urging population to unite and serve empire.
- bb. War Department letter, 5 August 1941, to Hawaiian Department transmitting letter from F. B. I. re information on Japan's entry into war dated 28 July 1941.
- t. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated November 1941 re Military Attache Report No. 23 dated 3 November 1941.
- u. G-2, H. H. D. Special Intelligence Report dated 17 October 1941 re New Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiki Tojo.
- v. Army Contact Office memorandum, 21 November 1941, re Seizure and Detention Plan (Japanese).
- w. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated January 1942 re M. A. Report entitled "Activities of Foreigners in Country. Mexico". (Distribution list and M. A. report attached.)
- y. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 re Japanese Residents of T. H.—Loyalty of—ONI report dated 28 November 1941 (attached).
- aa. Letter from Hq. Second Corps Area dated 28 November 1941 re George Paish (Paisn), w/FBI report same subject attached (2 copies).
- z. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 re French Indo-China.
- dd. MID, War Department, Summary of Information dated 18 August 1941 re Formosa.
- cc. M. A. Report dated 18 November 1941 re Japan, Military Agents.
- x. M. A. Report dated 3 November 1941 re Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft (Continued).
- ee. M. A. Report dated 28 October 1941 re Japan.
- ff. M. A. Report dated 23 October 1941 re Formosa.
- gg. M. A. Report dated 2 October 1941 re Japan.
- hh. M. A. Report dated 25 September 1941 re French Indo-China.

- ii. M. A. Report dated 25 September 1941 re Thailand.
- jj. M. A. Report dated 10 September 1941 re Japan and Japanese Relations.
- kk. M. A. Report dated 19 August 1941 re Airports in S. W. Pacific and Australasia.
- ll. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated August 1941, w/M. A. Report dated 19 August 1941 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.
- mm. M. A. Report dated 14 August 1941 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.
- nn. Inter-Staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND report dated 9 February 1942 re Fifth Column Activities at Pearl Harbor, T. H.
- oo. Inter-Staff Routing Slip w/WD Radio No. 628, 12 December 1941, re Japanese Spy Activities.
- pp. Memorandum, 12 December 1941, re Dormer windowed houses in Kalama.
- qq. FBI memorandum to ONI dated 4 January 1942 re Japanese Consulate Activities.
- rr. Copy of radio "638 12th".
- ss. Inter-staff Routing Slip dated February 1942 w/14ND Report dated 9 February 1942 re Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 5th Column Activities at.
- tt. Letter dated 3 December 1941 from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
- uu. Extract from ONI report dated 9 December 1941 re Report of activities, Maui, Lanai and Molakai, since 7 December 1941 (2 cys.).
- vv. Report, 12 December 1941, by R. C. Miller re Katsuro Miho.
- ww. Memorandum re ONI and FBI agents to Lanikai and Kalama to observe unusual activities.
- xx. Memorandum dated 17 December 1941 from R. A. Cooke, Jr., re John Waterhouse house at Kailua.
- yy. Memorandum dated 12 December 1941 re Dr. Tokue Takahashi.
- zz. Extract from Army & Navy Register, 8 July 1939—"The Spy Game".
- aaa. Four coded messages from Togo to Rijoji.

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A

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

Private File—Lieutenant Col. B. M. Meurlott—No File Number

G-2, Hawaiian Department Intelligence Reports

Prepared at Army Contact Office, Honolulu

No.	Date	General Nature of Contents
1	24 June 1941-----	General for Pacific area: Burma Road, New Caledonia mining, New Zealand troop training, Thailand Japanese merchants, Australia propaganda, economic and troop training, Japanese economic pressure in N. E. I., petroleum, agriculture, banking in N. E. I., Japan propaganda, economic warfare, petroleum, agriculture, banking, harbor defense, airways.
2	14 August 1941-----	General for Pacific area: Japan propaganda, general economic, harbors, mandated islands; Australia petroleum; N. E. I., petroleum, airports; Burma Road.
3	19 August 1941-----	China, general economic; Formosa harbor defense.
4	19 August 1941-----	Airports in S. W. Pacific: Canton I., Fiji, New Caledonia, Australia, New Guinea, N. E. I.
5	25 August 1941-----	Sprattly and Adjacent Islands and reefs.
6	5 September 1941----	Burma Road.
7	10 September 1941----	Japan and Japanese relations.
8	25 September 1941----	Thailand: Japan attempting to dominate Thai thought, business and government.
9	25 September 1941----	French Indo-China: Gloomy picture of present conditions.
10	25 September 1941----	China: Shanghai economic conditions, Burma Road, Suggling, casualties, air alarm system, raids.
11	25 September 1941----	Japan: foreign relations, economic conditions coal, iron, ironworks, foreign advisors, mobilization, conscription in Formosa, Palau, Yap, Manchurian frontier, troop movement, naval organization, construction, movement, mine laying, airways, air movement.

G-2, Hawaiian Department Intelligence Reports—Continued

No.	Date	General Nature of Contents
12	25 September 1941..	Dakar.
13	29 September 1941..	Japan: aerodromes.
14	29 September 1941..	Japan: movement northward, profits at Shanghai, intelligence services, war policies.
15	2 October 1941.....	Japan: treatment of foreigners, petroleum, troop movements, troops in French Indo-China.
16	3 October 1941.....	Fiji: summary from South Seas Weekly re RAF selectees, military training, military hospital.
17	3 October 1941.....	New Guinea Mandate: capital removed from Rabaul to Lae. (Summary from P. I. M.)
18	9 October 1941.....	China: oil fields near Suchow, transportation, airways, inhabitants.
19	11 October 1941.....	Dutch East Indies: political conditions.
20	23 October 1941.....	Formosa: foreign relations, volunteers to army, loyalty to Japan, fortifications, war planes, air raid precautions.
21	28 October 1941.....	Japan: foreign relations, raw materials and manufacture, oil, gasoline, iron, tungsten, rice, rubber, lampblack, steel, motor cars, rubber products, motorcycles, concrete, war morale of civil population, troop mobilization, embarkation points, airports, anti-aircraft, para-troops.
22	1 November 1941....	French Oceania: political situation.
23	3 November 1941....	Japan: aerodromes and aircraft factories, types of aircraft.
24	6 November 1941....	French Indo-China: airfields.
25	18 November 1941..	Japan: Japanese agents and military activities abroad; German agents and advisers in Japan; German raiders.
26	19 November 1941..	Japan: aerodromes, aircraft factories, types and movements of aircraft, para-troop training.
27	26 November 1941..	Australian air force and repair facilities.
28	1 December 1941....	Japan: foreign relations and domestic conditions.
29	9 January 1942.....	Japan: vital points in Nagasaki city.
30	14 January 1942....	Japan: Island of Kyushu, vital points in communication system.
31	23 February 1942....	Trans-Pacific air route suggested.
32	1 June 1942.....	Korea: large factory at Honan.
33	26 June 1942.....	Japan: Aluminium plant at Shimizu.
	3 January 1942.....	Memorandum on the Loo Choo Islands as a possible point of allied attack. (Spencer.)

Reports produced by Army Contact Office, Hq. Haw. Dept., Honolulu

Digest of Contemporary opinions on current topics in the Japanese Press. (Biweekly up to Nov. 5, 1941; final issue, Nov. 29, 1941, covered period Nov. 6-25, 1941.)

Distribution:

G-2 WD, 3.

S-2 Scho. Bks. 1.

G-2 24th Div. 1.

G-2 25th Div. 1.

F. B. I. (Hon.) 2.

O. N. I. (Hon.) 2.

File.

G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation.

Last estimates produced were: 17 October 1941, 25 October 1941.

Distribution: same as for Digest, above.

(Extracts from the above are given in Exhibit herewith.)

Military Intelligence Reports (periodic).

(See list and sample copy herewith.)

Counter-Intelligence Estimates. 350.05 at Shafter 1941 to 1942.

No. 7 was issued for period 16 to 30 November 1941.

Distributed to all M. I. Sections of Hawaiian Dept., 10 copies to ONI and 5 to FBI.

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HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence

Counter Intelligence Division

Box 3, APO 456

In reply refer to:

12 SEPTEMBER 1944.

Memorandum for Major Meurlott:

Total Shinto Shrines—55 (about 12 of these are independent shrines)

OK per Capt. Iwai.

Total Shinto Priests	49	(about 15 of these individuals were connected with the independent shrines)
" " Priestesses	9	OK per Capt. Iwai.
" " Asst. Priests	24	
	82	
Total in Custodial Detention	38	

Priests

CD on mainland	20
Paroled on mainland	3
Paroled in T. H.	2
CD and then repatriated to Japan	4

29

Priestesses

CD on mainland	3
Paroled in T. H.	1
CD and then repatriated to Japan	1
Released	2

7

Assistant Priests

CD on mainland	1
Paroled in T. H.	1

2

Total deceased	} Prior to 7 December 1941
Total in Japan	

WAR DEPARTMENT,
HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD,
7 September 1944.

Memorandum:

To: Commanding General, USAFPOA.

Subject: Documentary Evidence.

1. It is requested that you make available to the Board, named by War Department, to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces on the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, the following documents, to wit:

a. All data in whatever form, relating to the Japanese-American relations received by the Hawaiian Department from the War Department during the period January 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941; including movements of the Japanese armed forces and probable Japanese actions.

b. Similar data received by the Hawaiian Department during the same period from and through the Navy.

c. Similar data received by the Hawaiian Department during the same period from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

d. All reports relating to Japanese activities, both military and civil, made by G-2 of the Hawaiian Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, or others for said period, including G-2 summaries.

- e. All messages take from the Japanese Consulate on December 7, 1941, or subsequent to said date.
- f. Documents captured from Japanese invading forces on or about December 7, 1941.
- g. All correspondence or other writings relative to the alert of June 17, 1940.
- h. All orders for close-in reconnaissance by aircraft or other agencies for the period January 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941.
- i. Secret report of Colonel Capron describing damage to structures in Honolulu on December 7, 1941.
- j. Letter of transmittal to War Department of SOP of November 5, 1941.
- k. Report of Colonel Berquist upon his return from school in 1941 in which he discussed air warning service, stations and information centers, and generally the employment of Radar.
- l. Memorandum of General Staff asking study of air situation in Hawaii.
- m. Pattern of bombings by Japanese.
- n. Copy of record of trial against Kuhn in Hawaii.
- o. Herron's Field Order #1.
- p. Complete file of O. N. I. of message taken by F. B. I. from Hawaii R. C. A. file.
- q. Army's A—B lists in 1941.
- r. Navy's estimates based on presence of carriers in the Marshalls.
2. It has come to the attention of the Board that an exchange of information by the O. N. I. and G-2, Hawaiian Department was made during said period by means of teletype. Are there any records of these exchanges?
3. Procedure for obtaining the described documents desired to be used as evidence by the Board can be agreed upon.

/s/ George Grunert,
 GEORGE GRUNERT,
*Lieutenant General,
 President.*

Classification: Confidential
 Enclosures: No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
 WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS & DOMESTIC CONDITIONS.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Business men, journalists, and missionaries returning from Far East.
 Reliability believed good except as indicated.

Summarization of Report

When required:

1. Japan's relationship with Dutch East Indies, China, U. S. S. R., and New Caledonia.
2. Japan's internal conditions: Tojo cabinet, conditions in Korea, conditions in Japan.

1. FOREIGN RELATIONS

A. *With Dutch East Indies.* A. D. E. I. officials, en route from Singapore to Dutch West Indies, stated on 26 November that there is a strong feeling against Japanese in D. E. I. and that the attitude on the part of the Japanese has been to "clear out" as quickly as possible. Source is certain that there were about 7,000 Japanese in D. E. I. in October 1941. Early in November 2,000 Japanese were evacuated, principally from Java. In mid-November 1,500 more were preparing to leave. Practically all of the Japanese were "business men", no laborers.

B. *With China.* American journalist, returning from Far East, reports that there are many military leaders of the Japanese army in China who do not want the "China incident" to end. They are making big money, and this war in China has developed into "the biggest racket the world has ever seen". On the other hand, the navy resents the army's opportunity for graft and is attempting to plug the smuggling holes.

C. *With U. S. S. R.* Vladivostok is a more important base than Singapore or Manila from which to launch an attack on Japan, according to an American journalist. The Soviets have 110 submarines there. Estimates made in Tokyo gave the Russian forces east of Lake Baikal as about 600,000 men before the start of the Russo-German war. Since then this eastern front steadily has been reinforced until now the number is estimated to exceed one million. Some of these may be recruits replacing withdrawn veterans. But it was believed in Japan that an actual withdrawal of men and planes would have to be made before a Japanese invasion would be practicable. Source believed that the establishment of an American expeditionary force at Vladivostok could change the whole situation.

D. *With New Caledonia.* Evidence is accumulating to indicate an offer on the part of Japanese to gain a "peaceful" footing in New Caledonia. A Japanese line of freighters is said to be carrying unmelted nickel ore to Japan in spite of a Franco-British agreement that the entire output be sold to Britain. The Japanese consulate in Noumea is believed to be primarily a "listening post". TOKITARO KUROKI in Consul. He is said to have asked the N.Y.N. agent in Honolulu to interest Vuric in Hawaii to move to New Caledonia. In July, 1941, Georges Peloea, chief engineer of a new Caledonia nickel mine, stated that there were about 2,000 Japanese "businessmen" in New Caledonia. Most of them had come as contract laborers, but now were small merchants, etc. "Le Bulletin de Commerce", Noumea, 7 August 1941, estimated the Japanese in New Caledonia to number 1074 men and 52 women. Of these 316 men and 31 women lived in Noumea. It is believed that Free French authorities in New Caledonia dare not make reprisals or economic discrimination against Japan because lack of military or naval protection leaves the island open to Japanese attack and occupation.

2. DOMESTIC CONDITIONS

A. *The Tojo Cabinet.* An American journalist from Japan states that the fact that General TOJO did not resign from the army before accepting the premiership is noteworthy. It tends to bring the army out into the open as the real rulers of the government. Now the army itself must be responsible to the people for governmental activities. The problem now is what can TOJO do with the army group. Only a ranking army officer would be able to keep the extremists in hand. TOJO is believed to be more anti-Russian than anti-British and American.

Premier Konoye's admission of "blame" for the China incident was thought to be a well understood hypocritical statement, pointing the finger of blame directly at the army group. Hence, the "tears in the eyes" of the War and Navy ministers.

B. *Conditions in Korea.* An American missionary, resident of Seoul since 1917, gives the following information:

The attitude of Koreans toward the Japanese is one of hopeless acquiescence. They are afraid to talk, even among themselves, as they do not know who may be spies. Japanese surveillance of the schools is very rigid. Once or twice a day an under-cover official would come to the schools to inquire about various matters. Japanese language was stressed as a cultural subject. Teachers were made to reprimand children talking Korean, even on the athletic field. In August 1940, all school children had to have Japanese names. Any meeting that is held must be reported to the police and a permit obtained for even the smallest gathering in a private home. Police representatives always are present.

The position of missionaries has been harder and harder. The pressure is not direct, but upon anyone associating with them. This has made the missionaries realize that they were doing more harm than good to the people they are trying to help. In November, 1941, there were only 12 missionaries left out of several hundred. Permits to missionaries are for one year only, and are not subject to renewal if they do not "play ball" with the Japanese. At times direct pressure has been brought to bear on missionaries. In one instance a woman missionary was "detained" for questioning for about a month in a dark cell. Physical punishment has been occasional, but it is uncommon for Japanese to give punishments which leave marks of any kind.

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Strict censorship with the outside world prevents word of true conditions from getting through. Source states that it takes mail about three months to get out.

Present conscription by Japan of Korean youths is called "voluntary", but is far from it. In the summer of 1940 the Japanese called for a volunteer regiment, but obtained a bare 200 enlistments.

Source stated that many of the poorer class of Koreans were selling everything they had and were moving north into Manchukuo where they hoped to enjoy a better status as Japanese subjects. From this group the Japanese have been enlisting men to do their "dirty work", such as smuggling, spying, dope peddling, etc.

Source recommended that organization engaged in collecting money in the United States for Korean nationalist programs should be watched carefully, as he believed that the funds fell into private hands and were not being used for purposes for which intended.

C. CONDITIONS IN JAPAN

(1) An American missionary who lived many years in Japan up to last August, reports as follows:

The government does not like to have Japanese soldiers return from China, being afraid they will talk. The few who come back do not talk about the war. None of the seriously wounded soldiers are sent back to Japan. They are sent to Formosa. No casualty lists are posted in Japan. Parents are informed after about three months of the death of a son. Source believes that only about one-third of the parents are so informed. Source stated that many returning soldiers are intolerable and are unable to settle down to normal life. Many of them are diseased.

All telephone calls from city to city have to be carried on in Japanese. One English word would cause the operator to cut in on the line and remind you of the regulations. Even on the streets, if a Japanese person speaks to you in English it is likely that some other person will tell your friend that his language is good enough. Source believed that Germans are handling the censorship, especially of mails.

The average Japanese is said to feel more friendly toward Americans than toward any other foreigners. They dislike the British very much. Germans also are much disliked, especially as they make no pretense of covering up their contempt for the Japanese.

Source believes that food restrictions are handled very well by the government. At such times as New Years, restrictions are eased, so that people forget their hardships and praise the Government. Such relaxing of restrictions builds up morale in the people when it is most needed. Last July no food could be taken from one province to another.

Travel was restricted the latter part of last July. Special permits had to be obtained to get railroad tickets to go from one province to another on business.

The government first gave advice in regard to limiting amusements. When this was not taken seriously, the government issued bans on various amusements, such as dancing, and curtailed the movies. Students at high schools and universities were made to wear their school uniforms at all times. They could attend movies only on Saturdays and Sundays. They were forbidden to go into certain parts of the city, principally armament areas.

In Osaka (residence of source) blackouts were staged about twice a year and lasted about two weeks. The city was divided into about ten zones, each further subdivided into smaller units, the smallest being a group of ten houses. Meetings were held frequently amongst the members of this smallest group, the chairman being chosen by representatives of the ten houses. Each house had a bucket of water and box of sand on hand at all times. Each house paid dues, according to their means, to buy fire-fighting equipment. The next larger division, about one or two city blocks, purchased the equipment. Each house has three flags to be hung out in front: a red flag warns that enemy raiders are overhead, red and white that the raid is lessening, and yellow, all clear. This —(copy illegible)—word from house to house if communications break down.

(2) A returning American business man states that Indo-China rice is distasteful to the people of Japan; but the supply is adequate to meet all their needs. The people are willing to let the army have the best food and other supplies, because the army has the popular reputation of being made up of patriots. The people of Japan have little knowledge as to the graft and corruption which exists among Japanese army officers in China.

There have been no new motor cars in Japan since the start of the China incident. Gasoline is so closely guarded that sampan owners are unable to get enough to go fishing, hence, a shortage of fish.

(3) *Shortage of gasoline indicated.* Master of a tanker reports the conspicuous absence of Japanese fishing vessels, in October, from waters near the

Marshall Islands where on previous voyages he had seen numerous fishing sampans. He believed that it was caused by lack of fuel.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

G-2, HAWN. DEPT.
Copies furnished to
ONI
FBI

Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

Report No. 28.

Page —

Date: 1 December 1941.

[1] EXHIBIT I.—A STUDY OF THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS BEFORE, ON, AND AFTER DECEMBER 7, 1941

1. ESPIONAGE

a. Agents and Agencies.—In an examination of documents and confidential publications of various government departments, there appears the common declaration that Japanese espionage activities have largely been centralized in the Consular Offices, in addition to the more specialized Army and Navy intelligence functions. There were more than two hundred Japanese Consular Agents strategically located throughout the islands. Potential assistants, agencies, etc., are discussed hereafter in detail.

b. Sources of Information.—Obtaining of information was done mainly through multitudes of observations, reports and studies of thousands of commercial travelers, students, tourists, purchasing commissions, as well as agents in the guise of "priests", hundreds of thousands of photographs, a most comprehensive and minute analysis of practically any subject, and by Japanese Language School principals.

c. Transmission of Information.—Apparently all information of an urgent character was handled through the local Consulate, and transmitted by coded radio to Japan up to and including the evening of December 6, 1941; and it somewhat significant that local Japanese who might have had desirable information were apparently contacted at their homes or places of business by members of the Consulate staff.

[2] *d. Analysis of principal sources and type of information.*—An analysis of the information available to agents of Japan and which was largely used in the December 7th attack, was obtained through casual observation, publications and periodicals, as well as from various Territorial and Federal published reports. Maps and circulars issued by the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, the Chamber of Commerce, Territorial Planning Commission and other similar bodies, furnished accurate and complete details as to roads, public utilities such as water mains, electric power networks, telephone cables, and other such vital data.

High level vantage points on the surrounding hills offered ideal spots for photography which would show, in completed detail, the layout of Pearl Harbor, in complete detail, with the complete berthing arrangements of vessels when the Fleet was in port. Layouts of the principal airfields were equally accessible to photography and sketching operations.

A drive around the island of Oahu afforded full details of beaches, possible landing points, some of the coast defense installations, and landmarks such as prominent buildings, churches and chimneys and other such data.

In summation—other than for details as to technical description of equipment, war plans, and other classified data—an espionage system, as such, was not required to fulfill their needs under existing local conditions.

[3] From all of the foregoing, it can be assumed that any trained espionage group, other than that made up of various members of the consulate staff and visiting Japanese officials need not have been organized because of its non-necessity. There was the usual chain of Consular Agents, Shinto priests, language school principals and outstanding alien business leaders upon whom the Consulate could call for such meager details required to fill any gaps in each analysis of geographic, economic, political, or strategic subjects.

The seizure and holding in custody of the group outlined in the foregoing paragraph, in addition to other individuals who were suspected of subversive activities would logically appear to include the majority of possible leaders for such an espionage system. This action has been taken.

2. SABOTAGE AND FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES

As regards the question of planned sabotage or Fifth Column activities, it is significant to note that no local investigational agency has been able to determine any single fact which would definitely indicate that such activities have been planned or existed.

While we see definite, long-term activities and plans in such localities as the Dutch East Indies, which date back to 1915, none of these can be found in similar form here in Honolulu.

There have been but few purely Japanese businesses solely dependent upon the Japanese Government for support here in Honolulu as was the case in the Dutch East Indies. The N. Y. K. [4] had a most legitimate reason to exist here from a commercial transportation angle, the Sumitomo Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank were also maintained on a somewhat logical economic reason due to the large Japanese population and the heavy trade with Japan. While other alien companies did exist, with some degree of Japanese control through stock ownership, they were relatively unimportant and did not involve large spheres of influence.

Small merchants, businesses and professions were largely of Japanese nature but purely economic in their endeavor. Due to local patronage and the maintenance of large stocks of Japanese foodstuffs and supplies, these did a profitable business.

It is quite true that the Japanese aliens held a large portion of the economic control of such endeavors, but this was largely due to local conditions, their liberties under American ideas of free trade and not through any exercise of control or endeavor on the part of the Japanese government. There was a certain amount of resentment and jealousy directed toward these successful aliens by certain white elements of the business community, but largely because they were successful, knew their rights under American laws and customs and insisted upon exercising them. It is but natural that a white distributor would resent being taken to task by an Oriental retailer, but usually the retailer was right and could force the distributor to acquiesce to his demand. This has resulted in the building up of a certain amount of anti-Japanese feeling [5] but this should not be interpreted as being caused by any disloyal or subversive acts on the part of the Japanese individuals concerned.

There are also certain distasteful businesses which did not attract the local white population but which were profitable and lucrative. To the objectionable features the Japanese took no exception inasmuch as their sense of thrift could see the advantage. An example of this is the hog raising industry. The Japanese saw all of the possibilities and went in to the venture encouraged by the white population. As an adjunct the garbage collection system, to feed the hogs, was built up. The citizens were glad to receive small monthly payments for this waste material, and the City and County was greatly relieved in not having to maintain a large garbage collection department. In a comparatively short time these endeavors became a Japanese monopoly including collection of garbage from Army Posts and Camps. This was a most profitable business but it was not motivated by a Japanese nationalistic plot to obtain military information, as some would have it believed; and because these individuals amassed money and property is no indication of Imperial Government subsidy to cover espionage activities carried on by ignorant, non-English speaking aliens. The possibilities of such, however, is not to be overlooked. It is recognized that the very nature of their work provided potentially good fields for gaining military information.

[6] These presumably law abiding and legitimate business structures may be sharply contrasted to the activities of the Japanese Oceanic Bonito and Tunny Fishing Company and other similar Japanese government controlled and operated organizations which arrogantly and openly defied the authorities of the Dutch East Indies. (Attached hereto as Appendix — are copies of reports made by several organizations to the local Japanese Consulate.)

There has been abundant evidence that visiting Japanese vessels have brought individual officials who openly did all possible to maintain nationalistic and cultural ties between the local Japanese and their homeland. Japanese Language

Schools were allowed to flourish with their constant endeavor to impress on the second and third generation their fealty to the Fatherland. Many societies have been expected to aid in Japanese national endeavors, furnish comfort kits to the Army and offer financial aid to the Imperial Government in specific projects. While it is true that all of these activities have had their very objectionable features there appears no likelihood that any such endeavors have been directed toward the organization of Fifth Column elements or sabotage organizations.

[7] *a. Japanese Press.*—So far as this office has been able to determine, no attempt has ever been made by the Japanese Government to control, financially or through any channels, the publication of local newspapers. No campaigns have been initiated in the local Japanese language papers which would tend to unit the Japanese population against any other portion of the citizenry.

There have been expressions of pro-Japanese sentiments and pro-Axis sentiments, as well as some destructive criticisms and anti-American comments, but not in a manner or degree which could be termed a general anti-American attitude.

In specific local cases when it appeared that Japanese nationals or descendants were being discriminated against by proposed laws, regulations or rules these same papers did carry editorials and other comments in protest in much the same manner as would be true with any of the American press organizations.

Speaking generally the attitude of the local Japanese press has been normal, with a considerable amount of pro-Japanese expression as regards the war with China, but this may have been largely due to economic reasons such as the maintaining of a high level of circulation and the sale of advertising space to alien individuals and firms. Their has been no indication however that their policy was controlled financially or otherwise by the Japanese government.

[8] *b. Political Control.*—There is no substantial evidence of any Japanese attempts to control the local political situation other than such activities which were directed by white politicians and their Japanese or Japanese-descendent henchmen. It is true that legislators, supervisors and other officials in office have been elected by the Japanese-descendent citizen vote but the actual control of any legislation or selection of officials solely by a Japanese bloc has not been observed during the past years. Election of Japanese candidates solely by their own nationals vote has never occurred and no such candidate running on purely racial lines has ever been elected. In fact the contrary seems the case when Dr. Kurisaki ran for the position of supervisor and solicited the Japanese vote, even to the extent of having the priests speak in Japanese over the radio. He was defeated by a huge vote, losing his own district.

So far, the Japanese citizens have usually preferred to elect a white candidate as they apparently considered him to be "more suitable" as a political leader. Legislators claim that no single Japanese leader or member of the Legislature can obtain enough control to sway legislation even should they make an attempt (which they have never done).

In recent sessions of the legislature, the Japanese opposed the Wages and Hours Act. This was for economic reasons due to its effect through the establishment of a minimum wage which would greatly affect the small merchant, restaurant keeper, etc. They were unable to swing this opposition successfully, [9] hence traded their opposition to the Pier 15 Bill to the Dillingham interests who in return supported their bloc of the Wages and Hours Act.

It is regrettable to state, in connection with this phase of the discussion, that the Japanese vote has in the past greatly influenced the statements, actions and practices of many of the white politicians. While such an undesirable feature, as the continuation of the Japanese language schools, has been a subject of much investigation and proposed legislation, the matter has always been handled most gingerly and with a view toward the effect upon the individual's political future. It is believed that both protective and advisable precautionary measures have been, in the past, fogged and tabled because of such considerations.

In conclusion, it might be pointed out, that despite the fact that so far there has been no evidence of establishment of Japan's political bloc control, and no indications of any political influence having been wielded by the Japanese people or officials which was motivated or dictated by the Japanese government, there is a distinct possibility that such may eventuate should Japanese cultural efforts be permitted to thrive without proper American supervision. The economic, political, and social subjugation of these islands could eventually be achieved by first providing an appropriate cultural foundation; and is certainly within the realm of possible long-ranged Japanese planning.

[10] At present we must ~~need~~ reckon with the fact that there is a certain amount of leadership exercised by the Japanese-descendent political leader over his particular group or supporters, hence they are potential "leaders". Whether such leadership would be subversive or detrimental to the defense of these islands in the event of an invasion is problematic, but a list of these individuals is prepared and they can all be seized immediately if such action would appear desirable to the Department Commander.

c. Japanese Propaganda and Local Japanese.—This office is of the opinion that it is highly significant to note that Japanese official radio propaganda programs, which have been directed solely toward the Japanese in Hawaii, have been free from any actively dangerous propaganda both prior to and since December 7, 1941.

We have observed the "softening" processes effected by this means of propaganda directed toward French Indo-China, Thailand, the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, Burma, India and even Australia. In these instances there has been a definite attempt to drive wedges between the governments of those countries, the Japanese and the local inhabitants. Propaganda directed toward Australia has been designed to create dissention between the Australians and the British by showing how the Australian soldiers were victimized by the Home Government.

[11] Programs directed toward Hawaii have not contained such propaganda. There have been the constant reminders, to the children, of their loyalty to parents and the Emperor, the recitations of Japanese customs and culture, but no attempt to bring any anti-American feeling or active support to Japan. Appreciation of the Japanese soldiers for the comfort kits and letters from the Japanese children of Hawaii has been frequently expressed.

It would seem that no one in Tokyo has thought of the amount of trouble which could be caused by calling the attention of the local-born Japanese to the lack of confidence which his adopted home (Hawaii) has toward him. There is every reason to believe that the war measures which have been put in effect and directed against these local people could form the subject of a radio program which would bring doubt, discord and mistrust more prominently into their minds. The reasons for such an ineffective policy are obscure and may be the result of several logical deductions:

(a) Distrust of the local (Hawaiian) Japanese elements by the Japanese government itself.

(b) Hawaii considered to be outside of the present sphere of the "Greater East Asia" control plans.

(c) That other more effective means for the accomplishment of their objectives have been completed.

(d) The assumption that any such programs would be useless due to restrictions imposed on local short-wave reception.

[12] (e) The knowledge or belief on the part of the Japanese government that the inciting of any dissention, sabotage or subversive activity would immediately result in the seizure and internment of Japanese and Japanese descendent residents of Hawaii.

It seems that the first-mentioned deduction, (distrust of the local Japanese) should be given first consideration. It is most noteworthy to learn that the Japanese government has shown a marked suspicious attitude toward second-generation Japanese who have gone to Japan for a visit. Many of these have returned to Hawaii with stories of surveillance; and their inability to properly speak the homeland tongue, unfamiliarity with customs and irksome practices, have resulted in a loss of any desire to ever again return to Japan.

It must also be realized, by the Japanese government as well as it is by us, that many of the old aliens have no further interests in their land of birth, other than spiritually. Their children have been brought up under American ideals, culture and in association with white children, having only a small portion of their time spent in the language schools and under home influence. Their daily routine has brought them closer to American ways of life, freedom of thought, exposure to the American press and motion pictures, while their sports and recreations have been shared with other American children, hence the preponderance of influence is contrary to the Japanese scheme of life. They have also intermingled freely [13] with young people of the various races common to Hawaii, and thus become far more cosmopolitan and democratic than their parents could ever become.

There is much evidence to show that these old aliens have, in many cases, a genuine desire to provide for the safety and future welfare of their children here in Hawaii and hence have lost all idea of returning to Japan. For many years they have lived under American freedom, they have prospered, their rela-

tives in Japan have died and the only future remaining for them is to see their children secure, and then pass out of the picture themselves. Any subversive action or act of sabotage on their part would bring discredit and disgrace, not to themselves necessarily, but to their children who have the interest of the United States more keenly at heart.

All of the foregoing factors and considerations are quite contrary to those found in French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and Burma, where they consider themselves a superior race rather than inferior.

It is therefore quite possible that the Japanese government could, with all propriety, question the 100% loyalty of the local (Hawaiian) Japanese. In other words, perhaps both governments find themselves in the same quandary when attempting to establish probability and degree of loyalty of these subjects.

[14] It can therefore be easily assumed that Japan has little use for Hawaii, at present, in her "Asia for the Asiatics" policy other than that dictated by a purely military or naval point of view.

There is nothing to be found here as compared to the oil and minerals of the Dutch East Indies, or the rubber plantations of Malaya and Burma. Hence, her ideas of domination of Hawaii could be discarded for the present save for its strategic value, which in the military control of the Pacific, is high. Whether this value is rated high enough, at this stage of affairs, to warrant another very costly attack is a question to be decided by the strategists but, from the propaganda point of view, this has not made any strong appearance.

Considering the third reason for the lack of attention to the radio (that other more effective means for the accomplishment of their objectives have been completed), no evidence has been found which conclusively indicates any such plan; and to evaluate the possible existence of any such plans, we must first consider what their objective might be.

Since the start of the war, the Japanese Government has fully realized that no large, alien radio audience would be allowed to listen to language programs emanating in Japan, [15] hence a great portion of the propaganda value of such programs would be wasted. Restrictions as to radio reception, which have been placed upon residents of Japan, have been reported as being severe and rigidly enforced; and it is presumed that the Japanese would anticipate equally stringent regulations to be instituted by the government of the United States.

Current programs from Japan indicate that the Japanese have anticipated a large proportion of their expected audience would be American, as they have been rendered in English with special emphasis on spreading confusion, doubt and misinformation in regard to the efforts made which are in contradiction to the policies of the United States government. The inclusion of personal messages from prisoners of war has been interspersed in an attempt to keep Americans listening to the entire program in order to be sure of hearing a message from a member of the family. There has not been any similar or substitute method for attracting the attention of the alien Japanese, or the American citizens of Japanese ancestry.

[16] It is known that the radio broadcasting channels were to be used to transmit definite indications of decisive actions to come, prior to December 7, but this information was to be picked up only by the Consular staff and there is no reason to believe that any other persons, aliens or citizen, were aware of this secret code arrangement. This would tend to strengthen the supposition that the espionage system was built along lines to cover the situation up to the time when the attack was made but that no elaborate plans had been worked out for the continuation of such acts after the war had definitely begun.

From the point of possible espionage, sabotage or subversive organization, there is no reason to believe that the Japanese government could anticipate the protective action which we might initiate. There has been an abundance of open talk in that respect for many years past of which the entire Japanese population was well aware. Those rumored plans ranged from incarcerating all such citizens on one of the outside islands to evacuation camps located in various valleys of the island of Oahu.

In other words, there always has been great apprehension as to the drastic steps which would be taken against the Japanese in case of war. On this trend of thought we must be sure that the Japanese government was fully informed and therefore would be somewhat in doubt as to the effectiveness of any subversive organization after the outbreak of hostilities. Furthermore, there are the racial characteristics [17] involved, and no Japanese agent could carry on extensive secret, undercover, activities. With the entire population aroused as to potential sabotage and fifth column activities, the use of Japanese

nationals or descendants would appear to be quite a hazardous undertaking. Because of this line of reasoning we have assumed, at all times, that any great amount of continuing sabotage or espionage activities would involve the use of low-class unprincipled, or traitorous individuals of either American or European antecedents. It is for this reason that especial attention has been directed toward the German, Italian and communistic elements of the local population. Concrete results have been obtained in the case of Otto Kuhn who definitely contacted the Japanese Consulate with subversive intent.

These endeavors are subject to present and future close examination and investigation with a view to ascertaining any connection between the Japanese government and local paid agents.

With regard to the fifth reason for the non-existence of any direct, dangerous radio propaganda, we may safely assume that the Japanese government believes that swift retribution would follow should any revolutionary or concerted subversive action be undertaken by the local Japanese population. This could quite possibly be contrary to the plan of Japanese strategy, as it would seem entirely preferable from the military point of view, especially the Japanese version, to have as many potential assistants, fifth columnists and guerillas available to assist in a landing operation rather than have them inaccessible in concentration or detention camps.

[18] *d. Furthermore*, the confusion of moving large numbers of Japanese citizens, the inability of troops to differentiate between local Japanese and landed Japanese troops not uniformed would be momentous. Aid and assistance granted to the invaders would be of enormous value and far greater than any organized sabotage efforts made prior to such an invasion. We therefore do not discount this very possible angle and believe it may be one of the principal reasons why the radio propaganda has not been more actively dangerous up to the present time.

Some effects of Japanese Radio Propaganda.—The effect to date of the radio propaganda which has dealt with the Japanese war effort as directed against the Hawaiian Islands has resulted in greatly nullifying its value on local residents of Japanese origin. For example, the Japanese story of the great damage done by the submarine attack on Hilo, Hawaii, was clearly false and the Japanese residents of that city knew this to be a fact. In a comparatively short time these facts also became known to all the residents of other islands of the Hawaiian group. This was also true in the case of the single plane night raid against the island of Oahu, March 4, 1942, when the Tokyo Broadcast falsely claimed extensive damage done at Pearl Harbor. Instances of this type have resulted in causing the local Japanese to greatly discredit propaganda emanating from that source. Hence, it is quite possible that they would seriously consider the authenticity of any effort put forth to initiate a program of subversion in these islands.

[19] *e. Japanese Families Divided in Thought.*—A further argument against the possible existence of any subversive or sabotage ring among the Japanese, consideration must be turned again toward the second and third generation.

It has been outlined heretofore that these younger members of the race are subjected to strong American influences. There have been large numbers of cases where it is known that open conflict exists within the families due to the fact that the younger members refused to see eye to eye with their parents on matters of Japanese loyalty. A great number of cases are recorded where the second-generation youth refused to file his claim for deferment of military service with the Japanese Consul and the father, or head of the family, has executed this act without the knowledge of the subject. We have also found numerous cases where the parents, or head of the family, have protested when the second-generation son has filed request for expiration of Japanese citizenship.

In other words, we do know of many instances where the second-generation son has thrown his loyalty to the side of the United States, and even tried to sway the older member of the family to invest in American securities, follow American customs and disregard the established Japanese customs and ways of life. It would therefore be necessary that any plots or plans on the part of the older aliens be kept entirely secret from the younger generation which would be relatively quite a problem.

[20] *f. Miscellaneous Reasons—Why no Sabotage?*—Much argument has been indulged in as to the significance of there having been no single authenticated report of sabotage or subversive activity on the part of the local Japanese on December 7, 1941, or since that time.

While rumors ran rampant and stories of such actions were sidely circulated, nothing has ever been substantiated by any investigative agency. To analyse this particular problem, it is necessary to scan the record of known facts, to piece this out with logical assumptions and apply the positive results of recent investigations.

First of all, we can safely state that the objective of the attack was to cripple the naval and air arms in such manner as to prevent United States interference with Japan's program of attack in the Orient. The success of such a mission depended solely upon the element of surprise which enjoined absolute secrecy on the part of the enemy. Any one individual, Japanese or of any other nationality, who was made cognizant of these plans introduced a serious chance of exposure. Assuming such a case, it would first be necessary to convey the information to such a hypothetical person. Radio, telephone, mail, or cable communication could never be trusted for such an important message (again assuming the fact that the Japanese government would never believe that we were naive enough to allow these channels of communications to continue without surveillance during a period of extremely strained relations). [21] It is most probable that such a message would have to be divulged only by veiled insinuation, special courier or coded data in commercial radio broadcasts emanating in Japan.

We do know that there were messages received in the Japanese consulate which carried thinly veiled warnings that the situation was fast approaching the breaking point but no definite dates were mentioned. It was also apparent that the arrival of Ambassador Kurusu, on November 12, 1941, enroute to Washington held possibilities of personal instructions being conveyed. His progressive engagements, held on the night of his presence in Honolulu, at various locations such as the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, the Japanese Consulate, the Sunchoro Tea House, indicate that there was ample opportunity for important matters to be discussed with the Consul; and his constant moving about gave rise to the thought that these matters were being carefully guarded.

The only concrete evidence to the effect that the Japanese Consul in Honolulu had any idea as to when hostilities would begin was to be found in a notation on his private desk calendar under date of December 1, 1941, when he had written in Japanese "within the predictable future". We believe that it is thus safe to assume that he did not know exactly when operations would begin. It was quite possible that he was verbally informed of the general plan of the government but we seriously doubt that he had specific information that the attack on Pearl Harbor would be made at 7:55 a. m. on December 7, 1941. If such were the case, with the highest ranking and [22] most confidential agent of the Japanese government in Hawaii, stories of maids, garbage collectors, small merchants and laborers being aware of this fact can be dismissed as idle talk and the product of fantastic imagination on the part of individuals who knew nothing of all the facts involved.

Many of the above-mentioned facts are a result of investigations made since December 7, 1941. We know from examination of records that the Consulate was fully informed of fleet movements, names of ships, berthing positions and such similar data, and that this information was forwarded promptly by radio to Tokyo. This data was obtained, personally, by a member of the Japanese Consulate staff who visited vantage points on Pearl City peninsula to make the necessary observations.

There is also the Mori case where vital military information was exchanged with Tokyo on December 5, 1941, under the guise of a press interview. It is particularly significant that this was via radio telephone. Both radio telephone telegraph and radio telephone traffic could logically have been intercepted by ships of the Japanese fleet between Hawaii and Japan.

The fact that the Japanese Consulate was interested in getting information to ships laying off the Hawaiian Islands by radio, commercial broadcast advertisements, visual signals such as sheets, lights and fires has been made a matter of record through the evidence developed in the Kuhn case. Here we find our suspect German involved with the Consulate espionage system bearing out our previous suspicion of the use of some [23] of these means.

g. Investigation of captured maps and other data bears out the contention that no extensive espionage system, other than that definitely centered in the Consulate staff and Consular agents, as heretofore outlined, was needed to obtain the material required for their compilation.

Thus far we can see that the tactical plan was complete with no necessity for use of the weapon of sabotage to carry out the objective of the mission. Further-

more, the attack was such a complete surprise, to the Japanese residents themselves, that they were stunned and incoherent for a few days to follow. Casualties included a number of Japanese, property destroyed was not exclusive of that of Japanese ownership. There was no individual act, even fanatical, to indicate the slightest suspicion of any plans to carry out further acts of confusion or sabotage.

The absence of sabotage on December 7, 1941, is not proof that plans for such could not exist but it is evident that there was neither necessity or intention to use this weapon for the objective in view by that particular operation.

Japanese Leadership—Individual initiative Lacking.—In the consideration of any organizations with subversive policy, we invariably come back to the point of leadership. It has been found that the local Japanese inherently look for leadership to some single individual before any marked success is achieved even in peaceful pursuits. Japanese business partnerships hardly ever are successful when the corporations [23] stand much better chance of survival. Here again we find that leadership is required as it is practically impossible for the partners to agree long enough to produce any practicable results.

These fundamentals go back still further in the demonstrated regimentation and control of the lives, fortunes and existence of the millions of poorly educated people in Japan. A fundamental respect for law and authority exists in the minds of every individual Japanese alien. An order issued by the appropriate authority finds more complete and blind acceptance among the alien Japanese than is the case with the other elements of the population of Hawaii. For this reason alone it is necessary to properly explain, translate and interpret any regulations published or issued by the Military Governor.

This characteristic has been exemplified in their choice of white political leaders as mentioned heretofore, where the many Japanese feel that they are better qualified, more experienced and more able to successfully carry on political issues.

An interesting consideration of this element of obedience in the mind of the alien Japanese can be found in the Hirada case on the island of Niihau, where a Japanese officer pilot, who was forced down, armed and equipped, informed Harada, a U. S. citizen Japanese, that he had taken that island, as Japan and the United States were at war. Harada knew nothing of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the final outcome of the engagement [25] and had nothing to indicate to his simple mind any other fact than that the Japanese had landed on Niihau. There was probably no mental reaction, in his mind, of being loyal or disloyal to the United States because of his blind acceptance of the aviator's story and his complete obedience to his commands. There was no fighting, no conflict between forces of the United States and Japan, as far as he could see, hence it can only be said that he was immediately bound to obey Japanese leadership and domination in the form of the Japanese officer, but perhaps no question of loyalty to the United States entered his thoughts.

h. Local Japanese between two fires.—The Japanese, in general, here in the Hawaiian Islands, cannot be said to desire Japanese domination and control of the territory. They have been free in their businesses, life and customs and many have prospered far beyond their expectations. Most of them are fully aware that should the control of the islands pass to the Japanese, all of those freedoms, successes and customs would disappear and they would be as fully controlled and regimented as are the Japanese in Japan. Their fear of personal safety, the safety of their families and children is the predominant feature at present. Some feeling exists that they are between two fires and will suffer either one way or the other in case of an invasion. If they are not harmed by the United States forces, in such an action, they feel very [26] uncertain as to the treatment which they may receive in the hands of the Japanese invading forces. It is also very apparent that such apprehension is rapidly spreading through the Japanese population, hence it is greatly doubted that any organized sabotage system could thrive in such an atmosphere.

3. SOME OF THE MEASURES WE HAVE TAKEN

The daily drive and steady pressure being applied on the local Japanese community, since the war began, also lessens any possible organization of subversive elements. None know exactly when they will be picked up for questioning, their premises searched and careful examination made of the entire family background. Many are questioned and released who are required to return at stated intervals for check and recitation of their experiences, contacts and employment. Others

are placed in custodial detention on the results of these examinations. As a result of this relentless activity there is a wave of doubt growing up among the Japanese as to the loyalty of their neighbors and associates.

When one Japanese is placed in custodial detention, the neighbors remark that the army has caught up with another man whom they did not know was at all dangerous. With this thought in mind they wonder as to the reliability of the man next door, and the one living further down the street. In this manner there is an ever increasing apprehension, among the loyal Japanese citizens, as to how many and where the disloyal ones are located.

[1] EXHIBIT II—DECEMBER SEVENTH AND BEFORE IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
THROUGH THE EYES OF THE PRESS

a. Prior to December 7, 1941.—For several months prior to the treacherous Japanese attack on the Island of Oahu, there was an almost continuous fluctuation in both public opinion and official circles on the gravity of the international situation, with specific reference to Pacific relations.

While public opinion varied from a fair state of optimism to a low degree of pessimism, as reflected in the local press, official observers seem to have definitely looked upon the rapidly changing situation as growing extremely grave for a very considerable period, as may now be revealed from official files.

As early as June 24, 1941, an understanding had been reached by the local intelligencies, agencies, the M. I. D., O. N. I., and F. B. I., to accept the Digest of Opinion, prepared by the Military Intelligence Office in Honolulu, as the official digest for the three services. This was designed to avoid duplication of efforts.

There isn't anything that can now be said which will throw more light on the situation in question and at the same time illustrate the accuracy with which the trend of events were being viewed than by the following extracts taken from the "Digest of Contemporary Opinions on Current Topics in the Japanese Press", and other documents, prepared by this office:

[2] *Extracts from Digest of Japanese Press*
June 9, 1941.

"There has been a pronounced pessimism as to the international outlook, during the period 15-31 May. . . . The feeling is general that 'Japanese-American relations are precarious and that they may even become worse; that the leaders of both countries' are fully aware of the futility of war. . . . and that important leaders on both sides are working feverishly to avoid an open break—with slight hope of success.

"The course of action being adopted by the local Japanese seems to be strictly dictated by expediency; and that of the Japanese government, by opportunity."

June 16, 1941.

"The period, June 1 to 10, has been marked by a rapidly worsening of relations between the United States and the Axis elements of Europe. . . . On the other hand, during the same period, there was an ironical complex to local opinion which offered a faint hope for improved understanding between the United States and Japan. That is, despite the increase tension between the two countries, there developed a conviction that diplomatic efforts would triumph and head off any immediate crisis.

"The local situation, which may be affected by the above-mentioned trend, has been distinguished by patriotic declarations and movements by second-generation Japanese for the support of American policies; and, ostensibly, a better attitude shown by other Japanese elements.

"However, these many, and perhaps mostly, sincere patriotic utterances were largely offset by other statements which were definitely destructive criticism of our leaders and policies, and obviously inimical to national interests under present emergency conditions."

June 24, 1941.

"Pro-American, loyalty, and patriotic expressions continue strong from second-generation Japanese in particular, and a favorable attitude of other elements in general. . . .

"The idea of the Japanese remaining here 'irrespective of what might happen between Japan and America', seems to be growing into a fixed policy. There

appears to be a movement to instill in the minds of the Japanese that 'this is *their* country' as against the idea that they are merely 'hangers-on'."

July 2, 1941.

"Best opinion as expressed in the local press seems to indicate that Japan will continue a watchful-waiting policy until a definite decision has been reached on the outcome of the Russo-German war. . . . The local Japanese press was obviously bewildered for several days following the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Russia. . . . According to some . . . , it is believed that Japan is now confronted with new and serious problems, and that she must soon make decisions of far-reaching importance, possibly involving fundamental changes in her foreign policy. It is further thought by many that these changes will be at least temporarily and perhaps permanently to the advantage of the United States.

[3] *July 21, 1941.*

"The international situation during the last twenty days has grown gradually more tense, with a deep undercurrent of uneasiness. This is due principally to a feeling in many quarters that a decisive phase in the Russo-German war is about to be reached, and that the immediate results will be a deciding factor as to whether or not—and in what direction—the Japanese will move in the Orient.

"The Local Japanese press, in general, is still decidedly pro-German.

"The movement to encourage Japanese loyalty and cooperation with America in case of an emergency, of whatsoever nature, is being given outward support by most all elements of the Japanese community. The situation is such, however, that a show of anything but loyalty at this time would hardly be logical."

August 7, 1941.

"As reflected in the local Japanese press, the international situation in the Pacific area is extremely tense, delicate, and highly inflammable . . . Only a spark is required to cause an explosion that would set off the long-dreaded War in the Pacific.

"The local Japanese are still being encouraged to be loyal to America, no matter what may happen, and to cooperate in every way in support of the national policy of the United States."

August 21, 1941.

"International relations in the Pacific area have now reached their most critical point in history—where an explosion may be easily set off either by a false diplomatic step or by the rash act of an individual. Major interests, policies, and ideals have now been brought near to the point of physical conflict, gravely threatening the peace of the Pacific. Feeling is growing more bitter day by day as economic and other forms of pressure are being exerted by both sides. An open clash appears inevitable unless pressure is immediately relieved, or one of the opposing forces make some major concessions, or institute major changes in their basic national policies. Little hope is being entertained anywhere for better relations between Japan and other Pacific powers. Local Japanese, both alien and Hawaiian-born, in general, are determined to remain here, and throw themselves on the mercy of the American government and people, and do nothing that might prejudice their standing in the community as desirable residents and good citizens.

"In case of war between Japan and America, trouble with the local Japanese may be either little or great, depending largely on which country is able to dominate the local situation in the course of events, and in what degree; and, while United States domination remains unquestionable, a continuous campaign for tolerance and restraint on the part of all elements, civil and military, seems the best guarantee against local disorders so long as the Japanese are in the present state of mind."

[4] *September 5, 1941.*

"International relations in the Pacific area, which have continued extremely acute, have now reached the 'turning point'—in which direction, depending upon momentous decisions now in the making. Both Japan and America appear adamant in their determination to pursue their respective basic national policies to a successful conclusion; and each nation feels that it could not turn away from its set course or goal without catastrophic results in the end.

"There is a flurry of opinion in the Japanese press supporting the idea that Japan and America are about to reach an amicable settlement but, while

this is not beyond the realm of possibility, as yet there is very little tangible evidence to justify such an assumption.

"The local press and influential elements of the Japanese community continue outwardly to encourage and advise both alien and non-alien Japanese to be loyal and give their fullest support to the American government and its national policies, and to strive for racial harmony and unity of purpose in dealing with the present emergency. Local American military and civil officials are also giving very active support to the foregoing with a view to minimizing racial and other disturbances here in case of actual war.

"While the local press shows little evidence of definite propaganda, the tempo of such Japanese radio programs from Tokyo, has been stepped up noticeably. The most flagrant statement recently being 'the reminder to all Japanese that children born to Japanese parents are to be considered as children of the Emperor entrusted to their care'."

September 20, 1941.

"Japan's basic policy of establishing complete hegemony over the greater part of East Asia and adjacent areas of the South Pacific, remains immutable and her course, irrevocable. . . . Japan still continues toward 'total mobilization', and the combined forces which she may ultimately muster will constitute a continual menace to the United States and other democracies so long as said forces are *not actively* committed against our enemies. Japan has been and still is staunchly sticking to the role of an 'aggressive opportunist.' The future employment of her forces will be governed by the tide of the internecine struggle now being waged among people of the white race.

"Another Japanese cabinet crisis was apparently avoided as a result of the Emperor making the military directly responsible to His Highness. . . . Tension among local Japanese has been greatly relieved, and there is considerable optimism for some form of adjustment of differences between Japan and America.

"Protestations of loyalty by local Japanese cannot, from the military standpoint, be accepted as being actuated by 'sentiment' because of too many extenuating and compelling circumstances which might be forcing most of them along a course of 'expediency.' Only an acid test will reveal the truth."

[5] *October 5, 1941.*

"During the last two weeks, the Japanese government has been doing a superb job of fence-sitting and ring-side betting in the arena of international diplomacy—keeping contemporary observers in the dark, confused, and nervously speculative as to which way she might eventually be forced to fall, or choose to jump, in order to safeguard her present winnings or, perhaps, undertake to achieve new prodigious gains. . . . She has been assuming the unique role of 'serving two masters' while 'designing their mutual destruction.' . . . She may be expected to continue to exercise her present balance of power in the Far East to the disadvantage of the democracies, with no good intention toward the Axis, just as long as possible.

October 23, 1941.

"A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. . . . Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—which automatically underscores Japan's policies with 'further, intensified aggression'; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other democratic states; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham; and forces us into a state of constant vigilance . . .

"The local Japanese continue to outwardly display a determination to support American policies by the purchase of defense bonds and saving stamps, by organizing units to support the major disaster council, and by assisting the drive to collect scrap aluminum."

November 12, 1941.

"Most veteran observers who are in close contact with the situation seem to agree that:

"a. In view of the fact that all diplomatic efforts toward a settlement of outstanding vital issues on the Far East, between America and Japan, now appear to be doomed to failure, both countries have been rushing military and naval preparations to completion to meet what is considered to be an imminent showdown.

"b. Japan's special envoy, Saburo Kurusu, is going to Washington for the purpose of submitting the least and final terms upon which Japan is willing to remain at peace with the American government, and that our government will be expected to accept those terms with no more than nominal modifications. The United States government likewise is presumed to have a set of counter proposals, representing the minimum conditions under which it is ready to reestablish normal relations with Japan, and the Japanese government will be expected to harmonize its policies therewith. . . . Each country . . . is manifesting a most favorable disposition for war unless the other country is prepared to sacrifice some major, fundamental policies affecting matters in the Far East. Each state appears SO ADAMANT with regard to its own established basic policies, which are diametrically opposite to, and irreconcilable with, the policies of the other state, that very few observers now dare to venture an opinion that a successful compromise of differences is at all feasible.

[6] "The local Japanese in general continue to cooperate in the furtherance of the American national policies, and declare their loyalty to the Stars and Stripes. However, there has been recent evidence developed by the questioning of evacuees returning to Japan which plainly shows that the true sentiment of many Japanese here still definitely lie with the mother country. Accordingly, it is safe to assume that unfavorable reactions are likely to flare up occasionally under circumstances attending an American-Japanese conflict."

November 29, 1941. (The last issue of the Digest.)

"While the international situation centering in the Pacific and directly affecting the United States has been somewhat stabilized near the point of explosion during this period (Nov. 6-25), the situation in several other contiguous areas—Thailand, Indo-China, and Eastern Siberia—of strong indirect concern to the United States, has continued to deteriorate.

"The Japanese government announced on Nov. 5 the appointment of Saburo Kurusu as Special Envoy to Washington for the avowed purpose of making a final diplomatic effort towards a solution of American-Japanese problems and effect an easement of tension in the Pacific. While a certain amount of optimism was expressed in local quarters for the success of the Kurusu mission, the general opinion was indeed pessimistic.

"The consensus of veteran observers seem to be that Japan had taken such a strong aggressive stand that she could not back down without incurring serious internal trouble; and that the United States, on the other hand, had even less reason to compromise its well-known demands which were diametrically opposite to those of Japan, hence the impending diplomatic talks were doomed to failure before they started. This opinion moreover appears to have been well-founded as subsequent events began to unfold.

"Concurrent with the conversations in Washington came reports of extensive Japanese military movements in Indo-China, toward Thailand, and elsewhere. The Japanese home press intensified its anti-American attitude. The Japanese Imperial Diet passed a supplementary extraordinary military budget of almost four billion yen with unprecedented speed. Japanese nationals continued to evacuate from potential danger areas (including Hawaii). Total mobilization in Japan proceeded unabated and with an ever increasing tempo—involving even boys and girls down to 14 years of age.

"The foregoing together with many other reported actions immediately aroused grave doubts as to the sincerity of the Japanese government, and led many to believe that the Japanese were merely aping Hitler's favorite strategem of utilizing peaceful gestures to confuse, disarm, weaken, and otherwise destroy effective opposition to an early contemplated military move.

[7] "There is no marked change in the local situation. The very nature of the plight of the local Japanese dictates an extreme desire for peace. And while local Japanese commentators keep striking a tune of optimism, their statements are frequently spiked with a note of despair. They appear to feel that an acid test of their attitude is near at hand.

"It may be well again to emphasize that extreme and eternal vigilance is the only and safest course here in Hawaii."

Let us now turn to a few statements in official documents which represent definite action of this office, taken as a result of the foregoing conclusions backed by certain other information at hand.

From the G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation, H. H. D., Army Contact Office, Honolulu, 17 Oct. 1941—1200:

"1. *a.* With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the Pacific reached a new high. . . .

"*b.* The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, and is still necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has not been completed. . . .

"*c.* Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is fairly certain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will remain unchanged; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might oppose the execution of said policies—irrespective of what means she may choose to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement.

"2. CONCLUSIONS.

"*c. 4. Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers.*—While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above (the principle of defeating one opponent at a time—famous with her Axis partner, Hitler), it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed. An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever points might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents."

From a G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation, this office, 1200 25 Oct. 1941:

"1. *a.* A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. *b.* Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—which automatically underscores Japan's [8] policies with 'intensified aggression'; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other democracies; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham or object of suspicion; and forces America into a state of constant vigilance—but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent that we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done.

"2. CONCLUSIONS

"*c. Rapprochement Negotiations.*—Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—definitely our enemy—we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations as her partner, Hitler, i. e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies.

"*f.* . . . *Remarks. b.* . . . It seems logical to believe that no major move will be made before the latter part of November—in any direction—with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring."

As it too well know, the great break did come on Dec. 7, 1941, but as clearly shown in the above quotations from the Digest dated Nov. 29, that this office was thoroughly alive to the possibility, but only lacked the tangible evidence which might have been easily obtained by intelligence personnel had they not been handicapped by existing legal restrictions. Had those restrictions not been in existence, it is reasonable to assume that, "tangible" evidence would almost certainly have been obtained that would in all probability changed, if not entirely prevented, the great tragedy of Pearl Harbor.

[1] *b. December 7, 1942.*—In brief, Army Alert No. 1 was in effect, which provided "a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands, with no threat from without."

The Navy had made certain disposition of fleet units, in accordance with warning instructions previously received from the secretary of navy, which was considered appropriate to meet a threat no greater than could normally be expected from a power with which avowed friendly diplomatic relations were being maintained.

Neither of the armed forces were, however, prepared for a murderous, treacherous attack from a country whose high diplomats were making profound protestations of peace to the heads of our government.

There are many confirmed instances where both service personnel and civilians stood for minutes and even hours, watching the attack without being convinced of its reality—such was the deed which led President to state in bitter scorn:

"There is the record for all history to read in amazement, in sorrow, in horror and disgust."

So much for the immediate military, diplomatic, and political aspects. However, the local situation as regard the state of civil preparations for war should be mentioned.

As previously stated under paragraph 1 *a*, the civilians in general had been thoroughly alive to the tensivity of the situation for some time; and several groups of civilians were preparing for actual war. Some of the more important were:

[2] The nursing Association; a group of business men who had volunteered for police duty; another group who had been working on air raid warning plans; the Hawaiian Medical Society; and the Hawaiian Chapter of the American Red Cross.

All of the foregoing played an important part in rendering prompt and courageous assistance on the day of the attack.

The combined forces of the M. I. D., O. N. I., and the G. B. I., although woefully inadequate in numbers and equipment, pooled their efforts and endeavored to meet the situation with all possible means and energy.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter; T. H., 22 December 1941.

1. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION AS OF 7:30 A. M. 7 DECEMBER 1941

A. NAVAL OPERATIONS

No knowledge of Japanese naval vessels in waters farther East than the China sea, although it was known that they had bases in the Mandate Islands and in all probability had naval craft in those waters. Nothing had been received from the Naval Intelligence, between November 27th and December 7th, to indicate any movement of carriers east of the Mandate Islands.

B. AIR OPERATIONS

No information to indicate operations of Japanese aircraft other than on the Asiatic mainland and areas adjacent thereto. It was known that no land based Japanese aircraft could operate from nearer than the Mandate Islands (approximately 2100 miles). It was also known that no nation possessed aircraft which could operate from that distance and return to its base.

C. LOCAL SITUATION

Instructions from the War Department announced that the international situation was critical and directed precautions be taken against possible sabotage and subversive acts.

(1) *DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES*.—On Saturday, December 6th, it was learned through local investigative agencies that papers at the Japanese consulate were being destroyed by burning.

(2) *CONCENTRATION & MOVEMENTS OF LOCAL ALIENS*.—None. The entire local population was quiet and no indications of domestic unrest appeared.

(3) *SABOTAGE*.—Warnings were prevalent that acts of sabotage were impending but no action on the part of the residents of the Territory indicated that subversive acts would be committed.

On Saturday evening, December 6, at about 6:00 P. M., a transcription and translation of a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between a local alien and an unknown party in Tokyo was received. This conversation had taken place on December 5th. There were certain features about this conversation which were suspicious, although the communication in its entirety appeared innocuous. Efforts were made Saturday night to evaluate this conversation but it was impossible to reach any specific conclusion as to the meaning thereof.

D. PRECAUTIONS TAKEN

Alert No. 1 was in operation and had been since November 27, 1941, with the counter-subversive section of the G-2 Office in a fully alerted condition. In addition thereto the Aircraft Warning Service was in operation from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn each day.

CONCLUSION

A. CAPABILITIES

1. There was a possibility that disruption of relations, or war, might result at any time from overt acts by Japan either in the form of military action in the Far East, sinking of transports enroute to the Philippines or other similar acts.

2. With the large part of the American Navy based in the Hawaiian waters the probability of an attack by the Japanese carriers was believed to be negligible.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

[1]

CONFIDENTIAL

#69512

Copy

TRANS-PACIFIC TELEPHONE CALL TO DR. MOTOKAZU MORI

(J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all.

(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are, airplanes flying daily?

(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.

(J) Are they large planes.

(H) Yes, they are quite big.

(J) Are they flying from morning till night?

(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.

(J) Is that so?

(H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.

(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to [2] newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

(J) That's fine.

(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.

(J) Has there been any increase in ---?--- of late. That is, as a result of the current tense situation.

(H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.

(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various

sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

(J) Are there many big factories there?

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

(J) Is that so?

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

(J) How large is the population?

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

(J) What is the population?

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

(J) What about night time?

(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.

(J) What about searchlights?

(H) Well, not much to talk about.

[3] (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

(H) No.

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?

(H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.

(J) What is the climate there now?

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate.

(J) Is that so?

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

(H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

(H) Yes.

(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

[4] (J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.

† (J) Does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

(H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

(J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

†(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masanune"; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herringroe for this year's New Year celebration.

[5] (J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

(H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the Army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) off phone.

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

2834

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE

SECRET

P 2 WAR WD PRTY

WASHINGTON, D. C., November 27, 1941.

G-2 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Ft Shafter, T. H.:

473-27TH

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate Stop Hostilities may ensue Stop Subversive activities may be expected Stop Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only

MILES
144 PM

Received as a SECRET communication.

Decoded by LT. JOS ENGELBERTZ, SC. 4:00 PM 27 Nov 41.

Answer should be marked ANSWER to Code Message No. 473-27th.

NOTE: See AR 330-5 and and 330-6 for handling messages of this classification.

21 APRIL 1945.

The War Department secret radio reproduced on the reverse side hereof is that referred to in my memorandum of 16 April 1945, to Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, subject: Action taken on WD information concerning possible hostilities with Japan.

Byron M. Meurlott,
BYRON M. MEURLOTT,
Lt. Colonel, M. I.
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2 (CID)

CONFIDENTIAL

B

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

File 336—Foreign & International Affairs & Relations—G-2 Estimate of International (Japan) Situation

SONGKHLA is another name for SINGORA, Sri Tamarat district, southern Thailand, Latitude 7° 12' N., 100° 36' W. longitude. It has a seaplane anchorage, Government aerodrome, radio station. It is located at the mouth of the "Inland Sea" Dhale Sap. It is connected by a short branch railway with the main railway which runs from Singapore to Bangkok. It is also the seat of government for the Viceroy of that district.

[Penned notation: 336—Foreign & International Affairs. X336.31—Foreign Vessels.

ARMY CONTACT OFFICE,
FEDERAL BUILDING,
Honolulu, T. H., 1 August 1941.

MEMORANDUM: Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan.

The Asama Maru arrived offport from Japan at 2:00 P. M., and docked at Pier #8 at 3:30 P. M., 31 July 1941. Ship sailed for San Francisco and Los Angeles at 9:00 A. M., 1 August 1941.

Based on observations of several passengers, the actions of the ship en route were as follows: From 22 July till arrival in port passengers were allowed to receive radiograms, but were not allowed to send them; they were also prevented by the Stewards from listening to the radios in the lounges. On the second 23 July (the day after crossing the date line) the ship turned about and headed west until the morning of the 24th July, when they turned north in the vicinity of the 180th meridian, proceeding far enough north that the ship was laying in cold fog banks; they hove to in this vicinity until the evening of the 26th July, during which time they painted the funnels black, and painted out the Japanese flags on the hull and deck. On the evening of 26th July the ship headed toward Honolulu; then, in mid-morning of 27 July a notice was posted stating that the ship had been ordered back to Yokohama, and the ship again headed west for about 36 hours. In the evening the passengers noted that the ship was again headed east and that the notice had been taken down, and from the 28th July on, the ship continued on into this port.

It is interesting to note that the ship began its actions before the action was taken freezing credits.

Reliable business men report that Japan is very short on carbon black; and that they have some stock of roller bearings on hand, but neither the materials nor facilities for producing them, and that any shortage of this item would seriously hamper their airplane production. They are collecting all scrap iron in cities, even including iron fences and ornamental irons on buildings. Other

items reported to be short are high staple cotton, rubber supplies, high test aviation gasoline, sugar, flour, leather, wool, and anasthetics.

It is reported there are many Germans in all public offices in Japan, even including police departments, post offices, and finance offices; these men are said to wear civilian clothing, but with a large Nazi emblem in their coat lapel. Regulations are said to be mere translations from regulations used in Germany. On 3 July 1941 three German raiders put in at Yokohama, which were rumored to be from South America; the business men who saw these vessels could not give a description of them, but stated that the Captain of the "Frederick Lykes" could give a full and accurate description.

The general public in Japan, which formerly was friendly toward citizens of the United States, has recently developed a hatred for all Americans. The public has also developed a spy phobia as a result of continuous warning from the Government, with almost all advertising, such as on matches, billboards, etc., carrying warnings against spies.

During the last few months, many thousands of young men, all of whom have had military training, have been sent to Manchukuo as farmers. All men working in factories in Japan, regardless of age, have lately been required to take part time military training.

For the last year, troop movements have been through Shimoniseki instead of through Kobe, as formerly. Also during the past year, large numbers of bombers have been flown to China and Manchukuo via Kobe, with planes from other parts of Japan converging on a direction tower on top of Hachibuse mountain about six miles due west of Kobe.

On 11 July 1941 two statesmen were reported shot in Tokyo by young Army officers, in order to force a change in the cabinet; at the time of the incident no one was allowed to enter or leave Tokyo, and all communications were suspended, including local telephone service.

All telephone communications in Japan are now required to be in Japanese only. Trans-Pacific calls to the United States may be made in English, and calls to Germany may be made in German, but no other language is allowed in communications within Japan.

13 NOVEMBER 1941.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.:

(Attention G-2.)

Information furnished by W G Keswick formerly Singapore British courier now en route San Francisco comma Washington comma and London in same plane with Saburo Kurusu indicates mission of Ambassador is primarily to confirm Nomura reports that United States Government is not bluffing stop If he sees any indication of weakness in attitude of the United States then Japan may move toward other hostilities Stop Should he observe only attitude of strength and determination great possibility no such hostile acts would take place Stop Keswick information and opinions hitherto fairly accurate End

SHORT.

[Penned notation: 336—Foreign & International Affairs X 201—Kurusu, Saburo]

Subject: Japanese Magazine Translation from the "Gendai", July, 1941.

ADVOCATING THE CREATION OF A GOVERNMENT GENERAL OF THE SOUTH SEAS

(By Tetsu Nakamura)

BRIEF

Japan's overseas development policy has been stressed as the Great Continental Development Policy. Involved in said policy, was a North Advance Theory, considered a content thereof; and a South Advance Theory, often thought of as an opposite theory to that of the North Advance Theory.

However, the South Advance Theory is now considered as inseparable to the Great Continental Development Policy.

The South Advance Theory was also often checked as an Oceanic Theory (on account of encompassing mostly islands; and being principally a Naval job).

The reason why the South Advance Theory and the North Advance Theory were not taken up simultaneously as related policies heretofore is said to be due to limited national power.

Now it seems that, as a result of circumstances and developments of the China incident, it has now become necessary to combine the heretofore separate theories as to direction of expansion, into a single theory or plan.

Mr. Takegoshi Sansa, advocating the southward development of the Japanese race, stated in part as follows:

"Besides those receiving the culture of England and France, many among the 100,000,000 Malaysians are looking forward to our country, for although the Europeans have been exploring the waters of Malaya for several hundred years, there has been no change. Consequently, it is waiting to be developed. If the Japanese race is capable of developing this great treasure house, it can be said that the noble project of a great nation has been accomplished. Our future does not lie in the north, but in the south; not on the continent, but in the sea. The Pacific should be made our country's lake."

Mr. Sansa gave us our first European conception of colonial settlement.

The new slogan "East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere", adopted by the 2nd Kono Cabinet, is merely a progressive conception of the New Order in East Asia, adopted by Kono's 1st Cabinet, and due to its expansive nature requires the fusion of the New Order in East Asia with the Southward Policy.

It is a great mistake to immediately consider that the New Order in East Asia has been realized and that the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere has been accomplished. This is because the political and economic reality of East Asia must be reconstructed and revived for this ideal aim.

The East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere is being stressed as the ideal aim. This new aim or idea is considered more realistic—it is more economical and material (in the sense of natural resources). While the New Order in East Asia conception was more political and less realistic—hence the new aim or ideal.

It is needless to mention that the problems of East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere, which now includes a southern political sphere, must be taken up. Herein lies the reason why the plan of a Southern Government-General System as a political pivot of the Southern Political Sphere must be considered, although it may be a very idealistic plan.

The southern political sphere, which can be considered a part of the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere, must be said to include a very complex political structure and cannot be thought of as a single political block.

Within the Southern Political Sphere of East Asia are to be found our country's possessions—namely, Formosa, the Mandate South Sea Islands and the Spratley Islands and the Philippines, the Republic of China in South China, the French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and the Hainan Island. Their political control relations are multifarious; their racial structure, culture and customs are diversified; and the only thing in common are the blood-relations of the natives as races of East Asia. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the conceptions of New Order in East Asia and East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere have as their guiding idea the autonomy and independence of the races of East Asia, this blood-relation element of the races must be most seriously considered.

Now, the task assigned to the races of East Asia is that the southern political sphere must be formed as a part of the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere based on the blood-relation characteristics of the races of East Asia *in the south*.

Speaking of the Southern Political Sphere, although the relations between our country and such countries as the Dutch East Indies, the French Indo-China and the Philippines are *not only not similar*, but also *do not* appear to have the hopeful possibility of creating the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere today. It is therefore necessary to have some sort of close connection as races of East Asia, and is only proper for our country to have some sort of powerful southern political system as a local organ of the south for the consummation of such friendly relations. This is why the southern government-general system is being considered as one of the methods. Hence the necessity of a southern political system to control the southern policy is being keenly felt, in contrast to the northern political system of Manchoukuo and North China.

The Southern Government-General Theory is a contention stressing the strengthening of a local organ as its political pivot to correspond to the south-

ern new order of the East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere. It is wholly connected with requests of outside territories advocating the strengthening of the Formosan Government-General. However, if the *ideal condition* of the southern political sphere is realized, it is *doubtful* that *Formosa* would be the pivot. (Note: the center would probably move farther south)

There is at present conflict between the Formosan Government-General with the East Asia Bureau. There must be a close connection among the East Asia Bureau, the Foreign Ministry, the Formosan Government-General and the South Seas Office, and a powerful political system to unify the southern administration must be considered. Whether the southern government-general should be an expansion of the Formosan Government-General or separate, is a question.

Now, if Formosa, which presently has only man power and economic strength, were to be made the center of the southern political sphere and a southern government-general were to be created there, the question as to whether Formosa has the administrative and economic ability to discharge such a great task should be considered.

Firstly, if Formosa is not able to become the industrial and economic center of the southern political sphere, the independence of the southern political sphere cannot be expected.

For example, even if the South Seas Government were to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Formosan Government-General under the present economic condition due to its geographical relations, it would still be impossible to manufacture the raw materials of the South Seas into finished goods in Formosa. Hence, considering the fact that the raw materials must be sent to Japan proper to be made into finished goods, it would be more significant for the South Seas to be directly connected to Japan proper.

This is applicable to the products of Hainan Islands as well as those of French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, but if the products of these places could be manufactured into finished goods in Formosa, Formosa probably would be able to perform her role as the pivot of the Southern Political Sphere.

In this respect, the industrialization of Formosa is being regarded as the urgent matter of the present. However, the industrialization of Formosa cannot necessarily be regarded optimistically, for in as much as all products are being sent through Formosa to Japan proper, today, no material value, probably, can be seen even in the purpose of creating a southern government-general.

After all, it must be said that the possibility of the Southern Government-General System depends upon the possibility of the industrialization of Formosa. An administrative center, which is not an economic center as well, is meaningless. If Formosa, as the center of the new order of the Mutual Prosperity Sphere in the south, cannot be industrialized and be made into the industrial center, then it should not be the administrative center, except for possibly the reason of administrative necessity.

Judging from the problem of the quantity of electric power possessed and labor power of the natives, not only can the industrialization of Formosa not be regarded optimistically, but, also, is a very difficult matter.

However, instead of stressing the meaninglessness of the southern government-general system from such economic aspects, the significance of the system should be recognized from the point of view of administrative necessity for the establishment of the southern political sphere and our southern policy should, preferably, be turned toward the industrialization of Formosa and the development of the natural resources of the south.

(NOTE—I think the above covers all the things of immediate interest contained in the article.)

GMV.

[Pinned Notation : 336. Foreign & International Affairs & Relations.]

ARMY CONTACT OFFICE,
FEDERAL BUILDING,
Honolulu, T. H., 2 May 1941.

MEMORANDUM : G-2.

Subject : Comments on observations of a missionary.

1. The observations set forth in the attached memorandum reflect the viewpoint of most Christian missionaries in Japan. Being religious teachers, they are by nature idealistic and their feelings toward the Japanese are often influenced by

wishful thinking. During many years contact with them in the Far East, I found most of them pro-Japanese and often critical of our own people and actions of our officials stationed there. In this they were sincere, but in evaluating their statements regarding Japanese, these factors should be considered.

2. Paragraphs 2 and 3—The transition from feudalism to a more or less modern industrial nation, of necessity, made the Japanese imitators. They have contributed little in the field of modern inventions and research. Almost everything has been taken "as is" from western nations. Since they had not gone through the trial and error period of the western nations, they employed foreign advisors and sent investigators abroad to copy—to the letter—things other nations were doing. The Osaka Street Railway is outstanding in Japan but not superior to similar ones in western countries.

The Japanese merchant marine is very good. The white glove incident is typical of the people who are thoroughly disciplined by the Shinto system. However, this high standard of cleanliness is not standard throughout Japan.

3. Paragraph 4—I was present when the Emperor reviewed the entire fleet, on the occasion of his enthronement, and it presented a splendid appearance. Most of our naval officers I have talked to think the Japanese navy very good.

4. Paragraph 5—The Ministers of War and Navy are not accountable to the Premier, but have direct access to the throne; therefore it is not necessary to refuse to name these ministers. The usual method is to name the ministers and force the others to resign if they do not support the policies of War and Navy.

The Emperor undoubtedly approves many things after they have been accomplished, although he is all powerful (in theory).

5. Paragraph 6—Shinto is not a religion in the western sense, but is usually referred to as such. It is a form of ancestor worship and its control extends to every Japanese during every moment of his life. A person is [76] born into Shintoism if he is born a Japanese. When the Buddhists went to Japan they found that they could not change Shintoism, and altered their teachings so that they would not conflict. The consequence is that the Japanese are both Shintos and Buddhists and, in my opinion, Shintoism has far more influence over the lives and actions of the Japanese people than Buddhism. A Japanese may believe in Buddhism or not, just as he pleases, but is born into the Shinto system. The Japanese "conscience" is motivated by moral teachings of Shinto just as the Christian conscience is motivated by the Ten Commandments. A Shinto is constantly striving to make face for his ancestors' spirits and the elaborate code of conduct which has been built up controls every member of every family during his every breathing moment.

I have talked to Japanese who professed Christianity after attending mission schools. Some admitted that they could not throw off Shinto, as it is a national system of life. Most Japanese admire the idealism of the Christian religions and no doubt the second and third generations in Hawaii are turning more and more to Christianity as the old home ties are broken.

Few educated Japanese, even in Japan, will contend that the Emperor is descended from the Sun Goddess—they know it comes from their mythology, but one must also remember that there is a difference of opinion among Christians regarding the origin of man. Many good Christians contend that Adam and Eve were mythological persons.

6. Paragraph 7—I visited Japan three times before going there for a 4-year detail at the U. S. Embassy, and found that being followed by secret police is the rule, not the exception, in peace or war.

7. Paragraph 8—The "black-out" drill in Tokyo was described in an illustrated article in one of the Japanese publications during the past year, probably the Japan-America Review published in New York. Undoubtedly the drill was carried out efficiently. The rules and regulations were probably copied from the British and the people *ordered* to comply—they do not *ask* people to cooperate in Japan. In my opinion, it has never occurred to the Japanese people to deliberately evade or cut corners in regulations due to Shinto "Conscience." He is probably right about the neutrality pact, as each will honor it only so long as they profit thereby.

8. Paragraph 9—Probably true.

9. Paragraph 10—I am inclined to believe that very little information of value can be obtained from the women. They are as a rule more clever than the men, although they hold an inferior position in the family. They would not willingly jeopardize the safety of any relative in Japan by telling anything of importance that slipped through the censors. They are also reluctant to do anything that might displease the husband or his family, and any disloyalty reflects discredit

on her own parents and their ancestors for failure to give her proper moral training. However, in Hawaii, this strong Shinto influence is weakening gradually.

10. Paragraph 11—I concur in general with these statements, but I am not quite so optimistic. They do want to be Americans but reserve the right to define that status. However, I believe that the citizens will remain loyal and the aliens will be quiet and law-abiding through any emergency if they are kept informed as to what is expected of them at all times and if they clearly understand that their treatment will depend upon their behavior.

11. Paragraph 12—No responsible person could doubt this. It is most important that this be done.

12. Paragraph 13—The language schools retard the progress of Americanization, not because Japanese is taught, but because the children are kept in an alien atmosphere all afternoon when other American children are mixing on the playground learning to speak and think American. It is true that the students learn a very poor grade of Japanese, if any, but due to the fact that they come into contact with other American children only during public school hours, they also learn a very poor grade of English. The "culture" taught in the language schools seems to be stressed more than language, judging from the results I have seen. This "culture" extols the superiority and virtues of the Yamato Race. It includes moral lessons based on the Shinto system and an alien philosophy opposed to our own way of life. They are told that in order to become good Americans they must retain the virtues of the Japanese and combine them with the virtues of the Americans, thereby making a superior citizen. Incidentally, all Japanese characteristics are virtues to be retained.

The Consular Agents constitute an excellent semi-official network of communication and control for all who desire to do business with Japan or to aid its government.

13. Paragraph 14—These statements confirm my opinions on the same subjects. However, it must be kept in mind that "good Japanese contacts" are rare. Japanese are sensitive people, and family and racial ties are strong. It is almost impossible to find one who will say anything reflecting discredit on the race or any member thereof, and a contact will not bring discredit on his race by his disloyalty to it.

RICHARD W. COOKSEY,
*Lieut. Col. G. S. C.,
Contact Officer.*

1 AUGUST 1941.

Memorandum For: Col. Bicknell.

Subject: Local Japanese Situation During The Period 26-31 July 1941.

Local Japanese situation changed momentarily during this period, becoming more critical than ever before. This change was due to the proclamation by President Roosevelt freezing all Japanese assets in the United States on July 25th. Up to that time, in spite of the tense America-Japan relations, the Japanese here manifested very slight excitement and apprehension and remained practically unmoved because they have been imbued by local Japanese press with the idea that the international situation between these two powers was getting better and that it is certain to become better and hostility between them will never come and because they have been given assurances frequently that they will be treated fairly by the constituted authorities if they act properly. However, they lost this optimistic view when the freeze order was announced and started to harbor the feeling that a clash between America and Japan is imminent. Consequently, excitement and apprehension became strikingly evident among them. But, their apprehension was of financial nature more than anything else. The fact that about \$300,000 from the Sumitomo Bank, and about \$40,000 from both the Pacific Bank and the Yokohama Bank was withdrawn on the 26th and the fact that many Japanese have tried to transfer land titles and bank deposits to their children ably support this view. Spiritual apprehension also prevailed to a slight extent. That is, some Japanese were reported to have worried as to their future status regardless of their strong trust they have built in themselves that the American government will accord them fair treatment at all times.

Local Japanese newspapers persistently maintained a calm and advising policy, cautioning local-Japanese to remain calm and cooperate with the United States government and have confidence in the government of their residence at all times, both in their editorials and columnists' columns. They also refrained from

publishing articles that might excite or cause controversy in the community and gave big publicity on items that might calm the people.

The Japanese shipping situation was acute here during this period. The NYK ship Asama Maru which was scheduled to arrive here on the 26th failed to come until the afternoon of the 31st. This delay caused local Japanese merchants and Japanese people whose relatives were aboard the vessel considerable worry.

Local Japanese radio stations carried on as usual during this trying period, excepting a noticeable decrease in the store advertisements on Monday, the 28th, having been decreased to about half their normal number.

Practically all local Japanese importing firms have been closed by the freeze order and the Japanese retailers stopped selling freely, some even going as far as to hide their stocks. Shortages of Japanese goods became more and more acute and prices soared. Many people were reported as having rushed to the stores to purchase all available goods, but were unsuccessful in many instances.

Local Japanese educational institutions remained quiet. Authorities and people connected with them made no statement and held no known meetings.

The religious groups remained practically quiet, excepting that a convention of the delegates of various temples of West Buddhist sect was held in Honolulu on the 28th and at which time Bishop Kuchiba asked the gathering to build good American citizens of Japanese ancestry, cooperate with the United States national policy, comply with the American principles, repay gratitude, and remain calm.

The American Legion held a conference at Hilo on the 26th and passed a resolution calling for abolishment of Japanese language schools here. Local Japanese newspapers have given considerable publicity on this matter and aroused considerable interest among the Japanese.

More Japanese are now buying or advocating purchase of United States national defense bonds. For instance, Honolulu Japanese Contractors' Ass'n. cancelled its picnic and members have agreed to buy the bonds at a meeting held on the 27th.

Conclusion: Excitement and apprehension ran high at the beginning of this period, but gradually subsided and was practically normal at the end.

President Roosevelt has proclaimed an embargo against oil and gasoline export to Japan and it is expected the Japanese situation here will change.

SECRET

Copy of cable received Nov. 27, 1941

Secret source (usually reliable) reports that,

A. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1, repeat Dec. 1. without any ultimatum or declaration of break, with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singapore.

B. Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing point to be in Songkhla area.

Valuation for above is No. 3, repeat 3 (i. e. only about 55 to 60 per cent probable accuracy)

American Military and Naval Intelligence, Manila informed.

Copies to:

Mr. Shivers.

Capt. Mayfield.

Col. Bicknell.

[Hand written: distributed by me to those names shown on Nov. 27, 1941.]

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff and will not be sent to subordinate commanders.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded thru the Adjutant General, except that a General Staff section may route papers to another General Staff section direct. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will

be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

No. of Ind. From and Date	#249—To	Subject: Information re Japanese Situation	
1st Ind. Cont. O 9 Sept. 41.	G-2 C/S.	Attached hereto for information is a report received 8 Sept. 1941 relative to the Japanese Situation.	G. W. B.
2d Ind. G-2 11 Sept. 41.....	C/S.....	For information. My personal belief is that conditions are better since this report from H. B. Incl: Data from Naval Attache—Tokyo. (Undated).	R. J. F.
3d C/S.....	C/S.....	Noted.....	V. S.
4th Ind. G-20 1 Sept. 41.....	C/S.....	Office.....	G. S. C.
	Cont.....	MMM

COPY

INFO; CINCPAC, CINCAF, NAVATTACHE CHUNGKING, COM16, NAVATTACHE PEIPING. Z MOTH 030730 MUSK Q DART F5L F5Q OPE PLUG WIFE D

From: NAVAL ATTACHE TOKYO.

To: OPNAV.

Info: ASST NAVATTACHE SHANGHAI.

Influential semi official East Asia Development League headed by Expremier General Senjuro Hayashi has issued following advise to Government X Adhere to Axis Pact X Carry out Greater East Asia policy X Repudiate aid to ChungkingX invoke right of self defense in seas near Japan X Stated reasons for (50) advice are that Japan desires speedy restoration peace to enable nations find proper place in world X Keynotes Japans policy are early settlement China incident establishment co-prosperity sphere X Japan cannot tolerate American policy of assisting China opposing Japans peaceful southern policy exerting economic pressure on Japan and aiding nations (100) Hostile to Japans Allies X Japan cannot understand American policy of shamelessly illegally occupying Greenland Iceland violating laws governing neutral nations at same time remaining silent toward outrageous invasion Iran by Britain USSR X Japan must break encircling ring of hostile powers

TOD 0959

COPY

Z MOTH 030735 MUSK Q DART F5L F5Q L0PE PLUG WIFE D GR 129

In recent speeches military naval officials urge entire population to unite and serve Empire faithfully to meet greater crisis in history X War Minister desires closest contact between Army which is driving force of national and civilian population X Army trying carry out greatest mission must have nations support X (50) Colonel Mabuchi, Chief Army Press Section, in speech bitterly criticizing America states Japan must establish strong internal defense structure to break encirclement by ABCD powers X If favorable settlement Japans problems cannot be reached through diplomatic negotiations Japan must use force X All Japanese must be prepared sacrifice themselves for (100) state X Lt. Comdr. Tominaga of Navy Press Section states Japan must be vigilant since anti Japanese nations under American leadership have greatly increased military forces in Far East.

[Penned Notation: 336—Foreign and International Affairs and Relations X091—Japan.]

CONFIDENTIAL

MID-2801-510

C-I
WAR

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, D. C., August 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hdqrs. Hawaiian Department.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

2. Enclosures:

MID/2023-1026/1—Cpy of Ltr. Fr. F. B. I. re Info. on Japan's entry into war: atd 7/28/41.

OR/10524-4032—Cpy of MID Setin. re Subversion statistics—War Department personnel: dtd 8/4/41.

[Penned Notation: 336—Foreign and International Affairs.]

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

G-2

MID/2023-1026/1

DGE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D. C., July 28, 1941.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.,

Assistant Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. BERLE: As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a confidential source, the reliability of which has not been determined, to the effect that if Great Britain were to suffer a major military setback, the Japanese military party would force Japan's entry into the war, in which case Shanghai and Tientsin would be immediately occupied by the Japanese Army and would be completely blockaded by them.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. E. HOOVER.

cc—Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

cc—Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Further Distribution:

9th C. A.
Haw. Dept.
Phil. Dept.
File

Source: Reliable.

Info: Undetermined.

fm 8-4-41.

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C

HEADQUARTERS CPBC USAFICPA

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

350.05—Information on Foreign Countries—Binder #1 Through 1941

(HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT)

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Inter-Staff Routing Slip

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No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Military attache report	
1st Ind. G-2 6 Nov 41-----	Chief of Staff.	For information. This report pertains wholly to aviation and a copy has been furnished H. A. F. 1 Incl.: Military Attache Report No. 23. Dated 3 Nov 1941. Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft.	K.J.F. K.J.E.
2nd Ind. Of G-2 11/6/-----	-----	Noted-----	A. C. J.

CONFIDENTIAL

Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D.

Army Contact Office

Honolulu, T. H.

Date: 17 October 1941.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Subject: *New Japanese Premier Hideki or Eiki Tojo.*

Lieutenant General; Director General of Military Aviation. Born December 1884, Tokyo. Graduate Military Staff College 1915; Attache Germany, 1919; instructor Military Staff College, 1922; Chief of Mobilization Section; Commander Infantry 1st Regiment; Sectional Chief General Staff Officer; Commander 24th Infantry Brigade, 1934-35; Commander Gendarmerie Headquarters and Chief Police Affairs Department of Kwantung Army, 1937; War Vice-Minister, May 1938-December 1938; Minister of War since December 1938.

Tojo stressed the exaltation of the cardinal principles of the so-called war-time cabinet for both the army and navy on 18 July 1941.

An interesting analysis of the new Japanese cabinet (Konoye) was made by Miss Kazuko Higuchi of Hilo, a keen student of Japanese government affairs who returned recently from Japan. According to her, "The War Minister is a conservative among the members of the army clique."

Commenting on the appointment of Tojo as premier, a local news article stated that he is a conservative.

George W. Bicknell,
 GEORGE W. BICKNELL,
Lt. Colonel, C. S. C.
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,
Contact Officer.
 G-2, Schofield Barracks (3 copies).
 G-1, H. H. D.
 F. B. I., Honolulu.
 O. N. I., Honolulu (2 copies).

Distribution

C/S H. H. D.
 G-2, H. H. D.
 G-2, H. A. F.

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D

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

Private File—Lt. Col. B. M. Meurlott—No File Number

SECRET

ARMY CONTACT OFFICE,
 OLD DILLINGHAM BLDG.,
 Honolulu, T. H., 21 November 1941.

MEMORANDUM: Seisure and Detention Plan (Japanese).

1. It is quite possible that war may develop with Japan with or without a formal declaration, in the near future. Advice of such action to the Hawaiian Department, may be a single notification of the breaking off of relations between Japan and the United States; a declaration that the safety of the nation is imperiled; or definite instructions as to detailed action to be taken prior to such formal declarations. It may take place before the promulgation of the Presidential Proclamation, or it may not happen until such a final document has been prepared and a copy furnished this Headquarters.

2. In any event this question does involve the matter of policy to be adopted by the Department Commander, and this outline of procedure is suggested to meet these possible future requirements. They cannot be considered as either absolute or final but simply as a guide to actions, any of which may be changed by the then existing conditions and factors.

3. The total number of alien Japanese and Japanese Nationals in the Territory of Hawaii registered in compliance with the Alien Registration Act of 1940 is 41,346. American citizens, of Japanese ancestry, in the Territory on the same date are estimated to be 123,410. It is obvious that it would be both impracticable and ill advised to consider the question of seizure, detention, and possible internment of 37.3% of the total population of those islands, or even any sizeable proportion thereof. For this reason the situation has been studied and broken down into three major plans; known hereafter as Plan I, Plan II, and Plan III.

4. Plan I envisions the action necessary under conditions which would prevail if war with Japan existed, or was indicated to be imminent, and which would involve military action in the vicinity of Singapore, the Philippine Islands or the Southwest Pacific area alone with no immediate threat toward the Hawaiian Area.

5. Plan II considers the situation which would exist in a general Pacific war with the United States fleet (or a considerable portion thereof) in Hawaiian waters but with threats of surprise raids (by air or surface craft) against the Hawaiian Islands.

6. Plan III considers a general Pacific war with the United States fleet absent from the Hawaiian area and with the immediate threat of a large scale attack upon the Hawaiian Islands.

7. It is assumed, in the consideration of all these plans, that the exercise of power of arrest, detention, and internment of alien enemies in the Hawaiian Islands shall be under the jurisdiction of the Military Commander acting under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War. It is further assumed that the Secretary of War, in carrying out such regulations, is authorized to use such agents, agencies, officers and departments of the United States and of the territory and municipalities thereof as he may select for the purpose and that they all are granted full authority for all acts done by them in carrying out these regulations when acting by direction of the Secretary of War.

8. Full consideration has also been given to the established policy that all enemy aliens will be enjoined to preserve the peace, to refrain from crimes against the public safety, from violating the laws of the United States and the Territory and to refrain from actual hostility or giving information, aid, or comfort to the enemies of the United States, and to comply with regulations promulgated by the President; and so long as they shall conduct themselves in accordance with law, they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all law-abiding persons, except so far as restrictions may be necessary for their own protection and for the safety of the United States.

9. It must be understood that all lists of individuals which are mentioned and referred to in these plans will be in a constant state of revision and review. There may be additions made, names removed or transferred to lists of varying priority as future investigations are made and further information received. The lists quoted, at the time of the preparation of those plans, are based on current information and the reports of subsequent investigations will cause changes to be made at frequent intervals.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,
Lt .Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,
Contact Officer.

CONFIDENTIAL

E

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

File 336.8—Activities of Foreigners in U. S.—Japanese—Binder #3: From
1 November 1941 to 31 January 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

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No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: M. A. Report entitled "Activities of Foreigners in Country, Mexico"	
1st Ind. Contact O, 30 Jan. 42.	G-2 F.E.-----	1. The appended report is forwarded for re-evaluation in the light of developments since December 6, 1941. This matter formed the basis for requests to Commanding Officers of the outlying districts for close surveillance of near off-shore waters soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor. This is like a Rube Goldberg cartoon, hence, is of interest to read. No particular significance. Believe informer got a tip on pigny submarine and let his imagination run wild. Navy does not attach importance to theory. Searching could have been continued to extent of personnel available anyway. Return for file after anyone interested has read it. Noted—THD-----	G. W. B.
2d Ind. G-2 FWD ECH 1 Feb. 42.	Contact officer.-----		T. H. D.

(Page 92 of Exhibit 2 is a routing slip of Latin American Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department dated June 30, 1941, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 9, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen Investigation.)

79716

Classification: Confidential.

Enclosures: 1

Copy No. 6-5G

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report—Mexico

Source and Degree of Reliability: As stated:

I. G. No. 5940.

Source and Degree of Reliability: As stated:

1. The following information was received from the same source who has, from time to time, submitted information of a startling and fantastic nature, and which has seldom been proved to be reliable:

"GENTLEMEN: Related with my recent report on activities at Honolulu Pearl Harbor Hawaii Naval Base and the use of the word Molokai I have run across the following vital information bearing on that subject and related features. From different contacts and two especially one being the Naval I. S. agent Wagner Schioferle, who has recently been here from Managua Nicaragua, I am glad to be able to hand you two rough pencil drawings with inserted explanatory data of a new type of light draft short radius submarine that is now being built in quantities at the Japanese Navy shipyards at Japan.

"This submarine has a surface displacement of only 350 tons, carries four torpedo tubes has a maximum radius of action of 600 miles and carries a crew of ten men. This submarine is fitted with German N. A. M. engines made in Augsburg, Germany and shipped direct to Siberia on the Trans-Siberian Railroad and from there to Japan.

"Actual time of construction to build one of these small submarines is 5 months and their mission is what I find is as follows:

"These subs are so fitted with remote control electric magnetically actuated diving valves and air valves that they are susceptible of being operated from small 3 centimeter lead covered under water cables attached to the deck of said submarine and extended in the water along the floor of the beach to the shore line at which point you will observe from my rough

drawings as near as I can remember all the details of the different attachments that the submarine can be made to rise and sink simply by operating magnetic electric valves in the inside of the submarine by the mere opening and closing of the electric control circuits, the wires of which run to the shore and are concealed under the surface of the water.

"The only object of being outfitted with this remote control system of diving and elevating mechanism without requiring any man being on board is to slowly bring into the region of this Molokai Island in the Hawaiiis at which point the American government have established a large Leper Colony for people afflicted with Leprosy. These small subs it is planned to bring on to the number of about 12. Then they will be conveniently sunk in the shallow waters surrounding this Island in depths not to exceed 40 feet of water. Procedure so far followed in test experiments show that these subs can be sunk and will remain under water for perhaps of as long as 30 days without being compelled to raise them for charging of batteries.

"Plan consists in arriving at point of submergence where the exact depth of water is tested with a depth indicator on board. All men are removed from the interior of the ship the conning tower door is clamped down tight to prevent the entrance of water then the Three outer control cables are unwound and attached to the connection on deck after which a small boat carried on board leaves for the shore carefully unreeling these three cables until the Low Tide water level at shore is reached at which point the cables are tied down to the shore or else buried under the sand.

"All crew members of the submarine are then removed to shore in this rubber boat the submarine having been anchored fore and aft with light weight anchors to prevent it from drifting. Crew which is Japanese goes ashore and are met there or along side the craft by Japanese sampan Fishing vessels that take them to the other Islands where there are large colonies of Japanese working in the sugar fields and pine apple plantations and there are definitely absorbed with no chance of possible detection.

"Before crew is taken on board other vessels or given refuge in the other islands the control cable running ashore that controls the magnetic diving valve is made to charged using the direct current from the submarines stored batteries the circuit is closed stored valves inside the submarine respond to the flow of current coming from the Control Cable ashore the sinking tank start to fill with water and the submarines sink in a very few minutes.

[Handwritten: "If and when war comes between Germany and the U— S— or Japan and the U— S— the plan is to at once use this small fleet of submarines for lightning attacks on the U— S— Navy Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor."!]

"After once sinking this submarine can remain sunken on the ocean floor for 30 days. In the meantime, another cable shown on my drawing containing six wires and also anchored at the shore has a very ingenious air pressure gauge for indicating the air pressure of the air contained in the submarine tanks with a scale of I think five pressures so that if, for any reason this air pressure in the sub tanks leaks out or suffers any drop in pressure which would render the next raising of the submarine impossible the Japanese spies who are charged with the supervision of this submerged submarine fleet and working unobtrusively in their sampan vessels makes trips from time to time to check the air pressure in these tanks by simply uncovering this electric air pressure gauge and taking note of the reading.

"I also invite your attention to the existence of a special five Centimeter steel reinforced rubber hose all coiled and tied down to the deck of the submarine with its corresponding wooden float or buoy. This hose is attached to the main air tanks through the medium of the pipe attachment on deck. In case then if the gauge on shore indicates that the Submarine is losing pressure the word is given to bring in at night one of the aforesaid fishing craft run by the Japanese and which you will find is provided with a modern High Pressure Air Compressor specially provided to recharge these tanks in case of exhaustion. On board this simple fishing craft there is equipment for a deep sea diver who can descend at once to the deck of the submarine, untie rubber hose and its wooden float and the hose rises at once to the surface due to the action of this float. After the hose is on the surface of the water the small fishing vessel at once makes attachment to it and the air in the submarine tank is immediately recharged. It takes 35 minutes to recharge these tanks using this fishing vessel.

"After tanks are fully charged the air compressor still continues to charge the tanks inside; however, the use of a Safety Valve inside the submarine to prevent excess air pressure from bursting the tanks starts to function and this excess air is accordingly blown out inside the interior of the submarine. This continues until the air pressure inside the submarine is slightly in excess of the pressure of the water surrounding the submarine at which time it starts to purge and finds its escape through the Low Pressure Purge Valve that I have indicated on my pencil drawing.

"This performs the function of driving out the foul air in the sub and prevents corrosion due to the foul gas that comes from the submarine's electric storage batteries. At the time of wishing to cause this sub to rise the operation is very simple consisting simply in training one man to close the shore cable circuit this causing the air to be admitted to the diving tanks, the water is immediately expelled and the sub comes to the surface without any other manipulation.

"Going back to the primary function of this submarine fleet I find that about 10 of these small craft will be brought in to the vicinity of these Hawaiian Islands sunken and the crew members secreted ashore. If and when war comes between Germany and the United States or Japan and the United States the plan is to at once use this small fleet of submarines for lightning attack on the United States Navy Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor.

"Both high commands feel that a surprise attack of this kind would cause the loss of all United States Airplane Carriers which is the principal objective of the Japanese High Command.

"Due to the fact that these small subs have such small cruising radius it has been necessary for them to be towed and I find that the Japanese tanker called Kenwo Maru conducted an experiment recently on her way to Los Angeles, California, by taking one of those small subs from the Marshall Islands to a base where a base has been established to the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands at which point those subs were again taken back to the Marshall Islands in tow by another Japanese tanker for the object of giving the members of the sub crew experience in the deep sea towing of these vessels; also the tanker accompanying these sub supplies them with fuel for the expenditure of the fuel that they have to take for battery charging and the operations of their propulsions, appears during the day when practically all navigation is done under water to prevent any detection by other vessels of the fact that these subs are being towed by this tanker.

"I repeat a base is now established at the Marshall Islands and this submarine fleet will slowly be increased until such time as at least 11 or more of these small crafts are safely sunk near Pearl Harbor.

"I will have more this next week on further use of these small units. I beg to remain,

"Sincerely,

"Yours truly,

_____."

2. On June 15, the following further information was received by the same source.

"Gentlemen:

"Confirmatory to telephonic advices given to Sr. D M at his residence at 1:25 a. m., yesterday morning I wish to inform that I secured data just a short time before to the effect that 3 under sea boats dealt with in my last letter have been brought in and sunk either with the object of making tests or for the purpose of starting a definite establishment of a group of these boats off the coast of Molokai Island.

"Information here indicated in a vague way that these subs were successfully sunk and that definite locations have been found on shore line for these boats but information is not entirely clear as to whether ships have been submerged permanently or just by way of experimental test. More data will be prepared.

"Respectfully,

"Yours truly,

_____."

[Handwritten: "From: M. A. Mexico City Report No. 9899 June 17, 1941."]

3. The military attaché is unable to place an evaluation on this information. It was obtained by Mr. Lockett, commercial attaché of this Embassy, by Senor Villaseñor, President of the Bank of Mexico, who during the Cardenas regime was sub-Secretary of Recferio. It was given Senor Villaseñor by one of his agents. Numerous requests have been made for information regarding the identity of the agent and circumstances connected with his reports, but Sr. Villaseñor refuses to divulge with it. For this reason no evaluation is attempted.

The agent is believed sincere and he reports what he gathers from subversive individuals. These individuals may or may not be telling the truth. Their purpose may be propaganda or a form of war of nerves, or it may contain an element of fact.

On account of the serious nature of the information, it is submitted without other comment. The Navy Department may be able to determine the practicality of this scheme, and if it warrants investigation. If it can be used in Hawaii, it can be used in Santiago, Panama, and other Naval bases. A copy of the information quoted above has been given the office of the Naval Attaché in this Embassy.

GORDON R. _____
Colonel G. S. C.
Military attaché.

G-2 Distribution: 4, ONI.
Classification: Confidential.
From: M. W. Mexico City.
Report No. 2899.
June 17, 1941.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff Inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st indorsement list accompany papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

No. of Ind. from and Date	To	Subject: Japanese Residents of T. H.— Loyalty of—ONI Report	
1st Ind. Cont. O. 3 Feb. 42	G-2 -----	Forwarded for your information. (1 Incl: ONI Report dated 1/26/42, above Subject).	B. G. W. B.
2nd Ind. G-2 RE 4 Feb. 42	CO -----	Noted.....	K. J. F.

Form NN1-119

745-C—S/M Base. PH.—11-16-41—6M.

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Confidential

Date: 26 Jan. 1942

Subject: JAPANESE RESIDENTS OF T. H.—LOYALTY OF

Report made at: Honolulu, T. H.

Report made by: C. B. Baldwin, Lt., I-V (S), USNR; R. W. Breed, End., I-V (S), USNR.

USNR.

Period covered: 16 Dec., 1941; 26 Jan., 1942.

Status of Case: Closed.

Origin of Case: Fourteenth Naval District.

Character of Investigation: Report on specific incident as illustrative of Subject.
Enclosures: None.

Copy to:

ONI (2)	13ND (2)
CincPac (2)	14ND (2)
Com14 (2)	MID-HD (2)
11ND (2)	BIO-Kauai (1)
12ND (2)	FBI-Hon (2)

Source File No.: 14ND #1798.

ONI File No.:

SYNOPSIS: Report predicated upon Japanese plane crash on 7 December, 1941, and events subsequent thereto, on Island of Niihau, T. H. Niihau is one of smallest Hawaiian Islands, its meager population consisting mostly of Hawaiians and a few Japanese engaged in cattle raising, and communications with other islands are nil except by boat. Thus the residents of Niihau had no cognizance of the Japanese attack, or its extent and effect, until several days after it took place. Pilot of this plane survived and was taken prisoner by local Hawaiians, who confiscated his sidearm and flight papers. Among guards of the aviator were an American-born Japanese named Harada and an alien Japanese named Shintani, neither of whom had ever been considered disloyal to the United States. Shintani attempted unsuccessfully to secure possession of the pilot's papers by bribery, stating it was a matter of life and death, and that Japan had forced him to take this action. Shintani, however, later repented and re-joined the Hawaiians. With the aid of Harada, the pilot recovered his pistol and a shotgun, set up two machine guns from his plane, and dominated the island. Pilot was finally killed by an audacious Hawaiian couple, and Harada committed suicide. Shintani is now in custodial detention.

DEDUCTIONS: The fact that the two Niihau Japanese who had previously shown no anti-American tendencies went to the aid of pilot when Japanese domination of the island seemed possible, indicates likelihood that Japanese residents previously believed loyal to the United States, may aid Japan if further Japanese attacks appear successful.

CLOSED.

RWB/zv

APPROVED:

MAYFIELD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.

Confidential

26 JANUARY, 1942.

Subject: Japanese residents of T. H.—Loyalty of.

On Sunday, 7 December, 1941, a Japanese fighter plane crashed on the island of Niihau, T. H. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, was seized by the local Hawaiians and his pistol and papers were taken from him. He surrendered and at first was peaceable and friendly, speaking English fluently. At the time of the landing, SHINTANI, a Japanese alien resident on Niihau, held a brief conversation in Japanese with the pilot, the subject of which was not understood by the Hawaiians. SHINTANI had at this time no record of any subversive activities or tendencies.

Niihau is one of the smaller islands, being seventh in size in the Hawaiian group, and its meager population consists mostly of Hawaiians and a few Japanese. The people of Niihau have very few weapons, and had no means of communication, by radio or otherwise, with the Mainland or the other islands during the week from 7 December, 1941, to 14 December, 1941, which is the period to which this report pertains. Thus it is conceivable that the presence of the Japanese plane gave the inhabitants the impression that the other islands of the Hawaiian group had been invaded and captured by the Japanese; and the actions of the inhabitants with respect to the enemy pilot may be noted in the light of such possible belief, which also may have been fostered by the pilot.

The aviator was kept under guard pending his dispatch to Kauai, nearest of the more important islands. When, on Wednesday, 10 December, the islanders found themselves unable to send the pilot to Kauai, due to the failure of a motor launch to arrive at Niihau, the aviator was quartered at the home of YOSHI HARADA, American of Japanese descent. Several Hawaiians remained

to keep guard at the house of HARADA, who up to this time had shown no sign of disloyalty and took his regular turn at guarding the pilot.

On Thursday, 11 December, HARADA sent a messenger to SHINTANI to come and assist him in guarding the pilot, stating that he, HARADA, did not desire the responsibility of being the only Japanese in charge of the pilot. SHINTANI replied that he would join HARADA on the following day, Friday. He did so, and a conversation in Japanese was held between HARADA, SHINTANI, and the pilot. The nature of the conversation is unknown.

On the afternoon of this same day, Friday, 12 December, SHINTANI attempted to secure the pilot's papers and pistol from the Hawaiian who had possession of them, by offering the Hawaiian a bribe of two hundred dollars. SHINTANI said excitedly, in the course of the attempted bribery, that it was a matter of life and death and that Japan had forced him to take this action. The attempt at bribery failed, and SHINTANI took no further action on the pilot's behalf. SHINTANI has since been placed in custody, however.

On the same afternoon, HARADA and the pilot succeeded in obtaining HARADA's shotgun from a building near HARADA's house. With the shotgun, the pilot captured the Hawaiian guard and locked him in a warehouse. About 1730 that afternoon HARADA and the pilot broke into the house of the Hawaiian who had custody of the pilot's papers and pistol. HARADA was carrying the shotgun and covering a Hawaiian prisoner at the time. The pilot recovered only his pistol at this time. The owner of the house had been in hiding during the burglary; and, after the Japanese left, he removed the papers and secreted them elsewhere, after which he warned the community of the pilot's escape.

The pilot and HARADA then secured two machine guns from the plane and set them up in the village. HARADA, brandishing a gun, seized a wagon and horses from some Hawaiians and forced a captive to load machine-gun cartridges from the plane into the wagon. HARADA told a Hawaiian that the cartridges were enough to kill off every man, woman, and child on the island.

That night HARADA and the pilot broke into SHINTANI's house in search of the flight papers. They failed to find them and became furious; and later, when they saw SHINTANI in the village, they pursued him, but he escaped and joined the Hawaiians, who had scattered to the mountains and beaches. Thereupon the pilot and HARADA took as prisoners the few Hawaiians who happened to be in the village at the time, and bound them.

About midnight the pilot attempted to send a radio message from his plane in Japanese. A few Hawaiians heard him, although they did not understand the message; and the residents, now assuming that a war must be going on, were alarmed at the thought that the pilot had sent for aid from the enemy. While the pilot and HARADA were absent from the wagon containing ammunition, the Hawaiians recovered the machine-gun bullets and secreted them. At 3:00 a. m. on 13 December, the aviator burned his plane and the House of the Hawaiian who had custody of the papers. However, the Hawaiians had already sent the pilot's papers to Kauai, via a small boat, under cover of darkness. The pilot and HARADA told the Hawaiian prisoners that they would be released if they disclosed the location of the papers.

On 13 December an audacious Hawaiian couple succeeded in killing the pilot, whereupon HARADA committed suicide. Both men were buried at Niihau. An expedition squad of twelve armed soldiers arrived from Kauai at 1350 that day, having been apprised of the situation by the Hawaiians arriving in the small boat which had left Niihau with the pilot's papers the night before.

CONCLUSIONS: It is worthy of note that neither SHINTANI nor HARADA had previously exhibited un-American tendencies, living docilely so long as the American Government was the established one. Attention is also invited to the fact that the Island of Niihau was isolated as to communication, so it is conceivable that the presence of the Japanese plane induced a belief among the residents that the Hawaiian Islands were under Japanese domination; and the residents were in fact alarmed about the possibility of further Japanese aid for the pilot. These facts indicate a strong possibility that other Japanese residents of the Territory of Hawaii, and Americans of Japanese descent, who previously have shown no anti-American tendencies and are apparently loyal to the United States, may give valuable aid to Japanese invaders in cases where the tide of battle is in favor of Japan and where it appears to the residents that control of the district may shift from the United States to Japan.

CLOSED.

CONFIDENTIAL

EHG/td

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS AREA
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
Governors Island, New York, November 28, 1941.

Subject: GEORGE PAISH (PAISN).

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarter Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Referring to your communications dated September 30 and November 5, 1941, there is inclosed herewith copy of a report made to this office by the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding subject.

2. This is transmitted for your information and records.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

F. J. Pearson,
F. J. PEARSON,
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
Executive Officer, G-2.

1 Incl—(dupli) cpy FBI rept.

[Panned notation: 336.8—Japanese.]

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY OF FBI REPORT

An attempt was made on September 24, 1941 to contact MR. PAISN at the address furnished by this office to the Newark office, at which time it was learned from his daughter-in-law, MRS. DONALD C. PAISN, that his true name is SIR GEORGE PAISH and that he could be interviewed at 52 Briarcliff Road, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, as soon as the family had completed moving to that address. Subsequently, on October 4, 1941, SIR GEORGE PAISH was interviewed, at which time he furnished the following information:

SIR GEORGE went to Japan in the Spring of 1939 for a three weeks' lecture tour at the instance of the Yokohama Species Bank. During his three weeks' stay, he delivered about 15 lectures before business groups on subjects pertaining to world trade. The central theme of these lectures was the necessity for world trade to the happiness and prosperity of nations and the necessity for world peace to make trade possible. SIR GEORGE returned to England via Hawaii and the United States in the Spring of 1939. Upon his arrival at Honolulu, he was taken in tow by the Honolulu representative of the Yokohama Species Bank, whose name at this time he could not recall. He attributed great significance to the relations which he observed between the Species Bank representative and a group of people at a party given in his honor. At the party, the Hawaiian "Fire Goddess" danced and otherwise entertained the gathering.

SIR GEORGE was introduced to several ladies by the "FIRE GODDESS" and during the course of the evening he turned the trend of conversation to any spirit of nationalism that might exist among the Hawaiians. He was told that the Hawaiians are "a spirited people". He inferred from this that the possibility exists of a move towards independence on the part of Hawaiians if the United States should enter war with Japan and that the Hawaiians might all pray to a Japanese promise of "liberation".

SIR GEORGE also noticed that the United States' fortifications seemed to be inadequately guarded and he feared the possibility of the Japanese prevailing upon the childlike nature of some Hawaiians to influence them to carry in a bomb or otherwise sabotage the stores of the United States Army or Navy garrisons on the islands. SIR GEORGE stated that he had no particular individuals in mind but that at the time when he wrote the letter to the President it seemed to him that the crucial moment in Japanese-American relations had arrived and he felt it incumbent upon himself to utter his word of warning to America to be on guard and alert as to her outposts. He stated that he now considers this danger lessened due to the astute diplomacy of the United States State Department.

SIR GEORGE also furnished two copies of a reprint from "Le Canada" of Montreal, of a speech which he gave on July 22, 1941 entitled, "The World's Unlimited Emergency", and two copies of an advertising broad-side outlining his publications and ability as a lecturer.

It was noted that SIR GEORGE is a man of considerable age and a charming conversationalist. However, he seemed to be living somewhat in the past in that he interspersed his account of the Hawaiian incident with frequent reference to pre-World War associations, characters and historical events.

I am furnishing the above for your confidential information.

CONFIDENTIAL

F

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

336. 2—Foreign Armies

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,

M. I. D.,

18 August 1941.

Subject: FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

Summary of Information:

Following information received:

"----- reports July 25th.

A. July 18th 200 Japanese secret police arrived Saigon.

B. July 21st Lieutenant General HOMMA (GOK ITA) commander-in-chief Formosan army and Major General SUMIDA (IPB JYS) arrived Saigon with 30 German and Italian advisers.

C. On mornings of both July 20th and July 21st air reconnaissance carried on over Saigon by 6 aircraft.

D. July 20th one cruiser, one destroyer, one unidentified auxiliary and four repeat four transports packed with troops arrived CAMRANH BAY.

Message ends."

Distribution:

Evaluation

-of source -of information

X Reliable X

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,*

M. I. D.,

18 August 1941

Subject: FORMOSA.

Summary of Information:

Following information received:

"A. June 16 150 infantry transferred from TAICHU to KOGO for parachute training and on June 18th 200 paratroops were transferred from KOGO to ROKKO.

B. KOGO area now under martial law and entry near-impossible.

C. Recruiting for army and labour corps still being maintained."

[Penned notation: 336.2—Foreign Armies.]

Distribution:

Evaluation

-of source -of information

X Reliable X

CONFIDENTIAL

G

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

GX2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

350.05—Foreign Intelligence—General Reports No's 1 to 34
Classification: Confidential.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN, MILITARY AGENTS.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Source: B. F. See separate communication.
Believed reliable, except as indicated.

Summarization of Report

When required:

1. Japanese agents and military activities abroad. (5935)
2. German agents and advisers in Japan. (5940)
3. German raiders. (7020)

1. (5935) JAPANESE AGENTS AND ACTIVITIES ABROAD

a. Military attache to Rio de Janeiro. On 12 September it was reported that Colonel OUTSONOMIYA of the Japanese S. I. S. organization in Shanghai had been appointed Military Attache to Rio de Janeiro, in which capacity he will act as a link between Japanese and German S. I. S. and officials.

b. Suspected agent in Netherlands East Indies. In October the Japanese political agent OKANO TETSUO returned to N. E. I. on the KT ANO MARU. Having lived in N. E. I. since 1915, OKANO possessed a settlement permit and did not need a visa. According to a police report OKANO was employed by a high Japanese official during his stay in Japan. During his former stay in N. E. I. OKANO was in close contact with many suspected Japanese.

c. Code expert to N. E. I. Reported in September that Japanese courier, NOMOTO TATSUO, would be attached to Consulate at Batavia for two months after his return from Singapore. Consul General ISHIZAWA said he was a cipher expert attached to give instructions on use of new complicated Japanese code. NOMOTO told immigration authorities that he would hold conferences at various Japanese consulates. KAWASAKI YOSHIKI also a code expert in service of Japanese Navy. He is registered as a secretary to Consulate General; sailed from Japan 11 September. (Reliability excellent.)

d. Japanese and German intelligence in S. E. Asia. On 12th September it was reported that German and Japanese S. I. S. reached an agreement whereby the Germans will operate in all far eastern countries not occupied by the Japanese except Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, N. E. I., and the Philippines, which are operated by the Japanese. In spite of this agreement, Germans intend to operate in all far eastern countries under cover of the D. N. B. In Indo-China the D. N. B. and Domei will operate private W. T. stations! In Shanghai the Germans are operating Gestapo type of organization for political information. (Fairly reliable.)

e. Japanese Recruiting Chinese Agents. In September, the head of a department in the Nanking War Ministry reported having been approached secretly by General Ochita HATA, who requested his cooperation in enlisting Chinese agents

for work in Thailand, Burma, and Malaya. HATA stipulated that candidates should be either pure Fukinese or Chinese speaking the dialect of that province. Source stated that a certain number of men were recruited and dispatched overseas at hands of one CHEN KUANG, returned Japanese educated Chinese. Those chosen in all cases, had some previous military knowledge gained through service with Chinese troops. CHEN KUANG was said to be responsible directly to Japanese Military H. Q. at Nanking. (Reliability fair.)

2. (5940) GERMAN AGENTS AND ADVISERS IN JAPAN

a *German advisers.* (Dated 7 October 1941)

- (1) KURE, 5 working in shell factory and 4 in shipbuilding yard.
- (2) YOKOSUKA, 18 working in munitions factory, 26 in shipyard, 6 at aerodrome.
- (3) MAIZURU, 5 working on A. R. P. (air raid protection).
- (4) TOTSUKA, 18 aviation and parachute instructors, 2 constructional engineers.
- (5) SHIPUAKA, 8 working on aerodrome.
- (6) NAKAMITA, 10 working at aerodrome.
- (7) NAGOYA, 4 working at Aichi aircraft factory.
- (8) HIMEJI, 5 working at chemical warfare factory.
- (9) Three Germans, living at OSAKA, pay periodic visits to Nankai Heavy Industries Corporation to superintend parachute manufacture.
- (10) Source was told that 125 Germans, en route for Japan, were detained by U. S. S. R. on outbreak of Russo-German hostilities.
- (11) Source also told that 11 German aviation and parachute instructors were stationed at Nanking, and a total of 84 were attached to Japanese forces at Shanghai, Hankow, and Nanchang. (Numbers given with reserve.)
- (12) Movement of 30 German personnel from Japan to Indo-China was previously noted.

b. *Activities of German agents.* Information from a German source, reported to have good connections in Japan, states:—

(1) German ambassador in Tokyo is concentrating (a) on breaking down democratic tendencies of Court groups and winning over to pro-Axis views the heads of the Japanese Fleet who are anxious to avoid conflict with America; (b) on destroying the purely Japanese prejudices which have so far prevented the unification of the anti-Soviet, pro-Axis, and Right army groups into a united front; and (c) encouraging higher officers in the KWANTUNG and KOREAN armies to adopt an independent policy of action in respect to Far Eastern Soviet Army.

(2) German ambassador has considerable influence over General SENJURO HAYASHI, Admiral SUETSUZU, Admiral RYOSO NAKAMURA, Colonel HASHIMOTO, and among such civilians as SEIGO HAKANO, MITSURU TOYAMA, and KENSO ADACHI. "Waverers" at present are General ARAKI and General SUGIYAMA.

(3) In KOREAN and KWANTUNG forces, the following are known to be influenced by the German ambassador: Lt-General KIMURA, General ITIGAKI, Major-General MITSUNAMI, and Lt-General TAKAHASHI. These are stated to be quietly at work propagating for a move against Soviet forces in the Far East on the basis that Japan cannot enter into negotiations with either America or U. S. S. R. government resulting in a guarantee of the inviolability of Soviet Far Eastern frontiers and, in consequence of this, provide the possibility whereby the Soviet High Command could reinforce the West by withdrawing forces from the East. (Moderately reliable.)

c. *Agent obtaining raw materials for Germany.* Head of OTTO WOLFF informed source that, acting under instructions from Hamburg headquarters, he was buying up materials of which Germany is or will be in great need, such as wolfram, rubber, tin, etc. In particular they are interested in the purchase of supplies of these in Siam, where it is proposed that they shall be stored under innocuous names until such time as they can be delivered to Germany. (Reliability believed good; dated 6 October 1941).

3. (7020) GERMAN RAIDERS

It was reported that Germany has issued orders to German ships in North China to proceed to Japan under Japanese flag. They will be armed to operate against U. S. ships carrying supplies to Vladivostok. (Reliability uncertain; dated 10 October 1941.)

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

G-2, HAWN. DEPT.

Copies furnished to

ONI

FBI

Classification: Confidential.

Report No. 25.

Date: 18 November 1941.

[Penned notation: 350.05. Info on foreign countries.]

Classification: Confidential.

Enclosures: No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN, Aerodromes and Aircraft (Continued).

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Source: Various observers.

Reliability: Good unless otherwise indicated.

Summarization of Report When Required:

Continuation of G-2, Haw'n. Dept. Report No. 13, 29 Sept. 1941.

1. (9185) Aerodromes.
2. (9505) Aircraft factories.
3. (9570) Types of aircraft.

1. (9185) AERODROMES IN JAPAN

a. KASUMIGAURA aerodrome, located on shore close to western corner of LAKE KASUMIGAURA, east of and adjacent to AMI village. Lat. 36° 02' N., Long. 140° 14' E. Roughly rectangular, total area, inclusive of buildings, about 1200 x 2000 yards. Source informed that south edge of landing field has been extended about 300 yards. Surface sand and grass. On east side 26 buildings provide accommodation for headquarters, offices, barracks. These are two story buildings painted in camouflage patches of brown and green. Two steel hangars with workshops, about 200 by 90 feet high, on north edge. Source told that aircraft were stored in three layers in these hangars. New, large, circular hangar, about 250 yards in diameter was completed at end of 1939, in southeast corner. This hangar only protrudes about 20 feet above ground at its highest point and is believed to extend some distance below ground level. It is built of reinforced concrete, covered with earth and grass. There are 8 doors to this hangar. The W/T station is situated on the south edge. Seaplane and flying boat facilities are believed provided by two hangars on north edge. A number of mooring buoys were seen off shore. What appeared to be three catapults were seen on water's edge, north of aerodrome. Source was informed that there is an aviation school here with 600 students. Total of 2,600 aviation personnel is stationed here. Two high towers for parachute training were seen on the south edge. Source was told that 1,000 troops were being trained as parachutists, but it was believed that this large number was being tested out as to suitability and only a small proportion would be retained for training. Ten Germans were attached to this aerodrome and to the neighboring UDA aircraft factory. Source saw about 20 aircraft along south edge, including 6 or 7 Messerschmitts Me 110.

b. SUNOSAKI (1GD EAB) naval aerodrome and seaplane base, 45° 58' N., 139° 49' E., 6 km. east of promontory of same name and 4 km. west of town of JOJE (VHA HAL). Area about 100 acres. Possibly identical with TATE-YAMA aerodrome.

c. FUNAHASHI (OJL HOP) Military aerodrome, 35° 42' N., 139° 56' E., west of and adjacent to railway station of same name. Area about 106 acres. Four hangars, also barracks. 300 paratroops from Eastern Section Army headquarters undergoing training here under German supervision. Source states "there is an aircraft factory in vicinity with German technicians attached." Perhaps identical with SHINOSAKI aerodrome.

d. AKITSU (LTA IFX) military aerodrome, 35° 49' N., 139° 29' E., one and a half km. north of railway station of same name. Area about 170 acres. Total of 3,000 personnel stationed here, of which a very small proportion are believed to be paratroops being trained by German instructors. Perhaps identical with SAYAMA aerodrome.

e. SHINAGAWA (RGU ECB) aerodrome and seaplane base, approx. 35° 38' N., 139° 44' 30'' E., one and a half km. southeast of railway station of same name. Area about 80 acres: Possibly identical with SHIBATA aerodrome.

f. YOKAIDO (BYO, PON, SIR) military aerodrome, 35° 40' N., 140° 09' E., one km. northwest of railway station of same name. Area 75 acres.

g. MIO (AAF AHU) military aerodrome, 35° 00' N., 38° 31' E.; small number of paratroops from SHIDZUOKA military formations are under training here.

h. SUMA (UHN LIL) naval aerodrome, still under construction, about 5 km. west of KOBE. Area about 325 acres.

i. KANOYA (UZH DUW) military aerodrome, 31° 25' N., 130° 51' E., locally known as KASANOHARA (MEN TAK AYO) aerodrome; area about 325 acres. Parachute unit being trained by German instructors. Aircraft factory in vicinity employing several thousand workmen. Possibly identical with KANOYA naval aerodrome.

j. TSUDANUMA (IFX, JYS, IEC) military aerodrome, area 75 acres; paratroops of first division under training here.

k. YOKAICHI (BYO, GAZ, ECK) military aerodrome, locally known as KAWAI (ECB, BAC) aerodrome, area 125 acres.

l. OKAYAMA aerodrome has underground hangars similar in construction to that of KASUMIGAURA aerodrome (a, above), with capacity for 50 aircraft.

m. New aerodrome has been constructed at TOKO. This is said to be the largest in Japan.

2. (9505) AIRCRAFT FACTORIES

a. UDA (NYI JYS) aircraft factory, located 3 km. south of KASUMIGAURA aerodrome (see 1. a.), 35°59' N., 140°14' E. (Note: this disagrees with another report which states that it is in TOKYO, but KASUMIGAURA might loosely be called "near Tokyo".) This factory has been producing aircraft for the past 3 years, Labor force, 3,500. Production: 45 aircraft a month. (It is believed that this factory is used only for assembling aircraft.) The German Messerschmidt Me 110 is under production here. On 20 May, source saw 6 or 7 Messerschmidts on the adjacent KASUMIGAURA aerodrome.

b. HANEDA (NYI, JYS) aircraft factory, Tokyo, recently has produced 100 Italian 3-engine midwing monoplane bombers. These aircraft have been delivered to army and have been seen in the air over Tokyo. (Note: Source gave above characters for name of factory, but gave romanization as UDA, characters for this are (UCO, JYS) which resemble those given by him.)

3. (9570) AIRCRAFT

a. On 28 May, at a naval air demonstration at MISAKI near YOKOHAMA, source saw two 3-engine monoplanes and 18 twin-engine monoplanes. The three-engine aircraft were Italian "Piaggio P. XI. RC 40" bombers, manufactured in Japan. Engines are 14 cylinder, 1000 horsepower. Load capacity: 4,200 kilogrammes. Camouflage on under wings was light blue, gray and pale green in large irregular patches. It has been suggested that these aircraft were so-named because they are fitted with Italian engines. The twin-engine aircraft were German Messerschmidt Me 110 fighters, manufactured in the UDA factory. These aircraft gave a demonstration of low level dive bombing. Source noted that both these types of aircraft had single rudders, and stuck to this statement even when shown pictures in Jane's. Both these types of aircraft are based on

the SUNOSAKI naval aerodrome, near the promontory of the same name on the southwest tip of CHIBA peninsula.

b. Under the supervision of German engineers, the SHIBATA aircraft factory has produced a 2-engine monoplane fighter. Armament: 2 fixed machine guns (cannon guns?) and 4 movable machine guns. Tests have proved very satisfactory. The Germans refer to this as Messerschmidt and the Japanese as the "16th Year of Showa" (1941) type. (Casual observation, without definite reliability.)

c. A new type of high altitude bomber, built in Germany, has been reported in South China area. Described as Heinkel-land (IHA OMR GYH OYK) type 98. Its special function is "silent approach" bombing.

4. (9905) AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT

On 25 August, 22 twin-engine bombers, commanded by Colonel MORIYAMA (H DU DY A) arrived at KIUNG SHAN aerodrome (HAINAN ISLAND) from Formosa. They are stated to be dive bombers, but this is to be accepted with reserve. According to air force gossip, it has been decided that with the advent of foggy season at CHUNGKING aircraft at HANKOW will be transferred to the southern area and that after September 500 bombers are to be based in Indo China.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
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A. C. of S., G-2.

Report No. 23.

Date: 3 November 1941.

G-2, HAWN. DEPT.

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Classification: Confidential.

Penned notation: 350.05—Info. on foreign countries.]

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Source: Businessman, resident of Japan.

Reliability: Believed good.

Summarization of Report, When Required:

Foreign relations; raw materials and manufacture; war morale of civil population; troop mobilization; troop embarkation points; airports; anti-aircraft; para-troops.

1. (3850) FOREIGN RELATIONS. The Italian influence in Japan is negligible; the German very strong. There are several thousand German citizens in Japan and many are giving their technical services to the army and bringing strong political pressure to bear on the government. German successes or defeats in Russia have a marked effect upon political negotiations now going on between America and Japan. A Russian collapse may precipitate a Japanese move against Siberia. The Japanese desire not only to remove the threat of Vladivostock, but to occupy all of the Maritime Provinces. There seems to be doubt in Japanese minds as to whether or not the U. S. fleet would oppose them in the Pacific if they move against the Soviets. Their aggression will continue unless the U. S. makes up its mind to fight. Meantime, while the Japanese people are going through many hardships with unquestioning loyalty, the war machine is not breaking down, their war industries are becoming adjusted to the blockade, and their navy being augmented. Apart from Japan's determination to liquidate the China affair, they are prepared to take advantage of any weakness that may

encourage them to move either north or south. The fact that their plans for expansion are boundless is a reality and not an idle dream. The military still believe that the Germans can win, and that between them they can cause the collapse of the Soviets. A lining up of their armies, supplies, etc. will prove fatal to the cause of the democracies.

2. (4000) **ECONOMIC.**

a. (4020) *National Mobilization* is at its maximum and fully supported by the entire nation. Children from the age of 14 up to old men and women of sixty are engaged in munitions in defense industries. The war program has the full support of the people despite their many sacrifices.

b. (4115) *Oil and Gasoline.* There is an extensive storage of gasoline, under rows of temporary wooden buildings, at YOKOHAMA, at the west end of the harbor, near the Yokohama Yacht Club. At TSURUMI, across the harbor from Yokohama, there are Japanese oil installations, next to those of the Rising Sun and Standard Oil Company.

c. (4120) *Iron Ore.* Large, high grade deposits of iron ore have been uncovered in Manchukuo, making possible delivery to army and navy of important supplies of special high grade steel (see 4310, below.). The ore itself runs to 54% pure iron, producing 99.4% sponge steel. It is claimed that 100,000,000 tons of ore are near the surface, with at least 200,000,000 tons lying below the surface. The mine is located a short distance east of MUKDEN, with a broad gauge railroad leading to the main line between MUKDEN and DAIREN. Large stocks of crushed ore already have been stored at the steel works and they are being augmented steadily.

d. (4120) *Tungsten.* Japan is said to be obtaining tungsten and other special metals required in the manufacture of high test steel, from North China and Korea. Source believes that it would be a great mistake to underestimate Japanese capacity to mobilize in the future vast stocks of such raw materials for war purposes.

e. (4200) *Rice.* The domestic Japanese rice crop this year is estimated to be 10% below normal. However, this shortage will be made up and excessed by supplies from Indo-China. Only the shortage of shipping bottoms can possibly interfere with adequate rice supplied for the Japanese populace and army.

f. (4240) *Rubber.* Up until recent months there has been a severe shortage of rubber, but this gradually is being relieved since Japan's occupation of Indo-China. Now sufficient supplies are being received to care for military requirements.

g. (4240) *Lamp black.* There is a severe shortage of lamp black. Japan urgently requires 9,000 tons for their tire industry. This is being partially met by a very limited domestic production.

h. (4300) *Manufactures, general.* S. K. F. have for some years supplied Japan with major ball bearing requirements. These supplies have been stopped completely since the Soviet-German war interrupted rail shipments across Siberia. Despite the production of high grade steel in Manchukuo, Japan does not have facilities for manufacturing ball bearings, and unquestionably they are facing a serious shortage. Japan has been dependent on foreign equipment for their heavy industries, but they are working on a comprehensive plan to switch over from light to heavy industries. Sufficient time will enable them to realize this program. They are also concentrating on the tool industry to become independent of foreign countries. At TOTSUKA station, near YAKOSUKA naval base, there are several large, three-storied, wooden military establishments for manufacturing light military equipment, such as clothes, belts, etc. There are two plants adjoining the Bridgestone tire plant at KURUMI, Kyushu (see 4360) and a large one on the rail line at FUKUOKA, all supplying various military supplies to the army, such as shoes, clothing, helmets, etc.

i. (4310) *Manufacture, iron and steel.*

(1) In JAPAN proper, the great iron and steel foundries are located at KOHURA on the railway running between JOJI and FUKUOKA. They cover a narrow area nine miles long, running parallel to the railroad. This is the heart of Japan's iron and steel industry, and if destroyed would gravely cripple the army and navy.

(2) *Manchukuo sponge steel.* Large quantities of steel, said to be equal to high grade Swedish steel for tools and armor, are being produced in Manchukuo. The plant is located just outside of the port of DAIREN, on a railroad spur leading directly to the DAIREN-MUKDEN railroad. The grounds cover about 80,000 tsubo (66% acres). In March, 1940, two furnaces were in operation, producing 40,000 tons, and a new 30,000 ton plant was just being put in operation. A plant of similar type, capacity 100,000 tons, was being constructed. It was hoped that

this would be completed before the end of 1940, but construction was held up by shortage of building materials. It is believed that priority rights have been granted by army authorities so that it will be completed before the end of 1941. The combined production, upon completion of this, will be over 180,000 tons of this special steel, with twelve sets of electric furnaces in operation. Continuous additions to the plant are being contemplated with a final goal of 1,000,000 tons. It is stated reliably that they are using an entirely new and secret process, requiring neither water, charcoal, coke, nor high grade coal. Only a low grade of ash coal is required, and ample supplies of this are available from their own coal mines in Manchukuo. (Regarding the iron ore, see 4120, above.)

(3) Extensive "heavy industries" operate at FUSHAN, near MUKDEN, independent of Japan, but supported to a large extent by the Japanese armies in Manchukuo.

j. (4330) *Motor car manufacture.* For years, Ford at TSURUMI, near YOKOHAMA, and General Motors, outside of OSAKA, have dominated the passenger and truck markets of Japan. Today they have shut down entirely. They refuse to bring in parts for assembly, as no dollar exchange is available. Also, the Japanese Government passed the National Automobile Industry law some five years ago to protect and enable them to develop their own industries. During these last five years, they have made considerable progress, especially with trucks, military six-wheelers, and tanks.

The four most prominent factories are as follows:

Nissan Auto Co-----	Near TSURRUMI
T. E. G-----	" TOKYO
Nakajima Iron Foundry-----	" "
Toyoda Auto Co-----	" NAGOYA

All of these plants easily may be detected from the air. Production figures are unknown, but source estimates that total number of trucks produced monthly exceed 1000 units. They are copied after old American models, inferior in quality. They are 4th class compared to American army units, requiring much service, and with very short life, say six months to one year in the field.

The Nissan Automobile Company, leading Japanese auto company, is located at TSURRUMI, east of the Ford Motor Company's assembly plant. They turn out several hundred trucks monthly, modeled after the old 1934 Paige. This plant easily covers two acres of ground, and is the backbone of the army's truck production. Its destruction would seriously cripple the army. It can be located readily from its size and the fact that it lies between the YOKOHAMA-TOKYO highway and the bay. Originally commercial, it has been taken over by the army.

The T. E. G. and Nakajima factories, located in the suburbs of Tokyo, turn out special military trucks (and presumably light tanks), such as large 6 wheelers and scout cars. These are slow, lumbering jobs, but stand up better in the field than the Nissan-Toyoda units. Capacity of the plants unknown, but these two companies and the Nissan-Toyoda supply virtually all requirements.

Toyoda is located on the main railroad between TOKYO and KOBE, near the city of NAGOYA or just east of the city. Covers perhaps 200 acres and also is just east of five high aerial towers. Its trucks are copied after old Chevrolet models, and are considered inferior to the Nissan units. Production about 300 units monthly. Financially bankrupt, but now financed by the army.

k. (4330) *Motorcycle manufacture.* Within recent years many new military establishments have been erected along the water front between HIROSHIMA and KURE at UJINA, a small village on a short spur railroad out of HIROSHIMA. Here a large military establishment makes motorcycles and important naval equipment. Motorcycle capacity, 400 monthly. Another motorcycle factory is located near SHIMAGAWA (Tokyo). Formerly controlled by Harley Davidson, it now is 100% Japanese. Capacity of factory, 200 motorcycles monthly.

l. (4360) *Rubber products.* The Yokohama Rubber Co. is located at TSURUMI, east of the Nissan factory. It produces 800 truck tires daily, and manufactures miscellaneous military equipment for the army and navy, such as hose, etc. Goodrich formerly owned controlling interest, but have withdrawn, except possibly holding a royalty interest. This company, along with Dunlop, KOBE, and Bridgestone, KURUME, supply all military tires to the army and navy.

Dunlop is on the main railway line as you approach KOBE from OSAKA. It now is controlled by a Japanese Board of Directors, and thus the army. Source, however, believes that Dunlop, England, still controls a large share of the company. They endeavored to sell out, but Japanese were unable to pay in Sterling. They can supply 1200 truck tires daily.

Bridgestone is located at KURUME, KYUSHU, on the river front and also the main railway between FUKUOKA and KUMAMOTO. They can produce 1500 truck tires daily.

Bridgestone also has a factory at TSUIGTAO, China, producing 300 truck tires daily. They also have a new factory at LIAYANG, Manchukuo, about a half hour train journey south of MUKDEN on the main line to DAIREN. This is mainly a synthetic rubber plant, but also makes miscellaneous rubber equipment for the army.

m. (4380) *Concrete*. All concrete and structural steel building in Japan has ceased, unless they are for specific military projects. In some cases military plants are built of wood, owing to shortage of construction steel.

3. (5970) WAR MORALE OF CIVIL POPULATION. The masses in Japan are well informed by press and radio, which are filled with highly colored propaganda. Despite restrictions and hardships of all kinds, their unity and their remarkable national spirit drives them forward. No sacrifice is too great, and there is not a chance of revolution in Japan, so long as they continue forward as they are doing. Their blackouts are highly successful, but their ground defenses against bombing are very weak. Source believes that mass bombing attacks would have a devastating effect on the morale of the people.

4. (6545) A TANK PROVING GROUND is located at CHIBA, across the bay from TOKYO.

5. (6610) TROOP MOBILIZATION has continued throughout Japan (up to time of source's departure, Oct. 15, 1941), reportedly to reinforce central China units and to augment forces in Manchuria. Many reserve officers, known to have been held for any special Siberian developments, for which they have been trained for cold climate work in Manchukuo, in recent weeks have been called to the colors. Large forces are available on the Manchukuo border for a possible offensive against Russia should they collapse before the German offensive. Conscriptioin is at its highest peak since the beginning of the China "incident".

A very large number of horses were mobilized all over Japan in June-July period, and reportedly sent to Manchuria for cavalry and horse-drawn units. Source observed many horse concentrations in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA districts as trainloads passed through these cities.

6. (6905) TROOP EMBARKATION POINTS. The principal troop embarkation points observed by source were:

a. SHINAGAWA, by train. This is the south Tokyo railway station.

b. NAGOYA, by sea.

c. KOBE, by sea.

d. MIABORA, by rail. This is an important rail junction on LAKE BIWA, between NAGOYA and KYOTO. Troops from north and central Japan destined for Manchukuo pass through this junction enroute to TSURUGU, one of the principal embarkation points on the Japan Sea for Manchukuo, SEI SHIN, and VLADIVOSTOK.

e. The other principal port on the Japan Sea is NIIGATA, with fast steamer service to SEI SHIN. A railway connects with Manchukuo and to the Soviet border. NIIGATA is only eight hours by rail from TOKYO.

f. Troops from the south embark at SHIMONOSEKI (opposite MOJI) for Fusan garrison enroute to Manchukuo via Korea.

g. Troops and supplies from KYUSHU island pass through MOJI to SHIMONOSEKI by ferry. A tunnel now is being built between MOJI and SHIMONOSEKI. The pilot tunnel has been completed and the main tunnel should be ready within two years.

h. There is some troop movement from KYUSHU out of the ports of NAGASAKI and SASEKO, the latter being an important naval base. There are military establishments in KYUSHU at KAGASHIMA, KUMAMOTO, KOKURA, and FUKUAHA.

7. (9185) AIRPORTS. There is a large naval aerodrome and seaplane base connected with the YAKOSUKA naval base. At this point, back of the hills and in the YAKOSUKA-YOKOHAMA highway large aeroplane machine shops are located. There are naval or military aerodromes reported at KAGASHIMA, KUMAMOTO, KOKURA, FUKUAHA, SASEKO, HIROSHIMA, and YOKOHAMA. The large aerodrome behind HIROSHIMA is shut off from view from the railroad by a high plateau.

8. (9840) ANTI-AIRCRAFT. Gradually all principal cities are being protected by anti-aircraft batteries as well as military and munition establishments. These batteries are reported to be limited and defenses relatively weak. Source believes that Japanese have manufacturing facilities for the Swiss gun, but not of the most recent design. Searchlights and listening devices also are being utilized.

9. (9960) PARA-TROOPS were used for the first time during the last of September and early October this year (1941) in the central China area. They particularly were used in the assault against CHANOSHA when plain clothes men were dropped from three different points over the city. The attack was not successful—the Chinese mopped up the para-troops. Hence the report, "Japanese evacuated Changsha".

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
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G-2, HAWN. DEPT.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: FORMOSA

Sources and Degree of Reliability:

Diplomatic resident. Reliability good.

Summarization of Report When Required:

Foreign relations; volunteer recruiting of Formosans and their loyalty to Japan; fortifications; war planes; air raid precautions.

1. (3850) FOREIGN RELATIONS.

A. *South Formosa closed to foreigners.* Since April, 1941, the Province of TAKAO (South Formosa) has been closed to foreigners. Even resident Spanish missionaries have been required to leave. An Italian freighter, which had been at refuge in TAKAO since June, 1940, was ordered by Japanese naval authorities to move to KOBE.

B. *Japan's anti-white attitude.* The Japanese as a nation are not anti-British or anti-American—they are anti-white. They have no love racially for the Germans, but cannot help themselves. Their intention quite definitely is to try to throw the white man out of the Far East. Germans and Italians are included. Any temporary modification of their program is purely a matter of expedience—a marking time until the moment is ripe. The military will not and cannot give up the program upon which they have embarked.

C. *American citizens of Japanese ancestry.* Source believes that Canadian and American citizens of Japanese ancestry *cannot be trusted*. He has definite knowledge of their having betrayed the countries of their citizenship. When caught their excuse is that they were forced by Japanese authorities against their own desires—highly debatable!

2. 6240 VOLUNTEER RECRUITING FOR FORMOSANS. In (?) May, 1941, the Governor General introduced a volunteer system for Formosans. A similar system had been introduced into Korea in 1938 and had met with some success, the young Koreans having become saturated with the fervent nationalism taught in the Japanese army. The nebulous mysticism which is the core of this spirit is essentially Oriental in character and it is a mistake to suppose that a governed people like the Koreans and Formosans, in spite of the subordinate position in which they deliberately are held, regard it as alien and compulsory. In

the hands of the Japanese educationalists, as they have been for a quarter and a half a century respectively, their minds have been conditioned methodically to this doctrine, and the young generation now rising will be a tremendously powerful instrument in the hands of Japanese nationalists unless steps are taken now or very soon to break the Japanese military power and discredit their doctrines in the minds of the young. The jubilation and martial air of the Formosan children, when marching in procession to celebrate the opening of the army ranks to Formosan volunteers, was not assumed to order, although the processions themselves were, of course, organized. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the conditioning of the young for national expansion is older and more fanatical than anything Germany has known, as shown by their school text books and popular literature.

3. (6800) FORTIFICATIONS. The whole of the south half of Formosa has become a military garrison (strength of effectives not ascertainable). The beaches are fortified against possible attack. The harbor of TAKAO steadily has been improved for troop embarkations. The transports themselves are based at the PESCADORES, since TAKAO is open to heavy seas throughout the summer months and is not suitable for basing large numbers of transports.

4. (9000) MILITARY AVIATION. Up until the end of July Japanese war planes seen in the sky over North Formosa were of not very modern design and their speed seemed very moderate. From the end of July planes of more modern design and higher speed were seen. Planes based on the northern aerodrome at TAIHQKU were used for bombing the China coast of FUKIEN and CHEKIANG provinces. The main air defense and striking force are concentrated in the south of Formosa, opposite Hongkong. It is presumed that the authorities consider that any hostile air attack would come from the south and that it could be broken up before getting further north.

5. (9840) AIR DEFENSE. Throughout the island there has been almost continuous air raid drill. This consists largely of training the Formosan public to cooperate in extinguishing fires and controlling lights. Anti-aircraft guns have not been visible or audible on any of these occasions, and it is impossible to say if and where they exist. Searchlights have been of antique pattern. There are few air raid shelters in the principal towns, and much publicity has been given to the need for building more. Japanese householders in many cases have been canvassed and ordered to construct one for each group of houses, but these facilities (up to the end of July) were quite inadequate. Experiments were going on for the conversion of drainwater to drinking water in case of emergency. "Emergency" and "preparedness" were the constant cries of the newspapers and the armies.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
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Report No. 20.

Date: 23 October 1941.

G-2, HAWN. DEPT.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

American shipping agent from Kobe enroute to San Francisco. Believed reliable.

1. (3500. *Treatment of foreigners.*) There is intense anti-American and anti-British feeling in both Kobe and Yokohama. Every obstacle is put in the way of these nationals trying to complete formalities to leave Japan. They have to

stand in line in the streets for hours awaiting their turn for examination by local police or prefecture officials, only to be told to come again next day. Detailed and annoying personal search is made, particularly of British, before they leave.

2. (4115. *Petroleum products*.) Supplies of lubrication oil and gasoline are stored in valleys at ITOZAKI, near the Naval base, off the Inland Sea. These valleys are dammed at either end with concrete blocks and the whole area covered with soil and planted with grass. A stevedore's superintendent told source that the Japanese navy had oil reserve for 2 years. The Maruzen Oil Co., Shanghai, is reported to be still importing gasoline and oil from the United States, which is then transshipped to Japan.

3. (6905. *Troop movements*.) Source reports that about 10 September, 800 trucks assembled in Sports ground and loaded soldiers. He could not state regiments since no civilians allowed near, but he had opportunity to count the trucks. Their destination was supposedly Dairen.

4. (6905. *Troops in French Indo-China*.) In early September a Frenchman from Saigon told source that the Japanese were bluffing regarding the number of troops in French Indo-China, to divert public attention from the huge numbers being sent to the Siberian front via Dairen. The Frenchman estimated Japanese troops in French Indo-China were only 35,000. Another source gives 40,000.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,

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G-2, HAWN, DEPT.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Saigon business man, believed reliable.

Summarization of Report When Required:

Gloomy picture of present conditions in French Indo-China.

1. The Japanese advance party arrived at Saigon the latter part of July. They picked out and requisitioned both public buildings and private residences, giving occupants but 24 hours notice to vacate. The main body of Japanese troops arrived about August 8. They have continued to arrive, in numbers far in excess of what should be necessary to garrison and "protect" a country like Indo-China. This leads one to believe that invasion of Thailand is contemplated.

2. Business in Indo-China is at a standstill. Imports and exports, other than those controlled by Japanese, practically have ceased. Food materials are being requisitioned by the Japanese, so that it is very difficult for white residents to live. Even the rice and fish of the natives are being curtailed. Payment is made by the Japanese in paper yen, which have very little buying power in circulation.

3. With war supplies greatly diminished as a result of the trouble with Thailand, it was impossible for the government of French Indo-China to resist this invasion by Japan. Prior to the arrival of Japanese forces the sympathy of many Indo-Chinese had been with Japan. As a result of this taste of Japanese aggression, sentiment very largely has swung against Japan. The natives desire a return of previous conditions under the French. The sympathy of the majority of the French is with Britain. They believe that the only solution of their difficulties is the defeat of the Axis.

4. A report from Manila states that steps are being taken by Japanese:

A. Completely to suppress all pro-Chungking elements in Indo-China.

B. To encourage Annamite independence movement, which definitely would be pro-Japanese and anti-French. Results would create internal domestic trouble throughout Indo-China, providing further excuse for expansion of Japanese control.

Kendall J. Fielder,
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G-2, HAWN. DEPT.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: THAILAND.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

News correspondent returning by clipper to U. S., fairly reliable; and other sources as indicated.

Summarization of Report When Required:

Japan attempting to dominate Thailand thought, business, and government.

1. (2900. *Propaganda*). Thailand is being overrun by Japanese and their propaganda. They control 3 of 16 newspapers, including the influential Bangkok Times. Domei news is furnished free of charge to all Thai papers, and its volume far exceeds Reuters and D. N. B. combined. Control of Thai thought is being attempted by the announcement in Tokio of Thai events and decisions, regardless of facts. For example, a trade agreement is under discussion. At a critical moment it is announced to the world from Tokio that Thailand has accepted, although such may not be the case. This has great nuisance value in embarrassing the Thailand government. Reading rooms in Thailand clubs are being flooded with Japanese publications. Italian journals of recent date also are available. But British and American publications are old or unavailable. Source recommended that "wavering countries", such as Thailand, should be copiously supplied with well-illustrated journals displaying the might and power of the United States. Persons in the Orient listen to Rome, Berlin, and Tokio broadcasts, he said. What he thought is needed is strong American propaganda "bursting out of Manila", instead of "canned music and innocuities." American news reels are accepted in Thailand, but British propaganda films are not accepted in northern Thailand. (This last from representative of M. G. M.)

2. (3850. *Foreign relations*). It is reported from Manila that on August 18 the Japanese Minister to Thailand handed the Prime Minister the following proposals:

A. SATTAHIB naval base to be loaned to Japan.

B. Six aerodromes in north, south, and west to be leased to Japan, who would undertake to improve them.

C. Double tracks to be laid on railway ARANH to BATTAMBANG.

D. Japan to guarantee territorial integrity and independence of Thailand.

E. Japan to cooperate in improving Thai armed forces.

3. (4000. *Economic*). Japanese penetration, begun five years ago, is seeking economic domination of Thailand. Source estimated that there are 3,000 Japanese in Thailand, some well supplied with funds and entertaining extensively.

Thai shops were full of Japanese, who were willing even to pay "upped prices." In 1939 Thailand's foreign trade was 4.7% with U. S., 23% with Hong Kong, and 15.4% with Singapore. Much of remaining trade is with Japan. If Thailand is unable to obtain machinery, electrical, and other equipment from America or Britain, the trade will be forced into Japanese hands. The only raw material exported by Thailand which Japan does not control is tin. Most of this comes from southern Thailand, which is pro-British.

4. (7500. *Navy auxiliary*.) Investigations were being carried out during August by Japanese Special Service Department agents, as to the number of lighters and their tonnage in the Gulf of Siam. (From Manila, believed reliable.)

5. (8220. *Airways*.) Dutch air lines continue to operate into Thailand, and there is a line operated by the Chinese National Aviation Corporation. There is daily Japanese plane service out of Bangkok. Passengers carried by this last are said to be Japanese, Germans, and others friendly to the Axis.

6. (9000. *Air*.) Japanese troops dominate the Thailand-French Indo-China frontier, with extensive air bases near the border and within 250 miles of the Burma Road. Danger of penetration of Thailand by Japanese parachute troops was stressed.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

G-2, HAWN DEPT.

Copies furnished:

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Classification: Restricted.

Report No. 8.

Date: 25 September 1941.

[Penned notation: 350.05—Foreign Intelligence. X336.2—Foreign Armies. X091—Japan.]

[1] Classification: Restricted.

Enclosures: No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: JAPAN AND JAPANESE RELATIONS.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Various, reliability as indicated.

1. JAPANESE EXPANSION NORTHWARDS

Responsible British source reported that Itagaki favors expansion northwards, and that his appointment as C-in-C in Korea might be interpreted as a precaution against the need for big operations in Manchuria, for which Korea would be the first reserve pool. A technically competent observer in Hong Kong, 21 August, confirmed this view and added that Ushiroku, formerly C-in-C in South China, now Chief of Staff at Nanking of Japanese forces in China, is of same persuasion. He may be counted on not to neglect the north, however tempting easy gains in the south may be at the moment.

Renewed reports from Shanghai that observers there expect something to happen in Thailand, South China, Indo-China, etc. by a certain date, such as September 15, bear all the earmarks of crude Japanese attempts to wage a war of nerves on the democracies, doubtless at the request of the senior Axis partners. The Japanese in the past often have revealed their long term objectives, very seldom have talked about their next move and carried it out, secrecy in that respect being a habit with them.

2. JAPANESE TROOP MOVEMENTS NORTHWARD

Between July 10 and 17 about 50,000 Japanese troops passed through Mukden, proceeding north. They carried full war kit. (No means of checking numbers, which should be accepted with reserve.) During this period a total of 75 troop "specials" passed through Mukden. Flat cars carried [2] artillery and tanks. Japanese station master of South Manchurian railway, Mukden, on July 21 stated that he had received orders to transit a total of 240 troop specials, but over what period was not stated. As South Manchurian Railway was short of cars, these would be drawn from Peking-Mukden, Peking-Suiyuan, and Peking-Hankow lines.

On July 20, troops from Jehol area arrived in Mukden. They travelled in special troop trains via KOUPAUTEE on Peking-Mukden line. Source saw great activity at TANGKU TUN junction.

It was reported August 5 that mobilization and reequipment of troops in Korea, Kwantung, and Manchuria was quietly progressing in preparation for eventual movement against the Soviet.

There has been a "tug of war" between high ranking military officials as to when northward move should be launched, and that question was still unsettled, August 5. It was thought that the only event which would stop the move would be a decisive German defeat at hands of Soviet.

High Japanese official expressed some concern over Japanese anti-aircraft defense and lack of air raid protection, but no further details were mentioned.

3. MANCHURIAN MILITARY RAILWAYS

It was reported, August 8, that the following railways in Manchuria now are regarded as military lines on which the number of passenger trains has been reduced to a minimum:

- a. Harbin-Lafa-Tunhara, and to Korea via Tumen.
- b. Harbin-Peian-Heiho.
- c. Hsingehiang-Taonan.
- d. Taonan-Doekk-Arshan.
- e. Tsitsihar-Peian.
- f. Tsitsihar-Bukhedu-Mailar and Manchouli.
- g. Tumen-Mudadzian.
- h. Mudadzian-Tzetsiamusi.
- i. All railways in Jehol.

Since end of June, 1941, steps have been taken to increase capacity of single track Hsingchiang-Harbin by constructing sidings and numerous small stations for storage.

In Kwantung leased territories, since 1940, sand bag emplacements guarding bridges, stations, etc., have been replaced by permanent brick and cement structures.

Japanese War Office has acquired by purchase several large buildings in Harbin, and private hospitals have been warned that they may be taken over if necessity demands.

4. JAPANESE TROOP MOVEMENTS FROM FRENCH INDO-CHINA AND HAINAN

On June 8, 12,000 men left French Indo-China. It was rumored that they were bound for Manchuria, but this is given with great reserve. On June 14 the following units of the 11th Division, totalling 3,300 men, left Hainan for unknown destination:

HIROSE (EGZ IRX) Infantry regiment
 NAKAMURA (AAW GPA) Medium Artillery battalion
 HIRAOKA (EED DYJ) Transport Company
 YOSHINO (BAD TAK) and KUNO (COP MZA) Cavalry Squadrons.

[3]

5. JAPANESE MOVEMENTS SOUTHWARD

A. To SPRATLY ISLANDS. On April 19, two armed merchantmen arrived Kobe and unloaded scrap metal and 1,000 caskets of ashes. They were loaded with construction materials and 40 cases of aircraft components. The cases measure 8 x 6 feet. 400 men of a naval landing party and 130 coolies who had been segregated until going on board, embarked on April 21. The ships left for Spratly Island on April 21.

B. FORCES IN SANCHE AND KUKOK ISLANDS. Out August 2, 500 naval landing party left SANCHE ISLAND. Total remaining garrison strength, 400 naval landing party and 200 puppets. Stock on hand: 2,000 cases small arms ammunition, 900 cases shells.

At KUKOK ISLAND are 200 KATSIMURA (AUE GPA) naval landing party, 100 having left on July 22.

C. IN FORMOSA AND VICINITY. Between July 7 and 15, about 25 aircraft arrived at OKAYAMA aerodrome nightly from Japan. Aircraft based there July 19 were: 40 three-engine monoplane heavy bombers, 40 twin-engine monoplane medium bombers, 40 single-engine monoplane light bombers, 60 monoplane fighters, 20 reconnaissance, 4 four-engine transports. This is the largest aerodrome in Formosa, being about one mile square.

July 14, 6 fighters arrived at TAIHOKU from QUEMOY ISLAND.

July 10 to 11, 15 fighters arrived at KAGI from Japan.

July 15, 15 monoplane fighters arrived at HEITO from KWANGTUNG.

Aircraft reported at Quemoy Island, 12 fighters.

June 6, mines by naval units from Pescadores Islands.

July 11, 200 mines and 120 torpedoes landed at TAKAO from Japan.

July 25 the following aircraft left OKAYAMA aerodrome for HAINAN:

24 twin-engine monoplane heavy bombers.

15 monoplane fighters.

3 reconnaissance bombers.

July 28 the following aircraft left OKAYAMA aerodrome for Indo-China:

6 three-engine monoplane heavy bombers.

9 single-engine monoplane light bombers.

July 26, 27 aircraft, composed mainly of twin-engine monoplane heavy bombers, arrived KAGI from Japan and left July 29 for Indo-China.

August 1, 9 heavy bombers and 6 fighters left HEITO for Indo-China.

D. TO AND IN INDO-CHINA. July 20, the following Japanese troops left KARENKO for Indo-China:

[4] 24,000 TAKAHASHI (URA HOP) infantry,

1,200 ISE (AES AUI) artillery

600 KONDO (SOY MRU) and FUKASE (IIU IRX) A.F.V. units, with:

16 armored cars, 15 light tanks, 40 motorcycles, 32 field guns.

Paratroops are being trained daily at TOGO aerodrome, 8 aircraft used.

Japanese strength in TONKIN area, August 1, approximately 25,000.

Japanese strength in southern Indo-China, Aug. 12, approx. 36,000.

Collaboration between French and Japanese authorities appears close and it is believed that French troops are to be sent to the YUNAN and KWANGSI borders.

Quantities of railway equipment are being sent to PNOM TENH for the construction of a railway to the THAI border.

July 28 a transport left TOSHIYEN for Indo-China after loading 20 launches, 120 mines, and a quantity of naval ammunition.

August 21, strength in southern Indo-China was about 80,000, composed of units of Guards, 28th Division, 38th Division, Formosan army corps, and naval landing party. (This is given with reserve pending confirmation.) High commands are:

Lt. General IIDA, Army

Major General KWANGI (MIV GOH), air

Vice-Admiral HIRATA (EEU JYS), navy.

6. TROOP MOVEMENT IN JAPAN. There are naval bases or depots at KOSHIRO, TAKAHACHI, and ZUSI, and air bases at KAMAKURA and TOYOHASHI.

Sources state that at end of June there was considerable movement of Japanese sailors from TOKIO to KOSHIRO and TAKAHACHI, and that between June 26 and 28 numerous trainloads of young men arrived at ZUSI. At NUMAZU source observed soldiers wearing green badges on shoulders and also several howitzers with camouflaged gun platforms, pushed by heavy trucks. At HAMAMOTO he observed 97th, 72d, and 8th Divisions. At WUSHIZU, 22d Division. At OKOYAMA and HIROSHIMA, 2d and 4th Divisions. New oil tanks were in this district, which is very heavily industrialized.

All these observations made at end of June. Agent has had military training, but is newly recruited, and no opportunity to cross examine him.

7. JAPANESE INSTALLATIONS. A. Aerodromes in Japan.—A large aerodrome is under construction near KAMAKURA. (This is believed identical

with TOTSUKA aerodrome.) Overall dimensions: 3,500 by 3,500 yards. Labor force of 8,000, under supervision of 18 German engineers. Aerodrome expected to be completed in August. 3,000 parachute troops are under training there.

Polish refugee journalist in Japan, at end of June, said he had seen great earth-works, indicating underground aerodrome, with planes landing, at TAKARUZUKA. (Observation not considered very reliable.)

[5] Area between KOBE, AWAJI, and SAKAI is heavily fortified. (Creditable)

B. *Oil Tanks in Pescudores Islands.*—Ansan Naval Base has large surface tank, capacity 600 tons; small surface tank, capacity 400 tons. One underground tank at TAISHOKU FORT, capacity 400 tons. One underground tank at Keimo-U aerodrome, capacity 300 tons. Comment: Fairly reliable; reported August 20, 1941. It is regretted that source was unable to differentiate between types of oil fuel.

8. JAPANESE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR.

A. *Naval.*—Floating dock at KOBE, capable of accommodating ships of 16,000 tons, is expected to be transferred to HAINAN. At end of May an "aircraft tender" was under repair in this dock. Total of 2,000 workmen, working day and night shifts, were engaged on aircraft tender and reconditioning the dock. (Casual observation).

In collaboration with German advisers, the construction of 75 submarines is projected in Japan. Shipyards in Osaka have been allotted 20 of these jobs, of which the Osaka Iron Works are to build 4. (Casual).

Twenty vessels are under construction at Harima shipyard, OSAKA, with 24-hour day work being done on the jobs in May. Vessels expected to be completed at end of July. Specifications: Displacement 100 tons; dimensions 200 feet x 28 feet x 5 feet (note that these dimensions give a displacement well over that reported, and therefore are given with utmost reservation); speed 30 knots; armament, 6 machine guns. Said that these ships are to be used as troop landing craft in southern expansion.

Hearsay information, given with utmost reserve, states that some old hulks have been emptied of machinery and equipment, and "pocket destroyers" are being constructed *within* them. As a further aid to secrecy, the position of these hulks are changed by towing from one place to another. This may be an exaggerated account of Japanese tendencies to secrecy, but there may be something in it, and the report is passed on for what it is worth.

B. *Ordnance Construction.*—Naval guns are being made a OSAKA arsenal under German supervision. May 8, warships at YOKOSUKA were being fitted with guns from this arsenal. (Casual observation.)

C. *Aircraft Construction.*—Beginning of April, three German engineers arrived at Aichi Aircraft Factory, NAGOYA, from the Dornier Works. Name of one is given as Andernich (DJI IZU DUN). They are supervising construction of a new type of fighter. This is described as K-22 type, twin-engine, two-seater. It is still in the experimental stage. Production aimed at is 50 a month. (Note, this production figure coincides with that given for dive bomber reported as being manufactured in this factory in January.) Labor force 2,600, working day and night.

[6] A shadow factory situated at KAWAGUCHI in Osaka in mid May started manufacture of fighter aircraft wings and parts of fuselage for the Aichi Factory, NAGOYA. Labor force: 2,600, working 10 hours a day. Estimated production: wings, etc. for about 100 fighters a month. Three German advisers are attached to this KAWAGUSHI factory.

Aerial bomb factory in HIMEJI, names Nakabe (AAW?SRY) Heavy Industrial Works. Labor force in mid May, 600. Monthly production: 3,000 aerial bombs and 2,500 flares. Four German engineers are attached.

9. JAPANESE FOREIGN RELATIONS. A. *With Great Britain and the United States.*—Admiral NOMURA has been instructed to work for a modification of American embargo policy and to offer readjustment of American-Japanese relations on basis of mutual recognition on land, sea, and air of all areas defined and recognized as spheres of influence of U. S. A. and British. (Reliability unknown, dated August 5, 1941.)

At a meeting held by High Command at CANTON on July 27 to discuss retaliatory measures on British and American freezing, the following steps were decided upon and forwarded to TOKIO for approval:

1. Ascertaining financial holdings of British and Americans in South China.

2. Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied zone and possibility of their expulsion.

3. Banning of exports to HONG KONG and tightening of blockades. The ——— government to be forced to cooperate in this measure.

4. Expediting the plans for the subversing of Indian and Chinese personnel in British forces.

5. Unifying of new territories of HONG KONG and KULANGSU to the Puppet Government.

It was reported (August 15, 1941) that as a retaliatory measure for British and American action against Japan, Japanese military authorities discussed with Nanking Government the desirability of blockading International Settlement on lines of TIENTSIN blockade of British concession. Japanese "Business" Shanghai strongly opposed this and sent delegation of four representatives to interview General KAGESA at NANKING. Latter assured delegation that if any steps were taken along lines suggested at any time, every effort would be made to safeguard Japanese interests operating in International Settlement. He further stated that they were not contemplated in the near future as there was no complete accord between Japanese naval and military authorities on these matters.

B. JAPANESE SPONSORED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AT HONG KONG.

(1) *Incitement of Disturbances and Riots.*—Plans are prepared for the creation of strikes, disturbances, and riots at Hong Kong, when and if Japan breaks with Britain. One of the principal agents for this is JOHN LUI, senior member of Shanghai Tai Ping Insurance Co. One of Lui's close associates is the son of Chief Detective of Amoy, CHENG SAI HOL. Lui also is believed to have been the founder of Tung Man Alumni Association.

[7] Japanese hope to recruit about 100,000 refugee street-sleepers to take part in sabotage and nuisance activities in Hong Kong on outbreak of hostilities between Japan and Britain. A large number of these already are receiving financial assistance from the Japanese.

It is believed that puppet officials of Chungshan area and Japanese agents are being permitted to enter Macao with arms, and that this is the channel through which large quantities of illicit arms are being smuggled into Hong Kong.

(2) *Japanese Agents.*—LAM FEI, representative of Wang Ching Wei in Hong Kong, with 45 senior agents, is mainly interested in collecting military intelligence and recruiting questionable characters for subversive activities.

TAKEDA, of Special Service Section, is now attached to Japanese Consulate, Hong Kong, to control the intelligence section there.

TAM KOWK-WA, acts as liaison between Special Service Sections in Macao and Hong Kong.

C. RELATIONS WITH THE PHILIPPINES. Japanese business men, including Manila heads of Mitsui and Yokohama Specie Bank, appeared genuinely to believe, August 18, that present Japanese threats of further southward expansion were merely a "war of nerves" and that, under present conditions, Japan does not intend to fight Great Britain or America. (Reasonably reliable.)

A recently selected Sakdal candidate for next political elections states that local (Manila) Japanese agents have been cultivating him closely and volunteering the following information:

1. 650-700 aeroplanes are now assembled on FORMOSA.

2. Attack on PHILIPPINES and SINGAPORE simultaneously will take place about end of August.

3. Campaign in Philippines to begin with uprising in MINDANAO and bombing of MANILA.

4. Attack on SINGAPORE to be overland through SIAM, where at least 3 divisions of Siamese army will support Japanese.

4. Heavy troop concentrations are ready in HAINAN and SAIPAN.

(Source doubtfully reliable: this looks like a whispering campaign.)

August 9, Manila agents of N. Y. K. received telegram from N. Y. K. Tokio office, stating that all "overseas" service is now suspended. "Overseas" means all sailings except Japan-China ports. (Reliable.)

Manila agents, Tokio Fire and Marine Insurance Company, instructed by telegram, August 15, from Tokio Office:

1. To accept no new business or renewals until further notice.

2. To cancel Manila reinsured treaty.

3. To persuade local Japanese clients to insure direct with Japan if possible.

This company's 1940 premium income from Philippines slightly exceeded 200,000 pesos (25,000 pounds). (Reliable.)

[8] D. JAPANESE—THAILAND RELATIONS. Japanese Government reported "considerably perturbed by the insincerity" of the Siamese Government. Japanese Government stated that in spite of military "representations" by Japanese Minister to BANGKOK, there has been little if any improvement in the uncompromising attitude of Siamese Government towards Japan, and that it is clearly due to British and American intrigue and influence.

Instructions have been sent to Japanese Minister at Bangkok to make further immediate and strong representations to Siamese Foreign Office on matter.

FEI WEN CHUAN stated Japanese Government, in carrying out its programme in French Indo-China, is most anxious that its relations with Siam shall be clarified and that unless latter changes its attitude toward Japan and her co-prosperity programme, Japan will take whatever steps she deems necessary to bring Siam into line.

Between July 25 and 29, 12,000 troops left BANGKOK for Indo-China frontier. This is partially confirmed by official Siamese communique which states that infantry, artillery, cavalry, tank, signal, veterinary, and special mission units left for frontier at end of July.

An order has been placed by Thailand with Japanese for delivery in July, 1942, of two warships, probably torpedoboats, to replace three vessels sunk by French. 500,000 ticals have been paid on account of this order.

13 August, 1941. (Casual observation.)

E. JAPANESE PROPAGANDA IN NETHERLAND EAST INDIES. It was reported 12 July that in Japanese whispering campaign in N. E. I., the following was being said:—

1. In MENADO: Japan has decided to attack N. E. I. Local Japanese will be taken off in vessels from PALAU.

2. Japan will send her invading forces, ships and aircraft to N. E. I. from eastwards of the Philippines. N. E. I. will capitulate before aid from U. S. arrives.

3. Japanese will not be evacuated, as evacuation would give N. E. I. indication of pending attack.

F. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. *Blockade of Vladivostok.*—Two separate Chinese sources reported before July 7, that they understood Japan promised Germany, in return for recognition of WANG CHING WEI, to blockade Vladivostok, and that action was likely at an early date.

G. MADAGASCAR. At recent Japan-Vichy negotiations, Japanese delegates expressed concern over Madagascar as controlling Atlantic-Indian Ocean communications. A proposition is mooted for a Japanese fishing company of a million yen to start operations around island.

H. JAPANESE CONTROL OF NON-AXIS INTERESTS. It was reported that following the completion of Japanese military occupation in Indo-China, military have been considering possibilities of securing control of [9] TIENTSIN FRENCH CONCESSION through puppet North China administration.

Local (Manila) military circles consider that, if Tientsin venture is accomplished, similar action might be taken through WANG CHING WEI government at other points in Japanese controlled territory and eventually give them full control of all non-Axis interests. (Aug. 10).

It is reported that paper plans for taking over French Concession in Shanghai have been completed and, provided future developments in the general situation in the Far East do not necessitate change in plans, Nanking Government is expected to assume control in concession before October 10. Committee studying this matter, under chairmanship of HSU LIANG (Foreign Minister) and General KAGESA have forwarded their recommendations to Tokio for consideration.

I. RELATIONS WITH GERMANY. Admiral TOYODA has already informed German Ambassador that Japan is ready to readjust its political relations with Reich as prerequisite for closer economic accord upon which will be founded future economic relations between Asia and Europe, according to a report of unknown reliability, dated August 5.

On April 20, 2 of the German vessels lying at Kobe left for KURE. Guns were to be fitted, and the ships will be ready for sea again about the beginning of August.

On July 31, 700 Chinese laborers were recruited by Japanese in PO ON area for "the German expeditionary engineer corps", and as soon as possible are being sent to Germany.

According to a high puppet official, further recruiting is being carried out.

10. FRENCH INDO-CHINA. The following is from Free French sailors who left SAIGON about August 8:

a. S. S. FRANCOIS LOUIS DRAYFUS is leaving or has left Saigon with cargo of rubber in lower hold marked "Tokyo". Rest of cargo, nature not known, marked "San Francisco."

b. Vessel will be escorted by escort vessel ADMIRAL CHARNER and the submarine PEGASE.

c. S. S. SAGITAIRE has turned back near Cape of Good Hope and will have gone to Madagascar instead of proceeding to France with her cargo of rubber.

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G-2, HAWN. DEPT.

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Classification: Restricted.

Report No. 7.

Date: 10 September 1941

Classification: Restricted.

Enclosures: No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject: Airports in S. W. Pacific and Australasia.

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Unusually reliable expert.

Land planes flying from Hawaii to the Dutch East Indies might make use of the following airfields:—

1. CANTON ISLAND, north rim, undeveloped, but already a possible emergency landing, 1630 sea miles or 1878 land miles from Honolulu. Might be developed at comparatively small expense. Alternate.

HOWLAND ISLAND, a partly developed airfield, 1650 sea miles or 1900 land miles from Honolulu.

(NOTE: Ulm planned to land on south rim of BANNING ISLAND, at Peao.

Conditions of this landing place not known.)

2. FIJI. There are two airports on VITI LEVU Island. One along the Rewa River, northeast of Suva, present condition not known. Another on the Nandi Plain, near Lautoka, N. W. side, present condition unknown. There is a flight of British patrol planes operating in Fiji at present. Definite information about present airfield conditions doubtless could be had from them through High Commissioner for Western Pacific, Suva. An emergency landing might be made at low water on Nasali Beach, near Suva, where a two mile stretch of compact sand over 100 yards wide is capable of holding up aircraft of medium weight.

3. NEW CALEDONIA. Within 9 months an airdrome will be completed about 30 miles northwest of Noumea. When completed it will have two metalled runways, each 2,000 meters long. It is believed that already work has progressed so that a landing could be made. Low clouds and rain in this vicinity might make landing difficult at times. No other landing place is known on this island.

4. AUSTRALIA. Either Sydney or Brisbane airports could be used for the next hop. At both cities good airfields are available, with adequate repair facilities. Sydney is considered better, because in wet weather the grassy runway at Brisbane might bog large, heavy planes.

5. TRANS-AUSTRALIA. There are several usable airfields on routes across Australia:

a. The shortest route is via Charleville (620 miles from Sydney) and Cloncurry (1200 miles from Sydney) to Darwin (2200 miles from Sydney). At Charleville, in wet weather, the ground is soft off the runways, which are about 50

feet wide. At Cloncurry there are long, well-surfaced runways, 1200-1500 yards in all directions. Fuel may be had at these two airfields, but no repair. In summer, flying conditions may be bad in this region; conditions to be expected at 5,000 feet being found on the ground, at 1000 feet. Darwin has an airfield, with facilities for repair.

b. A southern, drier route is via Broken Hill, N. S. W., Oodnadatta, S. Austr., (with good field), Alice Springs and Daly Waters, N. Terr., at all of which airfields are available. There also are good fields at Canberra, Melbourne, Adelaide, and at cities in Western Australia. Wyndham, on Joseph Bonaparte Gulf, northern W. Austr., has airfield which can be used for heavy planes in dry weather.

6. DUTCH EAST INDIES. The best of several airports are at: Koepang, Timor, with good field, fuel, but no repair facilities; Bali, on south coast, west of Denpasar (not the smaller abandoned airfield inland from Denpasar); Soerabaja, N. E. Java, with a modern, first class airport, with repair facilities; Batavia Java, with excellent, new airport; Palembang, Sumatra, good field, but no repair facilities; Makassar, Celebes; Balikpapan, Borneo; and Tarakan, Borneo.

7. NEW GUINEA. There is a good airport at Port Moresby; and smaller ones at Salamanna and Lae. While these perhaps are too small for large bombers, they are being used by Lockheed "14's". There is an airport at Rabaul, New Britain.

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G-2, HAWN. DEPT.

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ONI, 14th Nav. Dist.

Classification: Restricted.

Report No. 4.

Date: 19 August 1941.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

No. of Ind. From and date	To	Subject: General report, Japan and China	
1st Ind. G-2 19 Aug 41	Chief of Staff	For information. This report was forwarded to G-2, War Department, this morning via air mail. 1 Incl. Mil. Attache Report.	K. J. F.
2d Ind. G-2 8/27/41	-----	-----	G. S. C. Chief of Staff.

Classification : Restricted.
Enclosures. No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attache Report—Japan and China

REPORTED BY G-2 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject : General Report, Japan and China.

I. G. No. : See below.

Source and Degree of Reliability :

Various sources, all considered reliable.

1. *CHINA 4000* Following is text of order issued 28 July 1941 by K. Oyamada for administrative Commissioner Chinese Maritime Customs :

"Shipments of exportation and interport export for America and England and their colonies, Burma, French Indo China, Hongkong and unoccupied area of China of following goods are temporarily to be referred to me before release :

"Machinery, provisions, oils, chemicals, cereals and fodder, fertilizer, cotton piece goods and yarn :

"Except for Japan and North China :

(Signed) K. OYAMADA."

2. *JAPAN 6810* (Formosa) on 16 June 1941 150 infantry transferred from Taiohu to Kogo for parachute training, and on 18 June 1941 200 paratroops were transferred from Kogo to Rokko. Kogo area now under martial law and entry nearly impossible. Recruiting for army and labor corps still being maintained. (End Formosa).

On 8 June 1941 following units of 12th division total strengtn 6,000 left Hainan for Manchuria :

46th infantry regiment

48th infantry regiment

24th artillery regiment.

On 14 June 1941 "Hirose" infantry regiment of 11th division left Hainan ; on 30 June 1941 this unit arrived Dairen and went on to Scheungkiang in Manchuria. On 24 June 1941 11th cavalry regiment of 11th division arrived Whampoa from North River area and embarked for Manchuria.

18 July 1941 200 Japanese secret police arrived Saigon. 21 July 1941 Lient. General Homma, commander-in-chief Formosan army, and Major General Sumida arrived Saigon with 30 German and Italian advisers. On mornings of 20 and 21 July 1941 air reconnaissance carried on over Saigon by 6 aircraft. 20 July 1941 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 1 unidentified auxiliary, and 4 transports packed with troops arrived Camranh Bay.

G-2, HAWN DEPT.

Classification : Restricted.

Report No. 3.

Date : 19 August 1941.

Classification : Restricted.

Enclosures : No.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attaché Report—Various

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Subject : General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.

Source and Degree of Reliability :

Business men of experience in the country regarding which they were interviewed. All believed to be fully reliable.

1. *JAPAN 2900* The general public in Japan, which formerly was friendly toward citizens of the United States, has recently developed a hatred for all Americans. The public has also developed a spy phobia as a result of continuous warning from the Government, with almost all advertising, such as on matches, billboards, etc., carrying warnings against spies.

On 11 July 1941 two statesmen were reported shot in Tokyo by young Army officers, in order to force a change in the cabinet; at the time of the incident no one was allowed to enter or leave Tokyo, and all communications were suspended, including local telephone service.

All telephone communications in Japan are now required to be in Japanese only. Trans-Pacific calls to the United States may be made in English, and calls to Germany may be made in German, but no language other than Japanese is allowed in communications within Japan.

4000 Japan is reported to be very short on carbon black; and that they have some stock of roller bearings on hand, but neither the materials nor facilities for producing them, and that any shortage of this item would seriously hamper their airplane production. They are collecting all scrap iron in cities, even including iron fences and ornamental irons on buildings. Other items reported to be short are high staple cotton, rubber supplies, high test aviation gasoline, sugar, flour, leather, wool, and anaesthetics.

Japanese Military Doctors have complained to American Doctors of being short on quinine, ateban, and plasmochin; all of which are used in combating malaria. Malignant malaria and blackwater fever are prevalent in Hainan, in the marshes along the Burma Road in Yunnan Province, and on the Kwangsi Tonkin border. It was reported that 300,000 Japanese troops went from Hainan to Kwangsi, and that only 50,000 returned, the others being lost account malignant malaria on the Tonkin border.

6810 50,000 Troops were reported to have left Hainan in June 1941, leaving only 3,000 troops, in addition to Navy, at that point. Also reported that large numbers of Chinese guerillas are still active in Hainan.

During the last few months, many thousands of young men, all of whom have had military training, have been sent to Manchukuo as farmers. All men working in factories in Japan, regardless of age, have lately been required to take part time military training.

For the last year, troop movements have been through Shimoniseki instead of through Kobe, as formerly. Also during the past year, large numbers of bombers have been flown to China and Manchukuo via Kobe, with planes from other parts of Japan converging on a direction tower on top of Hachibuse mountain about six miles due west of Kobe.

It is reported there are many Germans in all public offices in Japan, even including police departments, post offices, and finance offices; these men are said to wear civilian clothing, but wear a large Nazi emblem in their coat lapel. Many regulations are said to be mere translations from regulations used in Germany. On 3 July 1941 three German raiders put in at Yokohama, which were rumored to be from South America; the businessmen who saw these vessels could not give a description of them, but stated Captain Solberg of the S. S. "Frederick Lykes" could give a full and accurate description.

9185 An airport capable of basing 200 planes is located at Hoihow (Haiko), concrete roads to the airport and a large barracks have recently been constructed at this point, and that approximately 1,000 new trucks arrived at this point during June 1941. It is also reported that there is an airport at Sama slightly larger than the one at Hoihow. Large amounts of food and ordnance supplies are reported coming into Hoihow and Sama. A large emergency airport has recently been built at Haulang Plain about 20 miles northeast of Nodoo, and inland about 25 miles from the north coast of Hainan.

2. AUSTRALIA 4115 Australia uses about fourteen million barrels of oil per year, with none produced there; at the present time gasoline is being rationed at two gallons per month per car. A new oil field has been located recently at "Lakes Entrance", about 200 miles east of Melbourne; the field covers about five square miles, with the pool of oil at 1200 feet from the surface; a shaft will be sunk at a 30 degree slope, and it is believed production of 500 barrels per day can be realized within six months; this crude will be good for 70% lubricating oil only.

It is reported that there is a large gassy coal mine under Sydney, from which vapor gas (methene) of an octane rating of 115 can be extracted, with production equivalent of 20,000 gallons of gasoline per day possible. 140 cubic feet of this gas equals 1 gallon of gasoline, and it can be compressed in drums to equal 10 gallons of gasoline which can be carried on an automobile. There is a total of 10 mines in Australia which can be made to produce this gas within two months, and they are also locating additional mines in New Zealand.

Several large deposits of bauxite have been discovered in Australia, and are now being developed, but development is slow due to shortage of power.

3. *NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES 4115* 40,000 Barrel Refinery at Balek-papen, which is only refinery in area producing lubricating oil, mostly of crude from adjacent areas with small amount from Java, good harbor, 5,000 population, everything owned by Shell Petroleum Company. 45,000 Barrel Refinery at Pladjoe about 20 miles from Palembang, producing 100 octane aviation gasoline and all oil products except lubricating oil, sand bar across harbor limits draft of ships calling there to 18 feet. 45,000 Barrel Refinery operated by Sacony across Moesi river from Pladjoe. 15,000 Barrel Refinery named Pangkalan Branden in North Sumatra near Medan, limited to straight run distilling, no cracking, all crude from nearby areas by pipeline, export by sea. 7,000 Barrel Refinery in Tjepoe, Java, about 60 miles west of Sourabaya, only low quality gasoline produced, only Java supplied, crude from nearby areas by pipeline, delivery by tank car.

9185 Complete arrangements have been made for destruction of refineries, pipelines, and wells, with all wiring, switches, etc., in place; lacking only the placing of necessary explosives, which are kept near the points they would be placed.

Arrangements have been made to evacuate Balek-papen, with place already built in interior to care for all personnel. Plenty of underground protection for all persons at all other places.

It is reported that the N. E. I. Army is composed mostly of natives, and that these natives do not see any need for loyalty to the Dutch. Also reported that half castes in the Army are a possible source of trouble.

4. *BURMA. 4610* Number of trucks arriving at Kunming, exclusive of those carrying salt, increasing from an average of 58 per day carrying 5,220 tons freight in October 1940, to 162 per day carrying 13,071 tons in June 1941. Arrivals at Chungking during the period October 1940 to June 1941 remained about constant, with arrivals averaging 15 per day carrying 1377 tons. Numbers of trucks passing frontier at Wanting are as follows:

	To China	From China
December 1940-----	4,203	3,619
January 1941-----	5,090	4,629
February 1941-----	5,052	5,009
March 1941-----	6,282	6,207
April 1941-----	6,194	5,658

Freight rates are as follows:

Lashio-Wanting-----	\$12.28	per ton U. S. Dollars
Wanting-Kunming-----	112.01	" " " "
Kunming-Chungking-----	111.32	" " " "
Chungking-Kweiyang-----	40.21	" " " "
Kweiyang-Kunming-----	23.04	" " " "

Date: 14 August 1941.

G-2, HAWN. DEPT.

Classification: Restricted.

Report No. 2.

CONFIDENTIAL

H

HEADQUARTERS CPBC

G-2 [CID]

Box 3, APO 456—c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

File 383.4—Spies, Espionage, Agents, Suspects, etc.

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Date: 9 Feb., 1942.

Confidential

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.

Report made at: Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District.

Report made by: Lt. George P. Kimball, USNR, and Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR.

320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Period covered : 5 Dec., 1941 to 9 Feb., 1942.

Status of Case: Pending in 14ND.

Origin of Case: Receipt by DIO-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese Ambassador, Washington.

Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures and References: (See first page of details.)

Copy to:

- ONI (5)
- CinCPac (1)
- Com14 (1)
- FBI-Hon (2)
- MID-HD (2)
- 14ND (3)

Source File No.: 14ND #54A.

ONI File No.:

SYNOPSIS: On 3 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, transmitted by encrypted despatch to Tokyo a system of signalling by lights, cloths, fires, and radio (presumably to communicate with Japanese ships at sea, near the Hawaiian Islands), which signals would be used to announce the departure of U. S. Naval units from Pearl Harbor. The system was conceived, and submitted to the Consulate, by Otto KUEHN, a German subject and ex-officer of the German Navy. Evidence indicates all observation and reporting of ship dispositions and movements at Pearl Harbor was done by Consulate attaches or contacts (including, in at least one instance, KUEHN).

Other than suspicious lights (not conforming to the signal system) seen at night on the island of Maui, subsequent to 7 December, 1941, no evidence has been found that KUEHN's signal system ever was employed.

The decoded body of the despatch of 3 December gave the sender's name as FUJII and the addressee as Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff. Efforts to identify FUJII have so far been unavailing.

KUEHN, who has been in custodial detention since 8 December, 1941, will be charged with espionage and be tried by the Military Commission.

DEDUCTIONS: Japanese naval espionage in Honolulu prior to 7 December, 1941, was carried on by Consulate attaches and contacts, among whom was Otto KUEHN, a German subject.

APPROVED:

I. H. MAYFIELD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.

WBS/zw

[1]

9 FEBRUARY, 1942.

Confidential

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.

References:

- (a) ONI Information Card, Subject MR. AND MRS. KOEHN, 2-13-39.
- (b) Com14 Conf. Ltr. to CNO (DNI), Subject GERMAN LOTTERY, 4-21-39.
- (c) 14ND Suspect List, copy to ONI, 7-29-40.
- (d) 13ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 5-1-41.
- (e) DIO-14ND Conf. Ltr. to R. L. Shivers, FBI, Honolulu (Copy to ONI), 5-31-41.
- (f) 12ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 7-17-41.
- (g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject TAKAICHI SAKAI, 2-3-42.
- (h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KANAYE SAHARA, 2-3-42.
- (i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KIMIE DOUE, 2-3-42.
- (j) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTO-SHIRODO, 2-8-42.

Enclosures:

- (A) Table Showing Numbers of Battleships, Heavy Cruisers, Light Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Destroyers, and Destroyer-Type Vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.

(B) Table of Number and Movement of Ships in Pearl Harbor, by Types, at Various Times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941.

1. On the morning of 5 December, 1941, a thoroughly reliable confidential informant furnished the District Intelligence Officer with copies of certain commercial communications sent and received by Japanese Consul General Nagao KITA, of Honolulu, during the period, 1-4 December, 1941. These messages were despatch traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu and Washington and Honolulu, that is, between Consul General KITA and Ambassador Kichisaburo NOMURA, in Washington, and Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO, in Tokyo.

2. Preliminary evaluation of the importance of the messages was impossible to make, inasmuch as they were in code or cipher. They were, however, the first of such messages ever made available to this office, and for that reason deemed very important.

[2] 3. Efforts to determine the meaning of such messages were commenced immediately, but this task was not completed until the morning of 11 December. When the meaning of the messages was determined, the District Intelligence Officer, acting upon orders from Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, USN, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, immediately conferred with Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, assistant chief of staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, in charge of the Army Contact Office, Honolulu, and Mr. Robert L. Shivers, special agent in charge, Honolulu field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, with regard thereto. (Meanwhile, arrangements to secure copies of other commercial radio-grams and cablegrams to and from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, were effected.)

4. The following message, despatched by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO, on 3 December, 1941, was the basis of subsequent extensive investigation by the three intelligence agencies:

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo
(Secret Military Message No.)

(By Chief of Consulate's Code)

To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff.

From: Fujii

Re signals I wish to simplify communications as follows:

(1) Code (Following 3 section 8 line table)

Battle Force, including scouting force, are about to put to sea—

1. Several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea.
2. All Battle Force has sailed first to third dates inclusive.
3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
4. All aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
5. All Battle Force has sailed fourth to sixth dates inclusive.
- [3] 6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
7. All aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
- 8.

(2) Signal

1. Light in Lanikai Beach House at night—one light from 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "1", from 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "2". The below signals until midnight, in order, indicate "3" and "4". Two lights, according to the time, indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

—When not in accordance with (lights) above one full automobile headlight and one half light indicate "1", "2", "3", "4". Two full lights indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 am until Noon every hour one piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates "1", "2", "3", "4". Two pieces linen cloth indicates "5", "6", "7", "8".

3. In Lanikai Bay during daytime in front of harbor (offing) a star boat with one star on sail indicates "1", "2", "3", "4", a star and "III" indicates "5", "6", "7", "8".

4. Light in dormer window of Kalama House from 7 pm to 1 am every hour indicates "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8".

5. "KGMB want ads advertisements 9:45 am—(a) a Chinese rug, etc., for sale—apply P. O. Box 1476, indicates "3" or "6". (b) A complete chicken farm, etc., apply as above, indicates "4" or "7". (c) Beauty operator wanted—same—indicates "5" or "8".

In the event that in accordance with one of three items written above from Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located

between the lower road six miles north of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala Road which can be watch from the sea to the southwest and southeast of Maui, until the receipt of the signal "EXEX" this (the following) will be repeated, for several days: A small fire on the high peak—7 pm to 8 pm indicates "3" or "6"; 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "4" or "7"; 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "5" or "8".

[4] 5. At the aforementioned conference of representatives of the three Intelligence agencies, the following preliminary evaluation of the message of 3 December was made:

1. That no one named FUJII, was connected with the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu; but, that FUJII might be a code name or word employed by the Consulate or by some member of its staff, or by some person reporting to the Japanese Navy Ministry through the Consulate.

2. That the "Lanikai beach house" referred to was not readily identifiable, there being many beach houses at Lanikai, Oahu.

3. That the "dormer window of Kalama house" probably referred to a window of this type in the home of Otto KUEHN, a Class "A" German suspect, of Kalama, Oahu, who was put in custodial detention on 8 December, 1941.

4. That the method of signalling set up in the above despatch may have been used prior to the Japanese attack on Oahu, 7 December, and thereafter still might be used, to indicate the movements of United States fleet units from Pearl Harbor.

In an attempt to determine whether the signals referred to in the despatch of 3 December were used prior to the attack, and to detect any further use of such signals, the three intelligence agencies assumed the following tasks:

1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, was to send two or more agents to Kalama, Oahu, to stay there and gather all possible pertinent information regarding signalling from "dormer window of Kalama house". (The Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time had a pending investigation on Otto KUEHN and members of his family.)

2. The Military Intelligence Division was to maintain a watch at Kalama and Lanikai for a display of lights, display of cloths, or star boats with the indicated markings.

[5] 3. The District Intelligence Office was to send two or more agents to Lanikai, Oahu, to stay there and gather all pertinent information regarding signalling from a "Lanikai beach House"; and, in addition, to conduct an appropriate investigation in the vicinity of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala, island of Maui.

6. In execution of part of its agreed task, this office sent Agents Joseph P. McCarthy, Fred H. Paoa, and Albert K. Kai to Lanikai on the afternoon of 11 December. On the following morning, an officer messenger flew to Wailuku, Maui, with full instructions for Lieutenant (jg) Morris Adelson, USNR, Branch Intelligence Officer, Zone III, Fourteenth Naval District, to investigate the case there.

7. At Lanikai, the agents of this office early determined that of the more than seventy houses and cottages fronting on the ocean, only two had clothes lines on the premises that could be used for displaying the arranged signals, and that one of the two houses having a clothes line so usable was owned by Otto KUEHN, whose Kalama home with the dormer window already has been mentioned. Under a pretext, Agents McCarthy, Paoa, and Kai interviewed all available residents of the Lanikai area who lived on lots adjacent to the beach. It was determined that Otto KUEHN had no connection with the residents of the Lanikai beach house he owns, other than as their landlord. All star boats in the Lanikai area were found beached, and it was determined that none of them answered the description of the sailboat mentioned in the despatch of 3 December.

8. Upon the return of the agents of this office from Lanikai on 19 December, the following memorandum was submitted to the District Intelligence Officer by Agent McCarthy:

"In compliance with instructions, Agents Paoa, Kai and the writer proceeded to Lanikai on December 11, 1941, and remained until the evening of December 19.

"Over this period of time a complete and thorough canvass was made of all residences on the beach at Lanikai and all others adjacent thereto that might possibly have been used by anyone sending the type [6] of signals reported. It was immediately learned that Otto KUEHN owns a house on the beach at Lanikai, this being the fifth house from the junction

of Lanikai and Kailua. It was determined that this house is occupied by Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy and their wives. Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy are attached to Schofield Hospital.

"Mrs. Stuppy, when interviewed, advised that they had occupied Kuehn's house for a month and left there to take another house in Lanikai on December 15. Mrs. Stuppy stated that during her residence there she did not have any communication with Kuehn's family nor did any members of this family put in their appearance at Lanikai to her knowledge.

"All of the people interviewed during the course of this investigation reported that they observed no signals nor any activity that appeared to be suspicious or could be interpreted as signaling. This statement is made with the exception of the information received from Mrs. R. C. Waldron whose house is the second house from the Kailua junction, who reported that at 6:45 A. M. on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese, carrying a fishing pole, was observed running on the beach towards Kailua. Shortly after he left, a red flare was seen to have been sent from the vicinity of the beach near the Waldron residence. Mr. and Mrs. Waldron were unable to describe the Japanese referred to or to furnish any additional information concerning his identity.

"The inquiries made generally among the people residing in Lanikai, over the period of this investigation, were confined primarily to suspicious activity on the part of anyone for the period from December 1 to 7, 1941. The inquiries related generally to the possible signaling with flares or lights at night time and the presence of sail boats off the beach during the day time. Over this period, and for the three weeks preceding December 1, the waters off Lanikai were too rough for sailing and it was generally stated by the persons interviewed, most of whom are boat enthusiasts, that no star boats or other types of sailing vessels were seen near this beach over this period.

[7] It was pointed out by many of the residents that had a sail boat of any description appeared in this rough weather, these residents, being interested in sailing vessels, would have remarked upon the presence of a boat off shore in this type of weather and would have remembered the presence of this boat and probably could have recalled the name of the owner.

"Because of the nature of the other signals reported that could have been used in daylight hours questions, it was felt, could not be particularly asked concerning these signals without endangering the source of the information. However, in travelling about the vicinity of Lanikai, over this period, all residences were examined carefully for the purpose of attempting to determine from what residence the other day time signals might have been given. The Kuehn residence could have been used for all signals described except for the signalling with automobile headlights. A residence owned and occupied since Thanksgiving by Judson Roblee, which is back from the beach about 300 yards on a hillside, could have been used as a location from which to give all of the signals described. Mr. Roblee is the manager of the Edward R. Bacon Company. Inquiry generally concerning the Roblees resulted in the information that they are a very reputable family and should be held above suspicion in this case. Mr. Roblee is well known to Lieutenant (Jg) G. P. Kimball of this office.

"During the course of this investigation, the agents had access to, and the use of, the home of Mr. Arthur Powlison. This house is set on a cliff extending over the Lanikai road and from which can be had a view of all of Lanikai.

"During the period of time consumed by this investigation, a watch was kept for signals and for other suspicious activity from this vantage point without results. During the interviews, generally, those persons interviewed, who were found to be reputable, were advised to be on the alert for suspicious activity in this vicinity and requested to report any information considered worthy of further attention to this office."

[8] 9. In a general report of activities on the island of Maui, dated 9 December, 1941 (which report, due to poor mail service following the outbreak of war, did not reach this office until 13 December), Lieutenant Adelson told of the following pertinent incident:

"Only one incident of a number of reports received, indicated suspected espionage activities. The following is a resume of the reported incident

"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December, 1941, at about 2045, while he was spending the night at the Kula Sanatorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was telephoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing

of a light in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr. Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person flashing this light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room in the hospital in the Kula Sanitorium occupied by Shigeo FURUKAWA, who is subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will be noted that HAMADA and MATSUDA who visited FURUKAWA recently at Kula (DIO-Z/3-#3), have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the incident and have also been given all information available here, in regard to FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action. Following our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subsequently has made an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of his attempted suicide, no military orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien."

This report was considered very significant because of the fact that an investigation of Shigeo FURUKAWA was begun by this office shortly before the outbreak of war because of the latter's possible connection with Lieutenant Commander Sadatomo OKADA, IJN, among whose effects was found, in the summer of [9] 1941, FURUKAWA's name. (References (d) and (f).)

10. On 20 December, by officer messenger, the District Intelligence Officer received from Lieutenant Adelson the following report, dated 19 December, regarding investigation of the Haleakala and Kula Sanitarium region:

"Every night since 12 December, 1941, this area has been under surveillance from nightfall to past midnight—actual observation of the area being conducted personally with the assistance of Lt. Hanson, H. E. Anderson (Fish and Game Warden), a member of Fleet Reserve, and Police Officers Albert Wong, Louis Fernandez and Chas. Ledward.

"In addition the VJ3 Squadron and the Maui Range is keeping the designated point and its area under surveillance from their tower stations and are keeping this office advised.

"On the night of 14 December, 1941, the reporting officer in company with Mr. Anderson from their observation post noted the following lights and fire which were interpreted as signals:

"At 8:25 p. m. a strong blue light was seen on and off every few seconds in the PUUNENE area. In answer, a strong blue light was seen on and off in the MALAAEA BAY vicinity. Both lights went off and a definite fire signal was observed on the Island of Kahoolawe. This fire lasted 3 minutes. At 8:40 p. m. the light at Puunene came on again and in response the light at Malaaea Bay came on again. Both then went out.

"Police Officers Wong and Ledward also observed the above but placed the fire in the channel between Kahoolawe and Lanai instead of on Kahoolawe.

"Col. Lyman has been kept advised and particular stress laid on the Kahoolawe fire signal seen.

"Kahoolawe as far as is known is uninhabited. On an average of once a week a sampan—"Maisie C", owned by one of the Baldwins and captained by an [10] alien Japanese (Y. Yamauchi) has made a trip to the island—where Baldwin keeps some horses. Since hostilities with Japan, Mr. Baldwin has requested Col. Lyman's permission to send the "Maisie C" to Kahoolawe. Col. Lyman advised Mr. Baldwin that he would permit the trip to be made under armed guard. In view of the fire signal angle, Col. Lyman will notify this office if and when the "Maisie C" is ready to go and we will make a search of the boat and also arrange for a thorough search of the island.

"Numerous reports on lights and signals from various points on the island have been received by Police, Provisional Police, Army, and Navy. This has added to confusion as many of these reports when checked were found to have been carelessly put on or to be made by patrol cars.

However, there is one such report of interest: On the night of 11 December, 1941, (one day prior to receipt of reference (a) /referring to the District Intelligence Officer's letter of 11 December directing Lieutenant Adelson to investigate this case on Maui/, Provisional Police patrolling the Kula-area investigated a report of light signals coming from a point almost

the same as the one we have the information on. Upon investigation by Provisional Police, the person signalling was scared away and heard to scurry through the shrubbery. On 10 December, 1941, Provisional Police had received a similar report but could not locate anyone at the point. There is a strong possibility that this incident may have been connected with the information we have, and if such is the case, our suspect has been scared away or else using another point."

11. On 18 January, 1942, the District Intelligence Officer received a further report regarding FURUKAWA, from Lieutenant Adelson, which is quoted, in part:

" . . . Miss Marie Dupont, a ward girl, who observed the light was interviewed.

[11] "Miss Dupont stated that at about 2130 on the night of 8 December, 1941, she saw flashes of light in the subject's room, 401-B. The subject was sole occupant of the room. At about the same time she also observed a strong light flashing in the vicinity of the water tank on the Kula Sanitorium grounds. Subject's room faces the mountain and is in line of vision with the water tank. A check was made of the subject's room and matches were found. Subject was questioned by Miss Dupont about the matches and he stated that he had lit them to see what the time was. Subject does not smoke. Miss Dupont did not actually see subject light any matches."

12. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adelson was instructed to investigate fully the activities of Shigeo FURUKAWA since the latter's hospitalization at Kula Sanitarium. Lieutenant Adelson's findings will be set forth in a separate report being prepared on FURUKAWA.

13. On 30 December, this office received information that Morima MARUYAMA, who lives at Kailua, Oahu, T. H. (in an area between Kalama and Lanikai, but very proximate to the latter), was of doubtful loyalty and lived in a house high on a hill from where signalling to a ship at sea might be facilitated. After advising the other investigative agencies, the District Intelligence Officer, on 30 December, sent Agent Kai to Kailua with instructions to investigate MARUYAMA to determine whether signals had been seen emanating from his house, and also to investigate the portion of Kailua immediately contiguous to Lanikai.

14. On 2 January, 1942, Agent Kai returned from Kailua and reported, as to MARUYAMA, that "while this Subject's home is strategically situated and could have been used as a location from which to send signals, or as an observation point, no evidence has been secured to indicate any subversive activity on the part of Subject or to indicate that he would engage in such activities." Agent Kai also reported that no evidence was found to indicate that any other person in the area covered (about twenty houses) had engaged in any signalling to ships at sea.

15. It was learned from a highly confidential source that the full name of the sender of the Consulate's aforementioned message of 3 December probably is Ichio FUJII.

[12] 16. Confidential Informant J-1, who has been familiar with most of the contacts of the Consulate over a period of several years past, advised that the only FUJII known by him to have been close to the Consulate was Junichi FUJII, a prominent merchant. (It should be noted that the latter sailed from Honolulu for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on 5 November, 1941.) Former clerks of the Consulate who were interviewed by representatives of the three intelligence agencies confirmed this fact.

17. The records of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, at Honolulu, were checked and reveal that on 6 June, 1925, one Ichio FUJII arrived at Honolulu, from Japan, aboard the TAIYO MARU. At a hearing of a special board of inquiry held at Honolulu, 12 June, 1925, it was found that FUJII was born at Moiliili, Honolulu, T. H., on 1 May, 1908. FUJII stated that he was taken to Japan at the age of seven by his parents, who remained there. FUJII stated that he was a farm laborer. No further record of this Ichio FUJII was found in the immigration records, nor has any clue to his present whereabouts been discovered.

18. Appropriate examination of available indexes and directories with reference to the surname FUJII (or HUZII and possible variants, FUJIE and FUJI, was made, with negative results. However, investigation of this phase of the case is continuing.

19. On 1 January, 1942, interrogation of certain of the clerks formerly employed at the Japanese Consulate was commenced by representatives of the three investigative agencies: Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Captain Frank O. Blake, Military Intelligence Division; and, Lieutenant George P. Kimball, District Intelligence Office.

20. These Consulate clerks, who are American citizens of Japanese ancestry, all informed the agents that they considered themselves separated from employment at the Consulate on 7 December, 1941, and did not report for work on Monday, 8 December, 1941. However, none of them had submitted a letter of resignation or otherwise given notice to the Consulate.

[13] 21. The names of the clerks interrogated are as follows:

Miss Klmie DOUE
Takaichi SAKAI
Katsukichi MURAOKA
Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO
Kanaye SAHARA
Kiyoshi SHIGEFUJI

22. Miss DOUE, formerly employed as receptionist and typist at the Consulate, was the first clerical employee interrogated. Details concerning her personal history are set forth in reference (i) and will not be repeated herein. In her position as receptionist, Miss DOUE had a better opportunity to observe visitors to the Consulate than any of the other clerical employees. She appeared to be slightly above the average in intelligence for a Japanese girl of her class, and impressed the agents as being entirely frank and cooperative in answering questions.

23. It was developed in the course of the interrogation of Miss DOUE that Tadasi MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, who had arrived from Japan on 27 March, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following his arrival at Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA, where the nature of his work was unknown to Miss DOUE. The expatriation work was done in a different office of the Consulate, and was under the supervision of Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary. Most of the clerical details of this work were handled by Takaichi SAKAI, one of the clerks above mentioned.

24. Miss DOUE stated that MORIMURA often came to work at about 1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and seldom was at his desk in the afternoon. There was a week in October or November, 1941, when he did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi during office hours between 1000 and 1100 and would not see him again the same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, located at 6 South Vineyard Street, Honolulu (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during [14] business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, one of the aforementioned clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and at other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day.

25. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

26. Takaichi SAKAI, whose personal history is set forth in reference (g), also was interrogated on 1 January, 1942. He corroborated what Miss DOUE said about MORIMURA's lack of connection with expatriation matters and his frequent departures from the Consulate during business hours.

27. It was learned from Kanaye SAHARA, whose personal history is set forth in reference (h), that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or third, cut off at the first joint. However, SAHARA could not remember which hand it was. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours, accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, who often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On these occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they went to "important places", and upon being asked what he meant by that, said, "military places". On being asked why he thought they were going to such places, SAHARA said that it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and also because MORIMURA and

KOTOSHIRODO would not make any mention around the Consulate as to where they had been on their trips. SAHARA stated that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford sedan which he and MORIMURA often used.

28. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA's background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication containing the names and biographical data of diplomatic and consular officials. He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years of age, and if he is a regular member of the consular service, he would have been listed, as he could not have just recently been graduated from college. SAHARA believed that the other three secretaries of the Consulate, Kyonosuke YUGE, Samon TSUKIKAWA, and Kōkichi SEKI, were listed in this publication.

[15] 29. SAHARA also informed the agents that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they came into, or left, the office. Asked if he thought this was not strange, in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA attempted to explain it by the fact that both were about the same age and seemed to enjoy each other's company.

30. KOTOSHIRODO was interrogated on 3 and 4 January, 1942, and on 9 January, 1942. His personal history is set forth in reference (j), while details of his activities with MORIMURA will be discussed in a subsequent report. In substance, this information is that MORIMURA, often accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, sometimes in a taxi driven by John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of reference (k), proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, and sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car, made frequent trips for the purpose of making observations of military installations and operations. In addition to the trips made with MORIMURA, KOTOSHIRODO made a number of trips for the same purpose, by himself and with MIKAMI, at the direction of MORIMURA. The names and addresses of certain Japanese contacted by MORIMURA were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO, and the joint investigation of these leads also will be covered by a separate report. Signed statements concerning his activities were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO on 4 and 9 January, 1942.

31. From all the clerks interviewed an effort was made to obtain the names of frequent visitors to the Consulate, particularly those who saw the Consul General and the Vice Consul in private. Seven or eight prominent Japanese business and professional men, who have been in custodial detention since 7 December, 1941, were named, including the local managers of the Yokohama Specie and Sumitomo Banks and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line). According to Miss DOUE, these men would go directly into the office of the Consul General, who often would summon the Vice Consul for a conference. None of the clerks had any idea of the nature of the conversations between these men and the consular officials.

32. Asked if any persons, other than the prominent Japanese referred to above, visited the Consulate on what appeared to be other than routine business, Miss DOUE stated that a man whose nationality she did not know, came and went several times from the Consulate during November, 1941. This man she described as a "haole" (Hawaiian for "white person") [16] and looked somewhat Jewish. Miss DOUE did not know his name. Sometimes this man, the Consul General, and the Vice Consul were locked in the Consul General's private office. The last visit of this man remembered by Miss DOUE was about the end of November, 1941. The man referred to usually came in the morning and sometimes Miss DOUE would see him only when he left the Consulate.

33. On 31 December, 1941, the day before the investigation of the former consular clerks was commenced, Otto KUEHN was brought from detention quarters at the U. S. Immigration Station, Honolulu, to the headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for questioning by Special Agents J. Sterling Adams and George E. Allen. The interrogation of KUEHN, not having been completed on 31 December, was resumed the following day. While Miss DOUE was being questioned as described above, KUEHN also was under interrogation in a nearby room.

34. When Miss DOUE gave the information mentioned above concerning the unidentified white man who had visited the Consulate during the month of November, Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised. On the theory that this person might have been KUEHN, Miss DOUE was told by Mr. Shivers that he wanted her to observe a certain person and state afterwards if she had ever seen this person before. Miss DOUE was taken to a stenographer's room and placed at a desk. KUEHN was brought to the door of this room and was engaged in conversation. Miss

DOUE immediately recognized KUEHN and placed a sheet of carbon paper over her face so that she could not be recognized by him.

35. After KUEHN was taken back to the room where he was being questioned, Miss DOUE was brought back to the room where her interrogation was being conducted. She was thereupon asked whether she had ever seen the person who had just been shown to her. She answered immediately and with assurance that this was the "haole" she had previously mentioned as having come to the Consulate several times during November. Asked how she knew it was the same man, she stated that she knew by the shape of his head and by his Jewish appearance. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen this man leave the Consulate but had never seen him get into any automobile. However, she stated that on days when he came to the Consulate a tan-colored roadster was seen parked in front of the building. Miss DOUE stated that she thought his visits were peculiar and that she thought he was a "spy".

[17] 36. A short biographical sketch of KUEHN, based upon written statements obtained from him on 1 and 3 January, 1942, by Special Agents Adams and Allen, is submitted for information:

37. KUEHN was born in Berlin, Germany, on 25 December, 1895. In April, 1913, he enlisted as a cadet in the German Navy, serving as a midshipman until captured by the British in January, 1915, and remaining a prisoner of war until December, 1918. In 1920, he married his present wife. From the close of the World War until 1927, KUEHN was employed in various occupations. In 1927, he entered the coffee business and continued in it until 1935, when he came to the United States. However, during the period 1928-1930, he was in the secret police of the German Navy. In 1930, he and his stepson Leopold KUEHN, who was born 6 July, 1911, joined the National Socialist (Nazi) party, but KUEHN claims not to have been active in the party until 1932, when he was considered for a position high in the Gestapo under Heinrich HIMMLER, but which position was given to Reinhold HEYDRICH. Thereafter, KUEHN was twice jailed in Germany, but was released, he says, through the efforts of his wife.

38. In 1935, KUEHN decided to go to Japan to study the Japanese language, and passed through the mainland United States and Honolulu enroute to Japan. In 1936, KUEHN and his family returned to Honolulu where they established permanent residence and subsequently KUEHN returned to Japan for three months' further language study. Upon his return to Honolulu in September, 1936, KUEHN continued the study of the Japanese language. In Honolulu, he engaged in the steel furniture manufacturing business. Friedel KUEHN operated a beauty shop at Kailua and the KUEHNs have owned two homes at Kalama and one at Lanikai. KUEHN's furniture business failed in 1938, his wife's beauty shop brought in only about \$80.00 a month, and they were forced to sell the Kalama home and mortgage the other two residences, one of which usually was rented.

39. From time to time, KUEHN has received considerable sums of money from European sources. He claimed that this money came from the estate of his father and from the liquidation of the coffee business which he had owned. Friedel KUEHN also received money from inherited property in Germany. According to KUEHN, great difficulties were encountered in getting this money out of Germany. Certain of the transfers were said to have been made through a friend in Japan, a Doctor HOMBERG, who is connected with a German steel firm, ROESCHLING STEEL WORKS in Tokyo, who assertedly purchased the

[18] German holdings of Friedel KUEHN for \$40,000.00. Part of this consideration was transported in cash by Mrs. KUEHN from Japan to Honolulu in 1940. KUEHN said the amount so received was \$6,000.00, but his wife, who was questioned later, said it was \$9,000.00. In September, 1940, a payment of \$10,000.00 was received from Dr. HOMBERG and was delivered by one KAI, purser of the SS KAMAKURA MARU, an N. Y. K. liner.

40. The following additional information was obtained from KUEHN and is contained in his written statements made on 1 and 3 January, 1942:

41. In July, 1941, after the "freeze order", KUEHN contacted Vice Consul OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate and requested him to send a message to Dr. HOMBERG through a Baron KYOGOKU in Japan, whom KUEHN claims previously to have met on a trip to Japan. According to KUEHN, the message to HOMBERG was in a prearranged private code and the substance of it was a request to send the balance of the \$40,000.00 due Mrs. KUEHN as soon as possible. When OKUDA was hesitant about sending the message, KUEHN informed him that he was acting for the Japanese Government and had an im-

portant message for KYOGOKU, a Government official in Tokyo. KUEHN told OKUDA that it was imperative that he receive the money before 29 October, 1941, because of the Treasury Department's foreign funds regulations, and he intentionally gave OKUDA the impression that the money was to come from KYOGOKU as compensation for services rendered the Japanese Government. OKUDA finally agreed to send the message.

42. In his statement of 1 January, 1942, KUEHN had said that he first contacted the Consulate early in November, 1941, to request assistance in sending money to his stepson, Leopold, in Germany, and was informed that the Vice Consul would take the matter up with the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, he gave the version above set forth about the message to Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in both versions, KUEHN admitted having made several visits to the Japanese Consulate in November, 1941, and stated that he called in the mornings.

43. It was developed that on his second or third visit, either KUEHN or Consul General KITA suggested that KUEHN could be of assistance in obtaining information concerning United States fleet movements. KUEHN agreed to do what he could, and on or about 28 November, 1941, he drove to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, where he said he saw very few [19] ships in the harbor. Later, according to KUEHN, he informed the Consulate that there were seven battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty destroyers and twenty-seven submarines, "or some similar figure in Hawaiian waters." The information which KUEHN stated he furnished the Consulate, as set forth above, can be compared with the figures set forth in enclosures (A) and (B), which were prepared by this office (for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) from data furnished by the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. As to the figures admittedly reported by KUEHN, he said "those figures were purely fictitious, as far as I knew."

44. Subsequent to the visit during which information relative to fleet movements was first discussed, the following occurred, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942:

"At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also outlined a system of signalling that could be used in order to furnish information relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left. This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These signals were to have been given by a light in my home at Lanikai or Kalama which could have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows: One light between 6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor; one light between 7 and 8 meant scouting force in harbor; one light between 8 and 9 meant aircraft carriers in harbor; one light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet prepared to leave; one light between 10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared to leave; one light between 11 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one light between 12 and 1 meant battle fleet left between one and two days ago; one light between 1 and 2 meant scouting force left one to two days ago; two lights between 6 and 7 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meant battle fleet left three to four days ago; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meant scouting force left three to four days ago; two lights between 9 and 10 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two lights between 10 and 11 p. m. meant battle fleet left five to six days ago; two lights between 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to six days ago; two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a. m. meant aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

[20] "This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen on the clothes line at my Lanikai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a. m. in daylight meaning battle fleet in harbor; one sheet between 7 and 8 a. m. meaning scouting force in harbor; one sheet between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers in harbor; one sheet between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; one sheet between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave; one sheet between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning battle fleet left one to two days ago; one sheet between 1 p. m. and 2 p. m. meaning scouting force left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m. meaning battle fleet left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 8 a. m. and 9 a. m.

meaning scouting force left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 9 a. m. and 10 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 10 a. m. and 11 a. m. meaning battle fleet left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning scouting force left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

"They told me at the time that this system of communication was too complicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One or two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had ridden by Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that time. About three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified system of signalling, on what I think was December 2, 1941. This set of signals contained only eight combinations, as follows: No. 1 meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave; No. 3 meaning battle fleet left one to three days ago; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three days ago; No. 5, [21] meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago; No. 6 meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago; No. 7 meaning scouting force left four to six days ago; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days ago. These signals were to be given as follows from my Lanikai home: One light between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 1; one light between 8 and 9 meaning No. 2; one light between 9 and 10 p. m. meaning No. 3; one light between 10 and 11 p. m. meaning No. 4; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 5; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meaning No. 6, etc. These lights were to have been from a window or automobile lights. The same system could have been used with one piece of linen hung on the line at Lanikai between 8 and 9 a. m., meaning No. 1, one between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 2; one between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning No. 3; one between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4; two pieces between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning No. 5; two pieces between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 6, and so forth. It was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my Kalama home between 7 and 8 p. m. would mean No. 1; one between 8 and 9 p. m. would mean No. 2; one between 9 and 10 p. m. would mean No. 3 and 6; one between 10 and 11 p. m. would mean No. 4 and 7; one between 11 and 12 p. m. (midnight) would mean Nos. 5 and 8.

"It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been used with a star boat just off the mouth of Lanikai Beach between certain hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning corresponding signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat was in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have been used to indicate each signal.

"It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morning the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug was advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised for; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this system of signals, [22] a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality between certain hours would indicate the above number signals, such as a fire between the hours of 9 and 10 p. m. would mean signals 3 and 6, and so forth. In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located. I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a map of Maui which showed the names of the two roads which border that locality and which names were mentioned in my recommended plan as bordering the area wherein the fire signals were to be effected.

"It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to contact me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to my Box No. 1476 at Honolulu.

"This simplified set of signals was taken to the Consulate in an envelope by me about 8:30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and while she remained in the car I went to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals and another envelope containing \$500.00, which was to be sent to my son LEOPOLD in Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall. I had no conversation with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into Honolulu.

"I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted to the Japanese Consulate are probably not identical in every detail with those actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same as those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the hours stated for the signals to be given.

"Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had no further contact with any representatives of the Consulate to date, neither have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such representatives. Apparently [23] no effort was made by the Consulate to carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me.

"I have never been to the Island of Maui nor have I ever seen the island nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter, and my Lanikai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they departed from Honolulu about September, 1941. Further, I have had no correspondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about October, 1941. I rented my Lanikai residence on November 1, 1941, to two couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30, and the other an employee with the Engineers, about the same age, both of whom had been transferred from Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these individuals at the present time."

45. In the same statement, KUEHN said that following the arrival of the TATUTA MARU in Honolulu in October, 1941, a Japanese attached to that vessel called at his residence and delivered a package enclosed in cardboard containing \$14,000.00 in \$100.00 bills. The person who made this delivery stated to KUEHN that the package came from Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, KUEHN described the receipt of the money as follows:

"I did not contact the Consulate again nor did I receive any post card until one afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese boat came to Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama and he told my son that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working in my garden. My son came and advised me he was there and I went around. He very brusquely asked me if I was OTTO KUEHN and I said "Yes," and he said, "I have something for you from Dr. HOMBERG," so I took him back to my little garden house where he gave me a package and a letter and I asked him if he had any other information for me and he said no. I opened the letter first and in the letter was a sheet of paper written in English asking if I had a short-wave transmitter and if I would be willing [24] to make a test at a certain stated time which was on a night several nights later, on a certain wave length. This letter was typewritten and had no name on it. He gave me a sheet of paper and an envelope and I wrote on the sheet of paper that I was unable to make the test. I was quite nervous and put it in the envelope and gave it to him. I asked him if he knew what was in the package and he said no. I asked him if he wanted a receipt for the package and he said no, and he then left and I opened the package and counted the money. There were \$14,000 in the package, mostly in new \$100 bills, some \$20 bills. I think that this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to make with me through this letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of paper asking me to make this radio test and burned it up."

46. It was learned from KOTOSHIRODO that some time in October, 1941, he had been requested by Vice Consul OKUDA to drive MORIMURA and himself to Kailua. At the corner of Kuulei Road and Malunui Avenue, Kailua, KOTOSHIRODO said that OKUDA directed him to stop the car, which he did, and there MORIMURA got out of the car and commenced walking along Malunui Avenue in a northwesterly direction. OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive several blocks along Kuulei Road and to stop at the corner of Kuulei Road and Kalaeo Avenue. They waited there thirty or forty minutes before MORIMURA reappeared, walking along Kalaeo Avenue from the direction in which he had disappeared. (It is noted that the places where MORIMURA alighted and later rejoined OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO are approximately one-half mile from the Kalama residence of Otto KUEHN.) On 4 January, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO directed Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball to the places above mentioned, and identified the places.

47. Eberhard KUEHN, age 15, stepson of Otto KUEHN, was interviewed by Special Agents Adams and Allen, and stated to them that an unidentified Japanese had come to see his father between 1600 and 1630 on a Saturday afternoon, on either 18 October or 25 October, 1941. The description he gave of this person is substantially similar to that of MORIMURA. Later, a photograph of MORIMURA was shown to Eberhard KUEHN, who stated that it was very familiar to the Japanese who called to see his father in October, and that he believed that it was very likely the same person, but he could not say positively. The same [25] photograph also was shown to Otto KUEHN, who stated that it was quite similar to the Japanese who had delivered the money to him; that he is positive he has seen the person represented in the photograph before, and believed it probably was on the occasion when the money was delivered. However, KUEHN still contended that he was of the belief that the man who had come to see him had been sent by Dr. HOMBERG, and that a Japanese steamer was in port in Honolulu on the day in question. (It should be noted here that the only Japanese liner in port around the time in question was the TATUTA MARU, which arrived in Honolulu from the Orient on 23 October, 1941, and departed for San Francisco the following day.)

8. At no time has KUEHN implicated anyone outside the Consulate, other than himself and the Japanese who delivered the \$14,000.00 to him, in any of the activities above described. Thus far, no evidence has been developed that anyone, other than persons connected with the Consulate, have acted in conjunction with KUEHN.

49. In the plan of the system of signals submitted by KUEHN to the Consulate, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942, and set forth in the despatch sent by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO on 3 December, 1941, part of the signals consisted of "KGMB want ads". KGMB are the call letters of the broadcasting station in Honolulu owned and operated by the Hawaiian Broadcasting Company, Limited. The despatch designated the advertisements to be: (a) for the sale of a Chinese rug; (b) for the sale of a complete chicken farm; and, (c) for a beauty operator wanted. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation has failed to disclose any record of radio advertisements on any KGMB program of the type described, between 24 November and 8 December, 1941. However, it was found that Post Office Box 1476, referred to in the message of 3 December, referred to KUEHN's box at the Honolulu postoffice.

50. Of the original \$14,000.00 cash received by KUEHN, \$5,000.00 in new \$100.00 Federal Reserve Bank of New York notes was found on the person of Mrs. KUEHN, after she was taken into custody on 8 December, 1941. It also was discovered that Mrs. KUEHN had given \$2,000.00, in similar denominations, to her daughter, Mrs. J. Carson MOORE (nee Ruth KUEHN). This money also was recovered by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These funds are being traced from their source, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to determine [26] the persons or agencies through whom they were transmitted to Honolulu. It has been established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that these notes were not obtained from, nor cleared through, Honolulu banks.

51. Otto KUEHN and his wife are the subjects of reference (a), being named therein as "Mr. and Mrs. KOEHN". Reference (b) states that KUEHN and his wife had (before 21 April, 1939) been under observation by the District Intelligence Office for a number of months, and that KUEHN was strongly suspected of being an espionage agent for either Japan or Germany, or both.

52. Otto KUEHN was carried on the Fourteenth Naval District records (July, 1940) as a class "A" Nazi suspect. See reference (c). The following information appeared on the suspect card:

<p>"KUEHN, Otto Formerly (1918) officer in German Navy; cultivates acquaintances among officers in U. S. Navy; at one time received considerable sums of money from European source; frequent trips to Japan; Mrs. KUEHN recently (May, 1940) returned from Japan and reportedly brought back a considerable sum of money with her; has failed in business but owns considerable real estate."</p>	<p>(Occupation) None at present</p>
--	---

53. The name of Mrs. KUEHN was added to the Fourteenth Naval District Nazi list, as a class "A" suspect, on 31 May, 1941, as shown by reference (e), the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

"KUEHN, Friedel—Kailua, Oahu. Wife of Otto KUEHN, suspected of being a German agent. Friedel KUEHN is known to be pro-Nazi. Mr. and Mrs. KUEHN are suspected of being 'Mr. and Mrs. Friedel' who are reported as contacts of the local Japanese consulate."

54. The names of "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" were furnished to the District Intelligence Officer in July, 1940, by a reliable confidential informant who stated that the Friedels had approached the Honolulu Japanese Consulate with the request that certain information of theirs be transmitted to the Japanese Navy. The same confidential informant reported [27] that the consul-general requested the Foreign Office to advise concerning the reliability of the Friedels, and that the Foreign Office replied stating that the Friedels could not be placed, but that any information they furnished should be received and forwarded with an indication that it came from the Friedels. The message further advised that the Japanese Navy was prepared to compensate the Friedels for any information they furnished according to its value.

55. All of the information received from this confidential informant concerning "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" was transmitted to the Honolulu Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. An investigation conducted by that agency failed to disclose any "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" who in any way fitted the meager description furnished by the informant. It was concluded, however, that Otto and Friedel KUEHN might be "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel", but no evidence was obtained prior to the present investigation, indicating that either of the KUEHNs had contacted the Japanese Consulate.

56. The evidence obtained in the investigation, which is set forth in substance in this report, has been given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Angus M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, who has prepared charges and specifications charging Otto KUEHN with violation of Sections 34, 31, and 32 of Title 50, U. S. Code. These charges and specifications will be preferred by Captain Eugene V. Slaterry, Assistant Judge Advocate General, Hawaiian Department, who will act as trial judge advocate in the prosecution of the case before the Military Commission.

57. Charge No. 1 is based on Section 34 of Title 50, and avers that KUEHN conspired with Consul General KITA and Vice Consul OKUDA on or about 20 November, 1941, to unlawfully communicate, in violation of Section 31, information to the Japanese Government concerning the movements and positions of the United States Fleet, by means of a system of signals prepared by KUEHN, and that in the furtherance of the conspiracy, certain overt acts were committed by KUEHN. These acts include obtaining by visual observation on or about 28 November, 1941, figures as to the number of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor and furnishing the same to the consular officials; and preparing and submitting to the same officials on or about 2 December, 1941, the plan for the system of signals previously described, which plan was transmitted by Consul General KITA to the Japanese Government on or about 3 December, 1941.

[28] 58. Charge No. 2 is based on an alleged violation of Section 31, Title 50, and specifies that KUEHN, on or about 28 November, 1941, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, and with intent and reason to believe that the information to be obtained was to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely, Japan, unlawfully obtained information concerning the disposition of United States naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.

59. Charge No. 3 is based on an alleged violation of Section 32 of Title 50, and specifies that on or about 2 December, 1941, KUEHN unlawfully transmitted the information he had obtained concerning naval vessels to the Japanese Government, through the Consulate.

60. No evidence has thus far been discovered by any of the three investigative agencies which have handled the various phases of this case which would establish as a fact that any attempt was made, either before or after 7 December 1941, to put into actual operation the system of signals prepared by KUEHN for the Consul General and submitted by the latter to Tokyo. However, efforts still are being made to obtain such evidence, if it exists, and to determine what other person or persons, if any, may have been implicated in such activities.

61. (Other messages despatched by the Consul General, both in the period, 1-4 December, 1941, and at other times, as the same have been received by this office and have been resolved into plain language, will be discussed in a report supplementary to this one, and bearing the same subject title.)

PENDING—14ND .

6 February, 1942.

Enclosure (A): Table showing numbers of battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and destroyer-type vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.

Date	Time	Type of ships								
		BBs	CAs	CLs	CVs	SSs	DDs	DMs	AVDs	(#)
11/22-----	0800	3	6	1	1	4	21	8	2	31
	1800	3	6	1	1	4	22	8	2	32
11/23-----	0800	3	6	1	1	4	22	8	2	32
	1800	3	6	1	1	4	22	4	2	28
11/24-----	0800	3	6	1	1	4	21	4	1	26
	1800	3	6	1	1	4	21	4	2	27
11/25-----	0800	3	6	1	1	4	24	5	2	31
	1800	3	10	1	2	4	26	8	3	37
11/26-----	0800	3	10	1	2	4	24	8	2	34
	1800	3	11	1	2	4	23	8	3	34
11/27-----	0800	3	11	1	2	4	23	8	3	34
	1800	3	11	1	2	4	28	8	3	39
11/28-----	0800	1	8	0	2	4	11	4	3	18
	1800	6	8	5	1	2	26	4	3	33
11/29-----	0800	6	7	6	1	2	24	4	3	31
	1800	6	7	5	1	2	26	4	3	33
11/30-----	0800	5	7	5	1	2	25	4	3	32
	1800	5	7	5	1	2	26	4	3	33

Key: BB—battleship; CA—heavy cruiser; CL—light cruiser; CV—aircraft carrier; SS—submarine; DD—destroyer; DM—light mine layer (destroyer type); AVD—seaplane tender (destroyer type).

#Total of destroyer type craft. DMs and AVDs were built as destroyers and converted to their present use. To the untrained eye, they would appear as destroyers.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

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No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: WD Radio #628, 12 December 1941 "Japanese Spy Activities"	4837
1st Ind. AG 12 Dec 41-----	G-2-----	1 Incl.: Reply sent in Gen. Short's name....	R. H. N. 12
2 Ind. G2RE Cont., #362 19 Feb 42.	-----	For information-----	Dec 1941. KJF EM.

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

SECRET—CONFIDENTIAL—RESTRICTED

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE

SB OHU6 USG CDE WASHINGTON DC (VIA COMMERCIAL PACIFIC CABLE)

211/210

COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPT.

628 12th For your information and necessary action Colon One Ichiro Fuji on December third arranged following signal system for Japanese fleet upon closure normal means communication Stop Lanikai beach house to show lights between eight PM and midnight and between midnight and four AM with various meanings as to our naval dispositions depending on the hour of display Stop Similarly a star and a roman numeral three at the head of the sail of the quote star boat unquote In Lanikai Bay during daylight Stop Also lights in the attic window of Kalama house parenthesis beach village one mile north west of Lanikai close parenthesis Stop Also advertisements broadcast on KGMB re Chinese rug for sale comma Chic space space Co paren two letters missing end paren farm comma beauty operator and apply PO box One Four Seven Six Stop If above unworkable a signal bonfire to be located on Maui six miles north of Kula Sanitorium at point halfway between lower Kula road and Haleakala road.

(Signed) MARSHALL.

Received as a SECRET communication.

Decoded by: Lt. G. Lennox SC 850A 12 Dec 1941 Lx.

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 628."

NOTE. See A. R. 330-5 and 335-5 for handling messages of this classification.

DECEMBER 12, 1941.

Memorandum to SAC:

Re: Dormer windowed houses in Kalama.

In accordance with your instructions the district of Kalama was checked as thoroly as possible for houses with dormer windows. Three were found. These are the homes of Otto KUEHN, now in CD, John Waterhouse, and Ensign Bradley, USN, who has living with him a Lieutenant from Bellows Field.

A driving check was made in the district between Kalaheo Drive and the pine grove and none other than the KUEHN place were found here.

On the beach side of Kalaheo Drive we found the John Waterhouse home, which is the first residence encountered on the beach coming from Mokapu. This house has not been occupied, except on Sunday nite, 12-7-41, when John Waterhouse slept there. This was the first occupancy since the first of December. However, there are Japanese living there. These on interview I found to be Waichi Fukui, about 34; his wife, Hatsuko, 29, and their three children, the eldest 9. Also living with them are Miss Chiyoko TAO, 21, and Jotaro ONISHI, 32. The latter is a brother of Mrs. Fukui. W. Fukui was born in Japan and has lived in Hawaii most of his life. His wife is Hawaii born but did not regain citizenship. Miss TAO and ONISHI are Hawaii born. Also living there since the bombing are Isuke KIMURA, 49, his wife and 24 year old son who were machine-gunned on Sunday while on their farm at Mokapu. I learned from W. FUKUI that quite a few persons come about the place to fish and he complained that persons broke into the place frequently by means of the dormer windows. I was also informed by Norman Godbold Jr., Territorial Treasurer that while he lived there in that district, directly behind the quarters occupied by FUKUI that there were a number of persons visiting there at all times.

The house formerly occupied by Godbold is now occupied by Ensign BRADLEY, USN, camera party, and the Lieutenant from Bellows Field and is in the next lot to the WATERHOUSE property. The dormer windows of both places provide quite a good view of the ocean.

A walk along the beach from the Waterhouse property to the Kailua end of the beach failed to show any other houses with dormer windows.

Respectfully submitted.

J. A. BURNS.

HONOLULU, T. H., January 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Attention: Captain I. H. Mayfield:

Re: Japanese Consulate activities—CONFILE; ESPIONAGE—J.

During investigations which have been conducted by ONI, G-2 and the FBI, Special Agent F. G. TILLMAN and Lt. GEORGE KIMBALL of ONI have developed the following information which it appears may be of immediate interest to you in defense of these islands.

During the course of an interview with RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTOSHIRODA, a former clerk employed by the Japanese Consul-General at Honolulu, it was developed that TADASI MORIMURA, who is registered with the Secretary of State as the Chancellor of that Japanese Consulate, is without doubt the person charged by the Japanese Government with the collection of military information in the Territory of Hawaii. This is substantiated by the statements of other members of the clerical staff of the Consulate, and by MORIMURA's apparent activity.

KOTOSHIRODA is the only American-born Japanese employed at the Consulate in whom the Consulate staff placed any confidence in connection with other than routine matters. It has been learned from KOTOSHIRODA that he accompanied MORIMURA on numerous occasions to points on the islands of Hawaii, Maui and particularly in the vicinity of naval establishments on the island of Oahu. These trips were usually made in a Ford sedan owned by KOTOSHIRODA and a taxi owned and driven by an alien Japanese.

It was ascertained that MORIMURA showed unusual interest in the following points on the island of Oahu:

(1) Kailua Beach in the vicinity of the public park which was visited in May, 1941.

(2) Waimanalo Beach in the vicinity of the old sugar wharf which was visited on the same day as the above.

MEMO FOR ONI

1-4-1942

(3) Haleiwa Bay in the vicinity of the public park which was visited three or four times, the last visit being in about the end of October, 1941.

In addition, the entire Consulate staff had picnics at the SAM WOODS' place, Lanikai, the first in January or February, 1941, and the second in March or April of the same year. These picnics appear to have been held in the absence of the owners of the property and by arrangements with the Japanese yardman who is presently being investigated. This place is less than two miles from the Kailua Beach park previously mentioned.

It has also been learned that MORIMURA has contacts at Pearl City; these individuals are now under investigation. He has also visited a point below the home of CHESTER CLARKE at Aiea Heights where an excellent view of Pearl Harbor may be obtained.

The above information is being submitted in the event that it may serve some immediate purpose. The results of this investigation will be outlined fully in a subsequent report.

Very truly yours,

R. L. SHIVERS,
Special Agent in Charge.

RLS: mma

cc: Lt. Col. BICKNELL

SIGNALS

638 12th Contents messages as follows quote one twenty five please turn over immediately both items which I requested one twenty eight please wire immediately re the latter part of my one twenty three the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth circular two four siqq one please keep the code list until the last moment and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you so please notify us of this fact immediately this message is a precaution circular two four siqq siqq we are giving a great deal of thought to the question of the return to Japan of your staff and their families therefore wait where you are until I wire you at a later date unquote.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

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No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Fifth Column Activities at
1st Ind. Contact Office 2/12/42	G-2 HHD-----	1. For information and return. Encl.—(14ND report re subject dated 2/9/42).
2 G-2 2/12/42-----	C/O-----	1. Noted. 2. This is a good report and coincides with our beliefs.

[1]

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

District Intelligence Office

Sixth Floor, Young Hotel

Honolulu, T. H.

AJL/ab

14ND A8-5/P9-2/EF37

FEBRUARY 9, 1942.

Confidential

From: The District Intelligence Officer
Fourteenth Naval District

To: The District Intelligence Officer
Third Naval District

Subject: Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Fifth Column Activities at

Reference: (a) Letter dated 3 January, 1942 from Commandant 3ND to Chief of Naval Operations, above Subject.

1. Reference (a) suggests that "there be conveyed to all District Intelligence Offices, such information of Fifth Column activities at Pearl Harbor, as may be useful in connection with the operations of all District Intelligence Office activities".

2. For the purpose of this letter, methods of fifth column activities will be considered to consist of the following:

(a) To conduct accurate espionage work and transmit the results to the enemy.

(b) To demoralize public opinion; to cause panic or confusion; to promote discord and dissatisfaction.

(c) To carry on actual physical sabotage.

(d) To render assistance to invading forces.

3. Referring to Paragraph 2 (a) above, there is no question but that the espionage work of our enemies was carried out in an extremely efficient, thorough and accurate manner. There is also no doubt but that this information was very successfully conveyed to our enemies. The collection of the information was very simple. The geography and topography of the area around Pearl Harbor are such that any one with good eyes (perhaps aided with a pair of field glasses) can observe accurately movements in and out of Pearl Harbor from several highways and roads near Pearl Harbor and also from a great many houses on the heights

back of Pearl Harbor and Honolulu. There is no question but that the enemy did this in a very thorough and efficient manner. It is also true that they were able to transmit [2] this information very effectively and quickly to their forces at sea. This again is easily explained by the fact that there was no censorship of mail, cables or radio; sampans were operating regularly off shore; there may have been (and probable was) communication by private radio; and there may have been other signalling. Unfortunately, under a democratic form of government, it does not seem possible to take necessary action ahead of time to prevent this sort of thing.

4. Referring to Paragraph 2 (b) above, there were numerous rumors of cars zigzagging along highways to slow up traffic, of cars being parked across roads to tie up or block traffic, of shots being fired from ambush or from automobiles, etc. etc., etc. None of these reports were substantiated.

5. Referring to Paragraph 2 (c) above, there were no real cases of actual physical sabotage. This is somewhat hard to understand as the utilities such as the Hawaiian Electric Company, the Honolulu Gas Company, the Honolulu Rapid Transit Company, the plants and storage tanks of the privately owned oil companies all of which are concentrated in a limited area, the City and Navy Yard water supply systems, etc., etc., were not adequately protected. As a matter of fact, a comparatively small group of well trained saboteurs could easily have put them all out of operation in a very short time. This leads to the query as to whether there were no well organized plans to wreck these utilities and services, or whether such plans were and are so well organized that one might assume that instructions had been passed that no action was to be taken at the time as there were no plans to follow up the attack of December 7 with attempts to land and invade the island. This latter assumption may seem to be far fetched, but is being carefully considered and studied. The only real basis for considering it seriously is that there was not a single attempt made to sabotage any of these essential utilities on the morning of December 7.

6. Referring to Paragraph 2 (d) above, there were many reports such as the one about swaths being cut in cane and pineapple fields pointing to important objectives; people signalling enemy planes; etc., etc. All such rumors and reports were checked as expeditiously as possible. None of the cases investigated proved to be authentic.

7. This Subject has been checked thoroughly with the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and with Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, whose findings coincide with the above.

I. H. MAYFIELD,
A. J. LOWREY,
A. J. LOWREY,
By direction

CC: ONI (2)
COM14 (1)
DIOs in all NDs (1) (except 16ND)
FBI-Hon (1)
MID-HD (1)
Plan (1) "B."

3 DECEMBER, 1941.

From: ———

To: ———, Tokyo

(Secret military message No. ———) (Chief of Consulate's Code).

To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff

From: FUJII

Re: Signals: I wish to simplify communications as follows:

1. *Code* (following 3 section 8 line table) ——— battle force, including scouting force, are about to put to sea—

1. Several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea.
2. All Battle force has sailed 1st-3rd dates Inc.
3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed (1st to 3rd)
4. All aircraft carriers have sailed (1st to 3rd)
5. All battle force have sailed, 4th-6th dates Inc.
6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed. (4th to 6th)
7. All aircraft carriers have sailed. (4th to 6th)

2. *Signal*

— light in Lanikai beach house at night ———.

One light from 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "1". From 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "2". The below signals until midnight, in order to indicate 3 and 4. Two lights, according to the time, indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

When not in accordance with (lights) above 1 full automobile headlight and one half light indicate 1, 2, 3, 4. Two full lights indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 am until noon every hour 1 piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates 1, 2, 3, 4. Two pieces linen cloth indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

3. In Lanikai bay during daytime in front of harbor (Offing) a star boat with one star on sail indicates 1, 2, 3, 4; a star and "III" indicates 5, 6, 7, 8.

4. Light in dormer window of — house from 7pm to 1 am every hour indicates 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

5. "KGMB Want Ads" advertisements 9.45 am

(A) A chinese rug etc., for sale—apply P. O. box 1476 indicates 3 or 6.

(B) A complete chicken farm etc., apply as above indicates 4 or 7.

(C) Beauty operator wanted—same—indicates 5 or 8.

In the event that in accordance with one of 3 items written above from Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located between the lower road six miles north of KULA Sanatorium and Haleskala road which can be watch from the sea to the south west and south east of Maui, until the receipt of the signal "EXEX" this (the following) will be repeated for several days: A small fire on the high peak.

7 pm—8 pm indicates 3 or 6; 8 pm—9 pm indicates 4 or 7.

9 pm—10 pm indicates 5 or 8.

Extract from O. N. I. report dated 9 December 1941; Subject, Report of activities, Maui, Lanai and Molokai, since 7 December 1941.

"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December 1941, at about 2045, while he was spending the night at the Kula Sanatorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was telephoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing of a light in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr. Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person flashing this light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room in the hospital in the Kula Sanatorium occupied by SHIGEO FURUKAWA, who is subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will be noted that HAMADA and MATSUDA who visited FURUKAWA recently at Kula (DIO-Z/3-#3), have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the incident and have also been given all information available here, in regard to FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action. Following our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subsequently has made an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of his attempted suicide, no military orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien."

From Katsuro MIHO, attorney-at-law, it was learned that the subject is a respected surgeon and considered one of the best physicians in town even among the white doctors. He is also alleged to be a cancer specialist and radium expert.

The subject, MIHO stated has lived in the mainland and London and has been in the Territory for the past 20 years.

Subject has a son ISHIRO, an alien and an aviation engineer, who is now here. A daughter MARIKO, a student at the University of Hawaii is married to Daino SUMIDA'S adopted son and heir.

Dr. SAKAMAKI states that Sumida's son got married to avoid the draft. Subject's wife is now alleged to be in Japan.

RICHARD MILLER.

12-12-41.

ONI and FBI to send agents to Lanikai and Kalama to stay there and find out all possible information. Each to send two or more agents. No communication by phone, only by one man coming in by automobile. These groups to communicate with each other—How? How communicate with Army?

MID watch for (1) display of lights, (2) display of cloths (3) Star sail boat.

Army to send plane to Maui with the information. Get Adelson and Hansen on job with Army about house on Haleakala.

MEMO TO SAC

11:30 a. m., December 17, 1941

Re: John Waterhouse House at Kailua

Mr. George Moody, of Grossman-Moody, reports that on returning from horse-back rides almost any Wednesday, Saturday, or Sunday afternoon he would notice as many as sixty or seventy Japanese in the Waterhouse house. The servants at this house very seldom had the owners come down and they are also said to have been raising pigeons. Mr. Moody was certain that this house had dormer windows.

R. A. COOKE, Jr.

HONOLULU, T. H.

Dec. 12, 1941.

Memorandum to the sac:

Dr. Tokue TAKAHASHI

1385 Alewa Drive

95 N. Vineyard St.

Louis KAHANAMOKU, Sheriff's Office came in two nights ago and furnished information on the subject.

He stated that about a year ago he rented a house from the subject on Liholiho St. Soon after he rented the house, the subject asked him to take a group of Japanese Naval Personnel out on a canoe ride. He also told KAHANAMOKU that he had to entertain the Navy men at his home that evening.

KAHANAMOKU stated that this incident took place about a year ago upon the visit here of a Japanese Training ship.

The subject's home on Alewa Heights commands a full view of Pearl Harbor. KAHANAMOKU further stated that the subject is interested in sailing and owns a sailing boat.

Upon checking at the Ala Moana Basin, William NELSON, in charge of the Basin informed that the subject bought a second-hand 38 foot yacht, a very sea-worthy craft about three years ago. This boat was sold to Dr. Louis GASPAR by the subject about three months ago.

According to NELSON, the subject was a poor sailor and had a couple of Japanese boys to help him operate the boat whenever he went out.

Extract, Army & Navy Register, 7/8/39.

THE SPY GAME

In the military and naval intelligence service spies are classified as: (1) Stationary agents; (2) mobile agents; and (3) special agents.

The stationary agent has a mission assigned to him to secure information on a specified subject. He established himself in a place conveniently located and generally engages in a small business enterprise to serve as a cloak for his operations. A cafe or restaurant has been found to be one of the best screens, for by serving better food at lower prices he can eventually attract and make friends with people who may unwittingly, or wittingly, for a price, provide him with the information which he seeks. This information he pieces together to attain his final ends. Again these stationary agents may find employment in hotels and clubs, where they come in contacts with guests and members in a casual way and pick up bits of information. Here they also have access to baggage in the absence of its owners and may examine into it. They may also find employment in Governmental or industrial plants which are engaged in the manufacture of war material and thus gain information which they are charged to obtain. Many of these stationary agents are women and they are characterized as the most dangerous of all. This is evidenced by the reappearance in our own Navy Department of a war time warning against them—a sign which reads:

"Beware of female spies. Women are being employed by the enemy to secure information from Navy men, on the theory that they are less liable to be suspected than male spies. Beware of inquisitive women, as well as prying men."

Stationary agents are also employed as "letter boxes." These maintain a permanent address where mail to the other spies operating in the district may be addressed, be received and cleared to them.

The mobile agents operate under the guise of tourists, travelers, students or traveling salesmen. There are thousands of them all over the world. They assume the status which is best likely to permit them to accomplish their mission.

The reports of this gentry are pieced together by experts and an accurate picture of certain situations reported upon may be gained.

Special agents are employed on special missions, where more or less skill is required. They are used principally in times of international tension and political crises. Hundreds of them were used in Austria before that country was taken over and in Czechoslovakia during the Sudeten crises, as well as later when that republic was broken up and dismembered. They have been used in the Polish Corridor for months and are now paving the way for a Danzig coup.

All of the great democratic nations are today passing on to their nationals who are employed in activities connected with the national defense, directly or remotely, the warning which France impressed upon her whole body politic during the World War: "Keep your mouths shut. Be on your guard. The ears of the enemy are listening to you."

HUI181SN SCDE TOKYO 24 JG 4 816P

RIYOJI HONOLULU

01260 KOKOK UVUBA WWAYY IUIQO PETJJ UMNH IAHOO GAUEY
VYTIN DYKIE SVSEF BAUGL EFRAU ALDAI DHIYO MEYHE ATLIE
LBUOL EIELI AWBUB

TOGO

HUI187SN SCDE TOKYO 30 JG 4 905PM

RIYOJI

HONOLULU

SIKYU 92466 GOGOG PJVEU VUUIY UDFJG OUEAI JYPGB SUUPX SEEVF
IOCAA ATTHA OTYVA GUUOO GWWDZ AUAUH SUIYD LLAHI ARRLO
HEOIA QVEDE TLFGR YATAM EUEXA XWDEI PIDCO TGOOX

TOGO

HU301 CB SCDE TOKIO 18 JG 6 648P

RIYOJI

HONOLULU

SIKYU 01280 KEKEK OQUCQ SNAII UOIUB DDJIY HRBJI EEUGO
CHVWO DAANJ OJJKV UUAKEH UYDSU QSORO

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TOGO

CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT No. 3

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets I through K.

- a. Army Contact Office memorandum for Colonel Ricknall dated 7 October 1911 re Japanese Arrival In and Departure from Honolulu on Taiyo Maru.
- b. M.I.D., Washington, Letter of transmittal dated 28 August 1911, w/letter dated 8 August 1911 from George Paian to President Roosevelt re Japanese in Hawaii; summary of information dated 20 September 1911 re letter, and H.H.D. letter dated 20 September 1911 to G-2, 2nd Corps Area (reply thereto attached).
- c. M.I.D., Washington, letter of transmittal dated 16 September 1911, w/letter from M.I.D. Summary of Information re Alleged exodus of Japanese.
- d. Inter-staff routing slip dated August 1911, w/letter from Admiral Bloch to General Short dated 25 July 1911.
- e. Inter-staff routing slip dated June 1911 re Unknown Subjects, Book entitled "Three-Power Alliance and American-Japan War" by Kinosaki Matsuo, w/note attached.
- f. Inter-staff routing slip dated June 1911 re Small Japanese Submarines reported to be concealed in Shallow Water near Molokai, w/G-2, H.H.D. letter of transmittal dated 25 July 1911 re Activities of Foreigners in Country—Mexico.